


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
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THE THINGS MEN FIGHT FOR

WITH SOME APPLICATION TO
PRESENT CONDITIONS IN EUROPE

BY



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AUTHOR'S PREFACE

I have written this book because I could not help it. No professional or other necessity calls me away from the tranquil field of art into the turmoil of modern strife. But who does not scorn tranquillity in a time like this? Into this titanic struggle my heart enters with all the passionate sympathy of which it is capable. Were I young and free to follow the heart's behests, I should long ago have found my place in the trenches or in a soldier's grave. I know what my colours would be.

But I am neither young nor free, and my lot is cast with a people who, although all unwittingly in the storm centre, has another and a more difficult task. It is theirs to awake to the fact that their isolation is gone forever, theirs to accustom themselves to the strange consciousness, half irksome and half exhilarating, of contact with growing peoples, theirs to learn the laws of growth and the logic of its inevitable pressure. As the chief custodian of the world's future peace, we must understand the nature of war. We shall not bridle its violence so long as we see in it only the tyranny of monarchs or the caprice of naughty nations. It is folly to parley with protoplasm. It is wicked to malign the intelligence and the integrity of peoples.

Can I contribute ever so little to that deeper in-

sight and juster judgment which shall save our people from criminal confidence and from fool's errands across the sea? A single fact encourages me to make the attempt. I am more or less familiar with every country now at war except Servia. I was for some years a resident in Paris, and a like period in Berlin. I have mingled with the crowds in their thoroughfares, studied in their universities, learned their speech and made friends within their gates. I know the byways of Britain from Dover to Aberdeen. I have seen the shrines of the Moslem and the minarets of Stamboul, and have travelled through the empire of the Czars from the Caucasus to the Baltic and the far eastern sea. Italy I know better than I know my own country, and Greece is my Holy Land. I have found shelter in the homes of Nippon, and looked down from the Black Mountain of Montenegro. And I know that these folk are human, men of like passions and like virtues with ourselves. As I have their case from their own lips I have been compelled to recognise the inexorableness of the destiny that confronts them. The wanton selfishness and unprovoked aggression of their policy, the cunning deception of their leaders and the stupid delusion of the led, all this of which we hear so much at home, has a far away and unreal sound to one in whose ears still linger the accents of these human voices. To such an one it is easy to accept the premise which is fundamental to our inquiry. All peoples are serious and sincere, and their governments as well. There is probably not a monarch in Europe who would not surrender his throne in the interests

of his people. It is doubtful if there is one who does not understand better than we what those interests are. Every nation in the present war has its case, a case which it need not be afraid to present before the bar of humanity. Each has done the only thing that it could do, as judged by the standards which we habitually apply to our own national conduct. Any other assumption than this would be supremely unplausible; any other would be highly unjust. This assumption must be our working hypothesis. The passions of partisanship will not teach us the lessons of the war.

Can I, feeling these passions to the full, hold them in abeyance, and give each of these peoples its due? Such is my contract with the reader. What will be his contract with me? Will he listen patiently, even though righteous indignation ebbs, and the fervid glow of partisanship fades into the dull grey of commonplace justice? Or will he throw the book aside, impatient of one who thus gives aid and comfort to the enemy? With the few who continue to the end I hope to join in a confession of faith.

THE THINGS MEN FIGHT FOR ? — !



THE THINGS MEN FIGHT FOR

CHAPTER I

THE TANGIBLE THINGS

THE great war in Europe is now advanced into its second year. The surprise and consternation which it at first occasioned has now passed. It has become a matter of course, and looked at more calmly and in longer perspective, it seems more clearly a thing that had to be, an inevitable result of forces slowly gathered and organised through many decades. To the more philosophically minded this war, despite its magnitude, is slowly slipping into its place as merely one of a long series, fought on much the same ground and by much the same peoples, ever since history first lifted the curtain from this part of the world. It is even possible that the series is not finished, that the approaching settlement will leave some or all of the parties dissatisfied, and that peace will again be only a truce to be broken at a convenient season. Indeed, how can the settlement be satisfactory when one party declares that its fundamental demand is control of the sea, and the other just as positively insists that there can be no peace until that control is broken? Certainly one of these parties must be disappointed, possibly both. Conflict of interest is equally positive

on other points. Neither party can brook the success of the other, and both will resent a compromise which holds the prize beyond their grasp. Try as we may in the intervals of truce to moderate these conflicting ambitions, it is not clear that even a sullen acquiescence can be permanently secured. Slowly the conclusion is forced upon us that this may not be — that it probably is not — the last great war. Before us, as behind, extends the devastating trail of war, until it fades on the horizon of vision beyond which history and prophecy are alike unable to penetrate.

As our thoughts have thus unconsciously turned from *the* war in Europe to the greater fact of war in Europe, the whole centre of interest has shifted. A year ago the whole world was busy reading blue books and white books and orange books, and so on through all the colours of the spectrum. Whole pages in our daily papers were devoted to legal analyses of their contents with a view to convicting the diplomats of one group or the other of conspiracy and duplicity in the negotiations preceding the outbreak of war, and so of fastening upon them the responsibility for its horrors. More popularly, the monarchs of the warring states were the objects of interest and inquiry, those who have loved the limelight coming in for a preposterous share of popular interest and condemnation. To-day a lawyer's analysis of diplomatic correspondence would hardly find readers, while the most observed of monarchs is scarcely mentioned for months at a time. With the consciousness that war in Europe is a recurring rather than an isolated phenomenon — that it is a European habit, so to

speaking, rather than an accident — there naturally comes the realisation that it is due to longstanding causes, and that diplomats and monarchs have been its agents, rather than its responsible originators. Hence there is less talk about banishing the Kaiser to St. Helena, as a means of insuring peace. Other panaceas, like the abolition of secret diplomacy, the settlement of boundaries by popular vote, and the like, are far less confidently urged than a year ago. There is a growing consciousness that the causes of this perennial warfare in Europe are not to be found in the mere surface froth of human volition, and it is hopeless to look there for a cure.

The writer of these pages offers no panacea for the appalling evils of war. Such suggestions as he is able to offer looking toward the amelioration of human misery in this connection are of the most modest character, and are at best of remote and gradual efficacy. Long before the question "What is the cure?" must come the question, "What is the matter?" The sufferer may be impatient at the time spent in this preliminary inquiry. He wants relief. But it is quite clear that he must be patient if he would be cured — had better be patient even if it proves that he cannot be cured. During the past year the great sufferer has learned much of this patience. We can therefore more hopefully ask, what is the matter, than we could a year ago.

Even this inquiry must be greatly narrowed to bring it within the compass of one moderate volume. It is clear, for instance, that this, like other human ills, is due to ignorance and selfishness. If we fix

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our attention upon these causes, and trace them in their special forms and concrete applications, we can easily persuade ourselves that these are the sole causes of war, and that enlightenment and broadened interest in humanity are the only cure. There is abundant truth in this assumption to justify any possible effort at amelioration along these lines. The unwearying effort to extend the scope of arbitration and to promote friendship and community of interest among nations deserves the heartiest encouragement and support of all well-wishers of humanity, and despite the appalling scope of the present war there is much to encourage the friends of this cause. We are aghast that a single group can put ten million soldiers under arms, but is it not significant that so large a part of mankind can make common cause? Even concede that this community of action is due to the pressure of a common danger, and that it cannot be relied upon to outlive the present situation, it still means much that so large a number of men have seen this common danger and have been able to lay aside old jealousies and make mutual sacrifices to avert it. And this community of action did not begin with the war, and is not likely to end with it. Look at a map of France in the twelfth century, or of Germany even in the early nineteenth century, and see if men have made no progress toward cohesion and regular community of action. It is just because men have so greatly widened their horizon and have developed so much community of action, that these latter-day conflicts are so terrible. By all means let the process of enlightenment go on. If certain of these

efforts come in for disparaging criticism in this book, it is not because they are wrong in principle but because they are shortsighted and fatuous, as all such efforts may be. The chief remedy — perhaps we may say the only remedy — for ills that flesh is heir to, is to be found in the increased intelligence and forbearance of men.

But it is not the psychological or moral factor in the problem that it is here proposed to consider. We are concerned rather with the other side of the problem, the environment in which man finds himself, its characteristics and eccentricities, and the trouble that they make. For purposes of present discussion we will assume that men are a constant quantity, permanently endowed with the same limited intelligence, the same ideals, the same resentments and suspicions. This, of course, is not quite true, though it is perhaps nearer true than the sanguine reformer is wont to think. There are always those who try to hitch the car of urgent reforms to the slow moving force of human evolution, as Mark Twain tried to ride down to Grindelwald on a glacier. They are right in a way. The glacier really does move, and perhaps quite in the direction assumed, but as an agency in transportation it is likely to be disappointing. The practical man or movement will reckon with the glacier pretty much as a fixture. ✓

But whether men change little or much, we must eliminate this factor if we are to isolate our problem. This is the invariable procedure in all scientific inquiry. We merely dissipate our energy and evade the issue, if each time our inquiry gives us a hard

nut to crack, we go off on a tangent and say: "If all men would obey the golden rule there would be no difficulty." There is grave reason to fear that all men will not obey the golden rule for a long time to come, no matter what our insistence upon it. And if they did, is it quite clear that there would be no difficulties, no problems, to solve? Is it not probable, rather, that stubborn facts of situation and environment have much to do with men's failure to obey the golden rule? Be that as it may, it is these facts of environment which we have set ourselves to investigate, and in our investigation we shall take men as they are, finite in intelligence, selfish and suspicious, rarely capable of viewing their interests broadly, or of subordinating present to future good, yet dreamers withal, and seldom long free from the spell of conscience and generous ideals. It is with no disparagement of these ideals or denial of man's higher destiny, that we assume for convenience of analysis that for a considerable time men will continue to feel toward their neighbours and rivals much as they have felt, and that they will judge their own and rival interests by the familiar standards. Measure this period by decades or by centuries, as sanguine or sober temperament may dictate, it is the reality just now, and it is both legitimate and useful to study the problems which this reality presents. If our study discloses the fact that there are certain very real things which the nations are fighting about, things which with all intelligence and good-will must still involve serious hardship to one or another of the group, we shall at least have contributed something to that

intelligence which the idealist invokes as the solution of the problem, and we shall have aided the task of forbearance and good-will by a better understanding of the burden that is laid upon them.

What do nations fight for? Or, more definitely, what may a nation fight for, with a fair prospect of commanding the sympathy and approval of disinterested men? What, in a word, may be fairly accounted as just causes of war?

→ Defence of its own soil must undoubtedly come first. No doubt there are times when the invasion of a nation's territory has a large measure of justification, as the result of long continued unneighbourliness and provocative acts, but the nation that takes the initiative in such an invasion assumes a heavy responsibility and must usually expect but grudging sympathy from a jealous world. The sanctity of territory is a solemn tenet of our political philosophy, akin to the sanctity of life in individual relations, and to repel invasion is as well recognised a right as the right of individual self-defence. Even if a nation has forfeited the sympathy of the world, and the right of the invader is grudgingly conceded, it never forfeits the right of self-defence, and the duty of its citizens to rally to its defence is never questioned. So firmly established is this principle of national self-defence that even the most confirmed pacifists usually freely concede it. No considerable body of men in the world has pronounced more emphatically against war than the various bodies of socialists in Europe, and yet they have always declared in favour of a war in defence of national territory (and "honour," the

latter a vague category of grave potentiality, as we shall have occasion to learn). So obviously justified is the principle of defence that pacifists have usually thought this the place to draw the line. If all nations could be brought to recognise the principle of defence as the only justification of war, obviously there would be no war, for no one would be the aggressor, and so there would nowhere be the need of defence.

But, like most principles, the application is not so simple. The well known revision of the golden rule, *do the man that would like to do you*, and do him first, is obviously sound as a principle of war, and under this principle aggression may easily be justified as good defensive tactics. In fact, it almost invariably is so justified by the aggressor, who is not insensible to the strength of the defender's plea, and as any war is usually preceded by menace, invasion can always be construed with some degree of plausibility as a defensive act. It is interesting to note that in the present conflict, however clearly the outside world makes out its case of aggression, the socialists and other pacifists in each nation seem to have been fully persuaded that their own nation is fighting a defensive war.

→ Closely akin to the foregoing is the necessity often laid upon a nation of seizing territory adjacent to its boundaries in the interest of a more defensible frontier. The logic of such a procedure is less recognised, but it is quite inexorable. The man who repels a robber in his own house, is not more obviously within his rights than the man who puts a lock upon

his front door. The latter is simply more prudent. Unfortunately, in the case of a nation's household, the lock is the work of nature and can usually be secured only at the expense of a neighbour. A cartoon of 1871 represents the French peace envoys as protesting against Bismarck's demand for the surrender of Strassburg and Metz. "Strassburg! Why, that is the key to France." "Certainly, and it shall remain so; only we will lock the door from the other side," was the chancellor's reply. This was undoubtedly the chief motive for the annexation of these two mountainous border provinces. The recent seizure of the Khyber Pass by the British, to assure the defence of northern India is another instance.

It is plain that the principle of defence, thus construed, is transmuted completely into the principle of aggression. Yet its motive may be wholly that of defence, as in the case of the Khyber Pass above mentioned, and the justification fully accorded to the principle of defence may be claimed for strategic aggressions of this sort, with much plausibility. For the pacifist to insist upon the maintenance of an indefensible frontier, it may be argued, is to invite war and also to insure defeat. Placed thus in the uncomfortable position of seeming to favour war, the pacifist is compelled either to admit a much broader justification of war, or to deny it any justification whatever, even the most obvious right of self-defence. When events thus put vague beliefs to the test, the immense majority of men recognise the broader justification of war, seeing in offence or defence only a question of tactics, and stand shoulder to shoulder,

pacifist and coercionist alike, in defence of their common heritage. If the German socialists can, with practical unanimity, recognise the German rôle in the present war as a purely defensive one — as they honestly do and can — there is little to hope from limiting war to the defensive. Aggression, indeed, is little more than a name for defence, as seen from the other side.

Quite distinct from the defence of territory, yet indissolubly bound up with it, is the defence of independence. The freedom to choose one's own course of action is the very essence of nationality, as it is of manhood, and encroachment upon it is a subtle attack upon national existence. Nothing is more insidious than for a nation to form the habit of yielding to argument or pressure from a powerful neighbour. The essence of freedom may thus entirely disappear, while the semblance of independence remains as a deceptive mask. When the king of Syria, on his way to attack the king of Egypt, yielded to the advice of a Roman legate to return home and abandon the campaign, we are prepared for the unnoticed transformation of Syria a little later into a Roman province. It is a sound instinct which impels men everywhere to resent interference with their national freedom of action, even though the guidance proffered be reasonable and considerate. This is the → essence of the vaguely defined term national honour.

Men who prize the privilege of choice in their individual lives can hardly deny the validity of the principle as applied to the collective life of men.

But the right, though indisputable, is again difficult of application. Matters between citizen and citizen, or between the citizen and his own state, are usually willingly left to the state in question, though the right of neighbouring Mexico to maintain anarchy on our borders, and even the right of far-away Turkey to massacre her Armenians, is not fully conceded. But outside of the home circle lies the broad circle of international relations, where interests are sure to conflict, and where complete liberty of action for any one nation is clearly impossible. To adjust the frontiers of privilege is more difficult than to adjust the frontiers of territory. There is the same manœuvring for position, the same strategy, the effort to forestall and outwit as in the more concrete matter of frontier, and that in a field less concrete, less definable and permanent. It is clear that nations may be in perfect agreement as to their territorial boundaries, and yet find themselves in mortal conflict over questions of privilege and freedom of national action. The pacifist is wont to decry this whole body of interests on account of the conventional use of the word, honour, as its designation. It is easy to cite cases where the appeal to honour has been made on behalf of unjust claims and tyrannical action. None the less the word as used in this connection stands for very real interests, quite as well worth maintaining as those of territory itself.

We will not stop here to consider how far disputes in this field can be settled by other means than war. For the present we are concerned only to note that these interests are very real ones, quite as dear to

men's hearts as the possession of a particular territory, and that men can and do differ much with regard to them. This is one of the things about which wars are fought.

→ Commerce is a prominent interest in modern international conflicts, one more discussed in our day than any other. It is popularly supposed, at present, to be the animating motive in the building of colonial empires, which is so conspicuous a feature of the present age. The justice of this opinion may be questioned, but the importance of commerce as a factor in international relations and a possible cause of war cannot be denied.

→ The commercial motive for acquiring colonies is obvious, if popularly exaggerated. Many of the colonies belonging to European powers were at first nothing but trading posts, with guards to defend the property and life of the alien trader, not at all to control or politically administer the country. But this armed protection involved conflicts with native rule and a necessary increase of authority on the part of the trading company until it ultimately resulted in political rule. India is a well known example of this evolution. The British East India Company, when first it established trading posts in that country, had not the remotest idea that India would one day be a part of the British Empire. To carry on a profitable commerce with the inhabitants and to protect its property and trading posts in a country not always able or willing to afford the needed protection, was their only thought. But all things conspired — their growing wealth, accumulated grievances, and

not least the attacks of other European powers — to develop their military establishment to a point where it aroused the fear and hostility of native rulers. Conquerors in the wars with these rulers, they could not do otherwise than assume the administration of the conquered districts, until at last we have the anomaly of a trading company ruling and administering an empire. This once appreciated, England could not fail to realise the unsuitableness of a trading company for the guardianship of a people's interests, and her assumption of these responsibilities was inevitable. Such was the rôle which commerce unwittingly played for a couple of centuries, both in India and elsewhere, in the building of empires and their incident wars.

All this is at an end, however. There are no territories now in process of evolution toward colonies under the guidance of militant commerce, for the simple reason that no farther areas are available for appropriation in this way. China at one time seemed a possibility, and the presence of fortified outposts of foreign powers, like Hong Kong, Tsingtao, Weihai-wei, and Port Arthur, all in foreign hands, together with the foreign "concessions" of Canton, Shanghai, Tientsin and Hankow, patrolled and guarded by foreign gendarmes, are strongly suggestive of the earlier stages of Indian conquest. But there is little likelihood that the later chapters will follow. Even if China's power to protect herself be doubted, the jealousy of the great powers and their relative equality of position would make such an assimilation impossible. China will probably escape

subjugation. She will in any case never be subdued by a trading company.

But commerce as a cause of war is not therefore dead. Indeed, it sometimes seems to be more active than ever. For whereas commerce was once the handmaid of political power, political power seems now to be the servant of commerce. Never were colonies more prized or more eagerly sought than now. Whether the colony be acquired by deliberate design, or thrust upon us by the most unforeseen accident, it is held with equal tenacity, in full faith that it will contribute to national greatness and power.

It is commonly assumed that the motive for this colonial expansion is commercial advantage, and as such it has been the subject of vigorous controversy. Many volumes have been written to prove that colonies are seldom remunerative, even when acquired, and that they never pay the cost of a war of acquisition. These arguments seem conclusive, and when it is remembered that the rulers of colonies seldom find it practicable to exclude traders of other nations, and that in many cases outsiders are accorded exactly the same privileges as citizens of the ruling nation, we are confronted by the curious and seemingly irrational fact that nations acquire and administer colonies at immense cost, and then share them with rival and even unfriendly nations on terms of complete equality.

It is impossible to reconcile such action on the part of intelligent and practical nations with the theory that commerce is the motive for colonial expansion. As a commercial proposition colonies do not pay. It

is doubtful whether they ever will pay. As commercial propositions they resemble the doings of the gentleman farmer who produces eggs at a dollar apiece. The fact that individuals make money and exert a certain influence on their government to continue the expensive experiment very inadequately explains the unanimity, the positive enthusiasm, with which the expensive colonial luxury is endorsed and maintained.

The fact would seem to be that the motive for acquiring colonies is to be sought rather in a nation's ideals than in the field of material advantage. Two men were once discussing the relative advantages of renting and owning a house. Said the one: "You can make money by renting a house." Replied the other: "I don't own a house to make money. I make money to own a house." The answer was final and complete. Even the most sordid intelligence must recognise that the making of money is not a rational end, but a means to something beyond. In the getting of money there is some degree of agreement. The aim is tangible, and the procedure more or less formulated. The intelligent observer may fairly criticise the participants as "business-like" or the reverse. But when it comes to the spending of money, we usually recognise that there is no accounting for taste. The final good which lies beyond money, and for which money is, is too intangible and too varied to permit of formulation or criticism. The lover of fine horses will find it inexplicable that a man should pay hundreds of thousands for shabby relics of the old masters, but he seldom challenges the legitimacy of the expenditure, knowing that to another his own

choice is equally inexplicable. But both agree that their money is for something beyond itself. Disparage each other's choice as they will, they would both join in a far deeper contempt for the miser with whom money was an end.

→ It is an amazing fact that while all men recognise the existence of a realm of intangible, ideal interests toward which all individual effort justly tends, they often assume that nations have only material and concrete aims. To put it concretely, nations may help us make money, but they may not help us spend it. National aims must be severely practical. It is rational to own a house on which we lose money, but it is not rational to own a colony on which we lose money. But why not, if our taste is for colonies? Such a taste, with its white man's burden and its enormous expenditure of energy, its perplexities and its dangers, may be inexplicable to those otherwise minded, like the taste for football or classical scholarship or life in the smart set. But judge it as we may, the one completely unreasonable thing is to overlook it. Never is the idealist so mistaken as when he assumes that other men are materialists and without ideals. Nations, like individuals, seek material advantage, not for itself, but for the sake of ideal ends which refuse to give an account of themselves in terms of material things. This national idealism we must consider in its place. For the present it is sufficient to note that commercialism is not the chief motive for colonial expansion. Colonies were formerly acquired unintentionally, as an incident to commercial exploitation. But just as the

nation has relieved the trading company of the burden of their administration, so national idealism has taken from national thrift the burden of their justification. Colonies may not pay, any more than children and many other things that men deem it not irrational to want. And yet nations want colonies just the same, and refuse to be argued out of their desire.

But if the commercial motive is not so prominent in colonial policy as is sometimes assumed, it has acquired new force in another quarter with the development of trade between nations, and in particular of sea-borne commerce. The enormous development of maritime commerce in the last forty years has not only vastly increased the importance of this national interest, but it has quite revised its method and changed its required facilities. With the use of larger vessels and the introduction of new methods for handling freight, former harbours have become inadequate and new ones have risen into sudden prominence. Convenient relation to new rail lines and canals have played their part in the huge commercial readjustment. Considerations of defence have complicated the problem. Old defences are obsolete, and locations chosen long ago are not always suited to new methods of defence. Seas once safe can now be closed by rival powers. Altogether the whole apparatus of commercial and national life needs to be remade, and commerce is insistent upon the acquisition of sites once unnecessary. In particular, it may be accepted that the most urgent demand of every nation is adequate access to the sea. To be denied such access is to be condemned to hopeless inferiority and

backwardness. Industry is strangled, commerce repressed, and even the national intelligence and culture seriously stunted, if the nation is denied access to the highway of the world. Strangely enough, it is the peoples that are best equipped in this respect who are least appreciative of this need in others. The American people have never known what it was to be even moderately circumscribed in this particular. We have harbours to spare, and in at least one case have acquired a whole series of useless harbours that are the natural property and convenience of another nation. With this affluence of commercial facilities, this plethora of outlets into seas that no power can close, we hardly appreciate the position of a power like Austria, with an outlet only at one small corner, and that into waters which her neighbours completely control. We are like the man who said the moon was more useful than the sun, because the moon came in the night when it was dark, and the sun came in the day time, when it was light enough anyway. Sheer surfeit has made us incapable of understanding old world hunger.

The impatient pacifist will here object: "But why can a nation not use a harbour without owning it? Have not the Germans for years shipped through Antwerp, the Swiss through Genoa, the Canadians through Portland? And is not this commerce welcomed and protected?" Undoubtedly, and yet there is an instinct, the outgrowth, it may be, of a troubled past rather than of a wiser present, which refuses to be satisfied with these alien facilities. Would a man build on a lot which had no access to the high-

way? Access might be freely offered across a neighbour's premises, and the relations might be of the best, but prudence would still demur. An element of insecurity would inhere in such an arrangement. To say nothing of the tedious and expensive formalities which seem to be inseparable from all international arrangements of this sort, the sense of security for national interests will not cease to urge the acquisition of whatever may be needful to the rounded equipment of national life.

Here again idealism complicates the calculations of simple commercial expediency. How many a man has bought an additional bit of land which he did not need, and at an exaggerated price, merely to round out his premises and satisfy a vague ideal of trimness and completeness? It might not pay Germany to acquire Antwerp, but even the knowledge of this fact may not prevent her trying to do so. Look at the map and see how obviously nature intended the coastline of Belgium and Holland to be the boundary of Germany. How exasperatingly these severed border provinces with their Germanic population mutilate a natural geographical and political unity. Prove all you like that it isn't worth the price, the German will bid high to thus round out his premises.

→ One more commercial interest deserves brief notice, namely the demand for valuable natural resources, mineral deposits, timber, and the like. One of the motives for annexing Lorraine was the presence of valuable mineral deposits, the exploitation of which has contributed greatly to the recent industrial development of Germany. Productive soil, if not

in the possession of an irremovable population, is also an asset eagerly sought, especially by a people which is multiplying rapidly. These considerations account in large measure for Japan's desire to conquer Korea and thinly settled Manchuria, though strategic considerations of national defence were conspicuously present.

The foregoing are the more concrete and material interests for which wars are fought. Nothing could well be more tangible or concrete than the territory which a people occupies, or the strong posts which insure its control. Independence of action is the very essence of national life, and commercial success the most obvious of material advantages. But real as these interests are, they are probably not the chief causes of war in our time. There is a growing sense that national frontiers are to be respected, and a deepening conviction that territories can not be assimilated if acquired. It is rare, too, that nations interfere with one another's commerce, or refuse to neighbour nations the use of their facilities. No disputes are so capable of amicable settlement as these. Seldom has a nation made so lame a defence as Germany in the present conflict, when she gives as her reason, that England was preparing to annihilate her ocean commerce. Not only has England made no sign of such an intention, but she has given to German ships the same privileges as to her own in every port under the control of the British Parliament. She could do nothing else. The freedom and inviolability of commerce may be accounted one of the substantial gains of modern times, while the sanctity of territorial

boundaries in civilised communities where justice is reasonably administered, is approaching the same recognition. Germany may invade France, but she would hardly think of annexing any part of her territory. These causes of war are passing, as others have passed. What country would now go to war to enforce the claims of dynastic inheritance? What a gain it is that despite the close kinship between the ruling families of England and Germany, no member of either can ever claim the throne of the other!

But while these material considerations are less potent than formerly, and less potent than is popularly supposed, there are other forces which have lost nothing of their potency, have perhaps become even more menacing. It is to these more intangible ideal interests that we must now turn.

CHAPTER II

THE INTANGIBLE THINGS

IN the preceding chapter we have considered some of the more tangible interests that men fight for, independence, territory and commerce. These interests, just because they are more tangible, are wont to seem more real than others. We are very fond, in these days, of arguments drawn from statistics, and are wont to devote much attention to those factors in our problems which can be measured and enumerated. Hence the exaggeration of the importance of commerce as a cause of war, and the confident argument of the peace advocate that war does not pay. Even the popular mind, which can neither use nor altogether follow the argument of statistics, is inclined to emphasise "practical," i.e., material, considerations. When political accident raised our flag over the Philippines, there was forthwith much talk of the commercial and strategic value of our new possessions. Probably not one in fifty of these enthusiasts knew anything about either of these tangible interests, or was affected by them. He believed in the commercial future of the Philippines because he was enthusiastic. He was not enthusiastic because he believed in the commercial future of the Philippines. The enthusiasm came first and the belief aft-

erwards. And yet he expresses his enthusiasm in terms of commerce, or national defence, or missionary opportunity, or other familiar interest, because these things seemed more real to him and to others than did the things that were the real cause of his enthusiasm. We are all of us made that way. We use material interests as counters and signs of the real but elusive and intangible forces that shape our action. It isn't that we wish to deceive ourselves or others, but that we are quite unable to express or measure the subtler ideal forces that play into our lives. We are quite sure that there is some good reason for our enthusiasm over the Philippines, and being unable to lay hands on the intangible forces that really influence us, we lay hold on commerce or other substantial interest, believing without proof, and unconvinced by counter argument.

It is a very superficial judgment of mankind that takes all these disguises seriously, that assumes that because men talk in material terms they are therefore materialists. All men are idealists, though few men can give coherent expression to their own ideals, even to their own consciousness. Men do not make war because it pays, nor will they stop because it doesn't pay. They may talk about commercial advantage and the like, but they are fighting for something else. It is that something else which we have now to consider.

→ Race unity is one of the ideals which exercise large influence over the minds of men. Though often overborne by other considerations, it is never without its appeal, and across boundary lines or within them, it

acts as a constant gravitation, drawing together men of the same race and sundering those of different races. It is rare, perhaps, that a war has been fought solely in the interest of race unity, but seldom is this cause wholly absent. Whatever the occasion of war, the appeal to "redeem our brothers from foreign despotism" is pretty sure to come in somewhere, and is always effectual. The cry of the Italian "forward" party is *Italia irridenta*, unredeemed Italy, which being interpreted is a plea for the annexation of certain Italian-speaking districts in neighbouring countries, notably in Austria. Undoubtedly the Italian statesmen have other and more important purposes in the present conflict, but it can hardly be doubted that this is the popular purpose. It is necessary only to mention Pan-Slavism, Pan-Germanism and others to appreciate the rôle of this ideal in modern political upheavals. Has Pan-Americanism any such dread possibilities?

Looked at more closely, however, race unity is itself a very variable and incoherent fact. What is the criterion of race unity?

Blood relationship is the first suggestion, but inquiry along this line soon gets us into difficulties. Actual kinship of this kind can never be traced far, and when traced is apt to prove the opposite of what is assumed. There are no pure races, and those whose race unity is most apparent — like the ancient Greeks — have always been of very mixed origin. In America we are forming another such race, compounded of almost every human element, but probably destined to become quite as much a unit as any race in history.

Language is a more tangible and undoubtedly a more vital element in race unity. When we recall that the significance of race unity is purely psychological, that it is not actual kinship, but the *feeling* of kinship that counts, it will be apparent that obscure ethnological data like the cranial index, and so forth, will have little effect on men's minds, while language, a characteristic emphasised by every act of social intercourse, must be all potent. The unredeemed Italians who excite the popular fervour of Italian patriotism are largely Teutonic or Slavic in blood, but then, so are the Lombards of Milan, whose features still often recall their Germanic origin, and the same is true of large parts of the population in every part of Italy. After all, it is the Italian language that makes men Italians, far more than any fact of origin.

Yet it must be remembered that community of language usually leads to a popular conviction of community of origin, often with momentous consequences. The modern Greeks are certainly largely Slavic in origin — some have even claimed that they are wholly so — but they *believe* themselves to be descended from the glorious ancestry of ancient Greece, and are tenaciously attached to its traditions. Their only reason for this belief is the fact that they speak Greek and were born in Greek territory. Similarly the Rumanians believe themselves to be descended from Roman colonists sent to the East by Trajan, and hence closely related to the Italians and French, the ground of their belief being that they speak a language derived from Latin. They doubtless have very little Roman blood, but that does not make their belief

less potent. Both Greece and Rumania are largely influenced by this assumed ancestry.

But while community of speech is pretty nearly equivalent to race unity, it will not always obscure outward and conspicuous evidences of race origin. The negroes of the United States speak the English language, but no mastery of that tongue will create in them or the whites the feeling of community of origin. Community of speech remains, in such cases, merely community of speech, unsupported by any of these pleasing fictions of brotherhood which weld the parts of remote but more similar races into a coherent people. Even so, the community of language as a cohesive force is enormous, but it is not race unity.

It will occur to the thoughtful reader that community in other things than language may suggest the fact of kinship and so become a factor in race unity. It is related in Japanese legend that when the founder of the present dynasty carried his conquering arms into a distant province he was ultimately recognised as the kin of the reigning family because of the similarity of his weapons to those there in use. Similarity of any sort counts in the same way. One other factor is of sufficient importance to warrant brief consideration, namely, religion.

→ Religion has undoubtedly lost much of its importance in recent times as a political factor. Its ancient rôle, however, was very important. This will be more apparent if we recall the fact that nations were once supposed to be of divine origin and essentially religious in character. All adherents of the national religion (and all religions were national) therefore

logically belonged to the nation with which that religion was identified. Membership in the one as in the other was normally a matter of birth, though adoption, a far more serious thing than its modern counterpart, might, by the aid of religion, establish a real relationship which, in its obligations, its sentiments, and its all important recognition by the unseen powers, was identical with kinship of blood.

It is easy to see how a religion which held men in awe, and which had not only the right to sanction but the power to create the closest bonds between men, constantly held the fate of peace or war in its hand. A disrupted people would still be united by the consciousness of a common faith. Conquered territories were never secure if they held the shrines of the conquered. Religious conflicts would make political union difficult or impossible. Witness the crusades, the sacred wars of Islam, the religious obstacles to a united Ireland. Fellowship in religion has too often resulted in fierce conflicts between those otherwise akin, and at times in strange unions of those otherwise dissimilar.

It is a truism that the rallying power of religion in war has greatly diminished. No religion could to-day organise a crusade. More than once in our time the acknowledged head of the Moslem world has unfurled the prophet's banner in vain. Despite the pleas of the Vatican, the Catholic world has not rebuked Italy for despoiling the Church. Bulgaria in alliance with Moslem Turkey is warring against Servia, a nation of the same faith as her own. Strangest of all, the great war witnesses Catholic and

Protestant allies lined up against their counterparts, and in defence of Greek orthodox Russia, who is at war with Greek orthodox Bulgaria, while Mohammedan Turks are opposed by Mohammedans from India and Algeria, and Orangemen and Nationalists fight side by side to keep Ireland British. There could hardly be a better illustration of the utter refusal of men to be swayed by religious considerations.

→ Yet religion still counts, and under favouring conditions may turn the scale. The policy of the British Empire has been much influenced by the religious sensitiveness of Indian Mohammedans, and the religious animosities of Catholic and Protestant in Ireland not only brought that country to the verge of civil war, but were largely responsible for the confident expectation of British neutrality which led the Central Powers to precipitate the present war. Decidedly, the power of religion as a war maker and political factor has waned, but he would be a careless statesman who should ignore it in his calculations.

One great ideal interest remains, the recognition of which is vital to the success of our inquiry. It is complex and intangible, difficult to define or name, and in its present aspect it is comparatively modern.

→ In default of a better name we may call it nationality. Under its influence men do not think of the nation as a means of advancing commerce or defending their possessions or even of uniting their race, but rather as a good in itself, a thing whose majesty and power they love to contemplate, even in so slight a matter as their particular colour on the map. Indeed, nationality will often brush commercial interests quite

aside, will curtail independence, and will stride away over race boundaries under certain conditions quite without hesitation. It is futile to protest that nation building under these circumstances does not pay. Nationality itself is its own reward. Like the householder, we do not build the nation to make money; we make money to build the nation.

If we try to analyse this object of our affection, we are as much embarrassed as we should be to explain our friendships or our tastes. Why do we think so much of our children? Hardly because of their superlative excellence. They can not all be exceptionally admirable. Yet no one thinks our fondness absurd or profitless. Likewise our love for the nation. It is not at all an abstraction. On the contrary, our affection attaches to a multitude of concrete things, the most of them utterly inconsequential, but the aggregate all compelling.

The writer was once introduced by a vivacious young woman and former travel acquaintance as one who "has travelled all over the world and who actually asserts that French coffee is fit to drink." He was moved to reply: "My dear young woman, do you know that is just what those soldiers are fighting about over on the banks of the Aisne?" This hyperbole was justified by an incident of trench life reported about that time. A German cook, missing his way in the dense fog, stumbled with his steaming coffee pot into a French trench, and the narrator concluded his story with the words: "We drank his vile juice and kicked him out." Other people's coffee is not like ours, but we never phrase it that way. Other people's

coffee is "vile juice." Only our kind is "fit to drink." And what is true of coffee is true of thousands of other things, large and small, most of them quite as inconsequential as coffee, and preferred for reasons quite as arbitrary. But, taken all together, these multitudinous arbitrary things make up the substance of our lives, our bodies, so to speak, in which alone our spirits can be housed. Among people who make our kind of coffee and do all the other things in our way, we feel at home; we are in "God's country." We may recognise that these preferences are based on ignorance, that fuller knowledge, indeed, would quite revise our judgments, but the comfort of our wonted environment, and the extreme disagreeableness of readjustment are such that our feelings get little benefit from our intellectual concessions. "Their way may be all right, but, ugh! none of it for me!" Something like that would be the average attitude. If out of the heart are the issues of life, it is not difficult to see what that issue will be.

All this is quite condemned by ordinary logic and quite justified by the deeper principles of race evolution. The sum of these items, small and large, make up a nation's character, just as the sum of a person's habits and traits make up his individuality. Looked at objectively, this is what we of the English speech call civilisation, and the Germans *Kultur* (a word not to be confounded with culture). No doubt there is a difference in civilisations, just as there is in biological organisms, some being better fitted to survive than others, but with these differences our preferences have nothing whatsoever to do. It is perfectly

right for us to prefer our own civilisation, but that preference quite disqualifies us to sit on the jury that is to judge its merits. It is not for us to say whether French coffee is fit to drink, but we may say whether we care to drink it. There is only one arbiter. In the long run the superior civilisation will grow at the expense of the inferior. If the other kind of coffee comes out ahead, never mind. We shall not be here then, and those who are here will think it fit to drink.

But while our preference is not due to the superiority of our civilisation, the superiority of our civilisation is largely due to our preference. The most ideal civilisation would die if its devotees did not passionately prefer it, just as the most perfect species of animal would perish if it did not cherish and protect its young with unreasoning devotion. Hence our unreasonable preferences as measured by the inherent quality of things, are justified as the only thing that can give our way of life a fighting chance in the great struggle for survival. Cosmopolitanism is a very rational attitude, but it would take very little of it to unnerve a civilisation. And while most of the things that we thus jealously guard are as inconsequential as our coffee, and their superiority as doubtful, it must not be forgotten that within the sheltering fold of our national prejudice many an idea and principle of action of real value to the race survives through tender years till growth and achievement secure general recognition.

But nationality, it will be objected, is not the same thing as civilisation. It may even be claimed that

they are not close counterparts, and that the one is little else than an impostor, falsely claiming to be the guardian of the other. One writer goes so far as to claim that nationality is nothing but an administrative convenience, that it represents no matter of vital importance to men, and that we may well be indifferent to its divisions and frontiers. A Briton, it is argued, may legitimately desire the extension of British civilisation, but the extension of the British Empire is a wholly different thing. But is it a wholly different thing? A different thing, no doubt, but not an unrelated or independent thing. The nation is, in fact, an outward, concrete expression of the individual civilisation, by means of which that civilisation acts with tremendous additional efficiency. A national civilisation bears the same relation to a non-national civilisation that a modern army does to a horde of unorganised soldiers. The great fighting mechanism, in which individual units are scarcely more discernible than cells in our body tissue, sweeps the unorganised mass before it like so many sheep. Whether for purposes of peaceful achievement or militant assertion, the civilisation that has not acquired this organ of nationality is doomed, and that increasingly. Witness the case of the Jews. They do not lack personality, and their civilisation has profoundly affected the world. Their personal power has not lessened. But their civilisation, deprived of national expression, has disappeared. There are German Jews, British Jews, French Jews, all sorts of hyphenated Jews, each ready to fight for the civilisation that is distinctively his own. There can be no doubt that the greatest

civilisation in the world would suffer the same fate if deprived of this organ of national expression. That it would contribute greatly to surviving civilisations in the course of its elimination is a consolation but not a compensation. The lamb, under similar circumstances, contributes undeniably to the substance and efficiency of the lion, but may reasonably prefer to remain a lamb.

There is nothing new in this relation of nationality to civilisation, but it has clearly acquired new importance. No matter to what school of thought we turn or what political phenomenon we contemplate, the growing importance of nationality is apparent. It is a cardinal principle of socialism and near-socialism, as of imperialism and all growing schools of thought. The old doctrine that that government is best which governs least nowhere finds a defender. Little governed states like China are developing the new much-governing mechanism with all haste. Everywhere we witness the steady transfer of functions from the individual to the state. Under such circumstances there is an ever lessening chance that a civilisation that is not equipped with the organ of nationality can preserve its distinctive characteristics, can survive as a civilisation.


The newest thing of all in this connection is the fact that men have waked up to this fact of dependence. The last hundred years is in nothing so remarkable as in the revived consciousness of nationality. It is not so very long since Portugal seriously considered uniting with Spain, as territorial and racial considerations alike recommend. But although no

war or other untoward incident has since estranged these peoples, the consciousness of nationality as an exponent of civilisation has completely reversed this tendency, and no suggestion could be now more offensive to the Portuguese than the surrender or compromise of their nationality. In the same period Norway has severed her connection with Sweden, equally without special occasion, while suppressed nationalities like the Balkan states and the component elements of Austria-Hungary, even Egypt and India, have felt the intoxication of the new consciousness. It is folly to urge that there is no substantial good in this world passion; that nationality doesn't pay. None of us know enough to know whether it pays or not. And besides, our civilisation as incarnated in and energised by nationality is a final term. To argue that it doesn't pay is like arguing that children do not pay. Our argument will not be refuted; it will only be laughed at and scorned.

Recognising the great and unchallengeable position of nationality among the mental forces that shape men's conduct, it is easy to see its relation to war. In the first place, the conviction is easy and in a measure justified, that to extend the domain of our nationality is to extend the domain of our civilisation. The extension is accompanied by something of deterioration, no doubt, but a real extension, none the less. India is not England, but India is British in something more than a political sense, and must become so increasingly as the relation continues. Does any one doubt that Roman civilisation in some very real sense was established in Gaul as the result of Cæsar's conquest, and

that it has profoundly influenced the subsequent history of that country? The conquests of Alexander are a still more striking example of the influence of political arrangements on the course of civilisation. If it be said that in all these cases the civilisation in question would have made its conquests without the extension of political dominion, we need only to recall the difference between Gallic and Germanic civilisation in the days of Tacitus, the persistence of the German language and the disappearance of the Gallic before the Latin, etc. Or finally, we may ask ourselves whether there is any likelihood that India would have assimilated anything like so much of British civilisation, if independent or under the rule of some other power. To ask these questions is to answer them, to the minds of all reasonable persons. Civilisation is not nationality, but the one follows close in the footsteps of the other, and devotion to our own civilisation must inevitably express itself in a tendency toward imperialism. Such a tendency may easily be indiscreet, but it is not ungenerous, not so ungenerous in fact as the stay-at-home conservatism which counsels us to mind our own business and not bother about the white man's burden.

It is apparent that if nationality excites the strong to aggression, it must equally incite the weak to defence. Never a cause so hopeless, never a civilisation so worthless, never a coffee so bad, that it will not find defenders who will accept martyrdom in its behalf. This being the case, it is clear that nationality must often be a cause of war, for it incites the one to attempt what it incites the other to resist.



Never was this opposition more clearly manifest than in the present conflict. Germany-Austria-Hungary, convinced of the possibility and fascinated with the prospect of enlarged domain, Servia battling with the energy of desperation to preserve a national civilisation still in its uncomely fledgling state, and Turkey in noisome decrepitude embracing its moribund civilisation with the convulsive energy of despair, all for what? Just for the privilege of living, of being themselves, and that in the full measure of the possible.

One fact more should be noted in order to complete our inventory of these great forces. Men have become aware of late that civilisations are made and unmade mostly by the quieter forces of peace, and that war is often little more than a spectacular ratification of results already accomplished. On the face of it, it would seem that this should make for peace, but it does not always do so. A nation that finds itself gaining in the peaceful competition is likely to favour its continuance, but the nation that finds itself losing is quite apt to seek in war another chance. Thus, it is contended by Germany that England has fomented this war because she found herself losing to Germany in the field of commercial rivalry. On the other hand it is alleged that German commerce had been developed by government aid and bounties until that policy had reached the breaking point, and that Germany resorted to war to complete a conquest which she was not able to carry through by subsidy. Neither of these claims can be substantiated, but both suggest ways in which the forces of peace may drive nations to war.

→ Far more significant than these, however, is the growing consciousness of growth as the insidious ally of certain nations against others. Why not be content to live as you are, seeking prosperity by peaceful development, and avoiding the ghastly destruction of war, says the peace advocate? To which Germany may well reply: "We will if Russia will stop growing." But let peace continue for a couple of centuries, and what will be the relative status of Germany, Russia, and Britain? Much the same as that of France and Belgium, or Germany and Denmark. Peace may still continue, nay, is likely to continue, as the hopelessness of war becomes more apparent. But the influence of the lesser power will wane, and its civilisation as embodied in the form of nationality, will cease to awe or inspire the minds of men in the measure that the greater nationalities do. Insensibly it will be undermined in its own habitat. Overshadowed and cowed as the civilisation of a lesser people, it will be simply elbowed off the field, even by the most considerate of giant neighbours.

→ The appreciation of the fact that our civilisation is endangered by the insidious forces of peace, by the mere protoplasmic push of forces that are of no man's willing, of no man's ill will, is revolutionary in its influence when it becomes the consciousness of a people, as it recently has of one people at least. To extend the domain of empire before it is too late, with its inevitable sequence of mother tongue and all our kind of things, becomes not wanton aggression, as it might otherwise seem, but mere prudence and patriotic foresight.

40 THE THINGS MEN FIGHT FOR

To what purpose all this, do you ask? To what purpose anything? It is our own country, our way of doing, and we love it, that's all. There is nothing beyond that. How could there be?

CHAPTER III

THE PROBLEM OF THE MEDITERRANEAN

IN the two preceding chapters we have tried to remind ourselves of what men in our day are like and of some of the more constant purposes which govern their action. We have now to turn from abstract principles to concrete problems and see how these principles work out in practice. We will not undertake to consider all the problems which burden the statesmen of our day. We are concerned after all with the general problem rather than with its local manifestations. It will be sufficient for our purpose to examine a few marked examples.

The first thing that strikes us is that most of these problems have to do with the sea. There are questions of land frontier like that between Germany and France, Italy and Austria, but they are of little consequence as compared with the problems of control of the sea. More closely considered, they usually prove to be sea problems in disguise, as notably in the second case above mentioned. Whether or not it be true, as claimed by Captain Mahan, that sea power has been the decisive factor in all the great wars of history, it is surely the decisive factor now, and its influence is rapidly increasing. And the sea is potent in war because it is potent in peace, as the great

burden bearer of the nations who are ever more requisitioning its services. Ocean borne commerce has steadily increased for centuries, and in the last half hundred years the increase has been prodigious. It is not too much to say that any nation, even Switzerland, would suffer and perhaps perish if denied the freedom of the sea.

Hence the great problems of the nations to-day are sea problems, problems of easier access to the sea, of more and better harbours, of larger docks and more commodious warehouses, of ampler and easier railroad feeders, canals, etc. To entice the big steamship lines away from one port to another, to secure lower rates between this port and inland ports, or faster service which shall enable it to deliver letters or goods a few hours earlier than its rival, such are the great victories in the wars of peace. And concurrently, the problem of war is primarily to keep open these ports, to protect these steamship lines and to prevent the strangulation of this life-giving commerce. And the sea is not only the great thing to be defended; it becomes in turn the great defender. Its great ships become the carriers of soldiers and munitions, and metamorphosed for their purpose, they are the most terrible engines of war ever devised by man. To provide for their construction and housing, to protect them from enemies and satisfy their insatiable demands for munitions and supplies, becomes in turn a chief concern of the modern state.

This slow shifting of emphasis from the land to the sea has profoundly modified the science of strategic delimitation. The strategic unit was once a land



unit; it is now a sea unit. The Italian peninsula, walled in to the north by mountains and elsewhere bounded by the sea, was an ideal old-time unit. To-day the Adriatic is the unit. There will be no assured peace as long as rivals dispute its control. After her first war with China, Britain sought to make her commerce in the East secure by acquiring the island of Hong Kong. She later found herself compelled to acquire territory upon the mainland opposite to protect the vitally important waters lying between. In so doing she assumed the unwelcome task of defending a long and artificial land frontier, but this was the lesser risk. After Japan's victory over Russia she demanded the southern part of the island of Saghalien, accepting the very artificial frontier of a parallel of latitude, her purpose being to secure control of La Pérouse Strait lying between. When Greece, in the Balkan Wars, extended her conquest into Epirus, the Powers absolutely refused to allow her to retain part of the territory conquered, because it would have given her control of the mountain-girt body of water lying between the coast and the Greek island of Corfu, a position too strategic to be lightly yielded to a power of unknown affinities. Such cases might be multiplied. They all point to the single conclusion, that while we still live on the land, our destiny is determined on the sea.

And perceiving this, we must assume that nations will struggle for the control of sea areas which are vital to their existence, that they will manœuvre for position and that if conflicts of interest can not be adjusted by compromise, wars will result. It is to cer-

tain of these sea areas that we now turn our attention. We will begin with the Mediterranean.

The importance of the Mediterranean in ancient times is too obvious for insistence, but it was of quite a different kind from that of the present day. It was practically the only known sea, and the known world bordered upon it. To this world it stood in much the same relation as the ocean at large holds to the nations of to-day. Its control was possible only with world dominion, and that dominion was attained primarily on land and thence transferred to the sea, maritime instincts and maritime science being both rudimentary.

The discovery of America and other concurrent events led to the development of the larger modern world, built about the Atlantic much as the ancient world had been built about the Mediterranean. The latter now became a local issue, immensely important, no doubt, but no longer the goal of world dominion. Finally, the development of large interests in the East and the construction of the Suez Canal has again lifted the Mediterranean to honour, though its modern importance is of a different kind from the old. It remains to be seen whether the new route via Panama, undoubtedly a rival, will again rob the Mediterranean of its brief importance and make the great highway again a mere line for local traffic. It seems certain, however, that among lesser bodies of water, the Mediterranean must retain its place as an area of first importance. At present the most important problems of statesmanship are directly or indirectly connected with this sea. We will consider here only the

problem of through traffic, that is, traffic from or through this sea to the Atlantic on the one hand and the Indian and Pacific areas on the other, leaving for separate consideration the local problems of dwellers on its shores and in the areas of tributary seas.

As thus defined, the problem of the Mediterranean is primarily a problem of its western and eastern entrances, to which must be added the southern entrance to the Red Sea which latter is essentially a long vestibule to the Mediterranean. All these approaches are essentially in the control of a single power. The nature of that control and the problems that it involves invite attention.

The western entrance, a narrow strait from eight to ten miles in width, is dominated by precipitous heights on both sides, constituting a natural fortress of great strength. On the north the height consists of a huge isolated rock, essentially an island, projecting boldly into the strait, though not quite at its narrowest point, and connected with the mainland by a mere strip of sand scarcely above the level of the sea. This rock heavily fortified, together with the harbour laboriously constructed on its western side, is Gibraltar, the most famous and in popular opinion the most impregnable of all fortresses.

Whether popular faith in its impregnability is justified or not we need not inquire. Certain it is that its nature and purpose are popularly misunderstood. It is commonly assumed that its function in war would be to prevent a hostile fleet from passing the straits. Its service in this connection would be but incidental. For such a purpose, the heights on the African side

should be fortified and should co-operate. Unaided, it is doubtful if the guns of Gibraltar could stop the more powerful of modern fighting ships. But for such a purpose Britain relies, not on the fortress, but on her own fleet. What then is the use of Gibraltar? The question has been asked by writers of some pretension, and some have not hesitated to conclude that Gibraltar is useless, an expensive souvenir of an earlier day, and an example of the unconscious out-of-dateness of Britain's defences.

These errors are due to popular ignorance of the nature of naval warfare. There is an unconscious assumption in the minds of all of us who are not of the craft, that warships once launched and manned are able to fight indefinitely in any waters to which they have access. The fact is that warships are very helpless if far or long away from their base of supplies on land. For one thing, they obviously need frequently to replenish their supply of fuel. An ocean liner coals every voyage, carrying little more than a week's supply. The provisioning of the ship with its large crew is another source of dependence in peace and war. In actual war this dependence is greatly increased. Suppose a warship in actual action, and victorious. What is its condition and its need? Its magazines would be empty, and perhaps its bunkers as well. Its hull and funnels would be riddled with shot, and its hold filled with wounded men. It must get to arsenals to replenish its munitions, to a hospital for the disposal of its wounded, to coal depots to fill its bunkers, to workshops to repair its hull and its machinery, and above all to a garrison post to fill

the gaps in its fighting force. Failing this, it is quickly reduced to impotence. The distance at which a warship can successfully operate from its base (known as its radius of action) is far less than is usually supposed, and is of course far less in war than in peace. The condition of a navy's successful operation in distant waters is therefore the possession of suitably located naval bases, having all the requisites for repairing and equipping the ships of the fleet. The sea power of England consists not only in her ships but quite as much in her long line of naval stations which dot all seas.

Her control of the Mediterranean is essentially naval, and Gibraltar is the first of her naval stations. The visitor to the historic fortress is conducted through the rock-hewn galleries armed with obsolete cannon, and gets a glimpse of one or two big guns on the rocky summit, and is satisfied that he has seen Gibraltar. He should rather walk up the road which ascends behind the Alameda to a point where he can look down on the vast shops where the click of the riveter is never silent. He should note the huge cold storage plants, the hospitals, the fresh water reservoirs, the ammunition stores, etc., for these are Gibraltar. It goes without saying that such a base needs protection, and that this duty should, as far as possible, be performed by other agencies than the fleet, whose freedom of action it is its purpose to assure. Hence the necessity of the fortress, which exists to protect the base, not to close the straits. This purpose it amply serves as against a hostile fleet.

But while the inability of the fortress to close the

straits is no indication of inadequacy, the developing science of war is gradually undermining its security. When Gibraltar was chosen as Britain's naval base, the utmost range of artillery was three miles, and from such artillery the isolated rock was perfectly safe. To-day the range is twenty-six miles. Far within this range rise heights on the Spanish mainland from which the fire of modern artillery could dominate both fortress and harbour and make the task of shop and storehouse impossible. The possibility that these heights may be seized and fortified by some powerful antagonist is the subject of unconcealed anxiety on the part of British strategists. Were Spain as isolated and impotent as China, there can be no doubt that England would long ago have assured Gibraltar by acquiring a considerable area on the adjacent mainland, even though this involved, as at Hong Kong, a difficult problem of frontier defence. Even now, should she descry the beginnings of fortifications on the heights above mentioned, there can be no doubt that, if protest were unavailing, the guns of the big fortress would be turned on the offending summits. A removal of the entire base to the east side of the rock has been contemplated, but not as yet effected.

The defence of the Suez Canal is, if possible, even more vital to Britain than the defence of Gibraltar. Yet the canal itself is not fortified, and is under pledge to observe neutrality in war. Not till we reach Aden at the mouth of the Red Sea, thirteen hundred miles to the south, or Malta in the mid-Mediterranean, eleven hundred miles to the west, do we come upon the real defences of the Suez Canal. Obviously here

again reliance is placed in the fleet, and the impregnable forts of "Steamer Point" and "Valetta" serve even more than at Gibraltar merely to protect the base and its activities. The character of these defences is further emphasised by the location of Aden a hundred miles from the narrow opening of the Red Sea, where alone its guns might hope to be efficacious in resisting a passing fleet.

It is clear that if naval bases so located can serve the needs of the British navy, the shores of the Mediterranean furnish other potential bases in abundance. The nations bordering on this sea have not failed to equip themselves with such adjuncts to their naval power. France has bases on both European and African coasts, and all other aspirants to sea power have bases appropriately located.

What then, is the problem of the Mediterranean, and how may the situation thus outlined lead to war? Primarily it is a problem of more naval bases, and the possibility that other strong and aggressive nations may acquire a foothold in this region which might threaten the security of the Mediterranean powers and particularly of the through traffic between East and West by this great central route. It is irrelevant to inquire whether others have as good rights as present possessors. We are not here arbitrating claims, but are simply noting actual tendencies and possibilities. Present possessors do not wish rivals, especially powerful rivals, least of all rivals who have grievances or ambitions in other quarters which might give them more than local reasons for using the power thus acquired. In a word, neither Britain nor the local

Mediterranean powers want Germany admitted to their number. Free passage for her commerce is granted as a matter of course, nor is there any evidence that this privilege was grudged or liable to be withheld. But to have the freedom of the Mediterranean contested, or menaced as an incident to the pressing of outside claims is not to their liking. That Germany resents her exclusion from any part of the trade route of the Mediterranean is equally natural, and in view of her extensive commerce with the East, perhaps equally justified. We are concerned not with the merits of these opposed claims, but simply with the fact that they are opposed, and that the conflict is liable to make trouble.

It has made trouble. Long ago, as the statesmen of Britain looked over the field, it became clear that the African shore was a source of danger. In 1827 France had seized Algeria, and after a long and costly struggle had confirmed her possession about the middle of the century. Thus a long stretch of coast in Africa was appropriated before the question became acute. Following the acquisition of the Suez Canal, Britain had occupied Egypt, and to appease the much aroused anger of France, had acquiesced in her occupation of Tunis, a most important strategic extension of her Algerian possessions. All this while Germany was struggling to become a nation. Slowly Germany became conscious of her remoter interests and possessed of a new and mighty ambition. France with her old grievance and Britain with her new anxiety, rivals till now in this field, even bitter enemies in the eighties, now make common cause, and divide the

keeping of the Mediterranean between them. Tripoli and Morocco remain as danger points. They must be permanently disposed of.

The diplomatic records of this period will not be given to us until interest in these problems has largely ceased. Until then we have but circumstantial evidence as to what happened. Some things, however, are written large on the face of the situation. Tripoli was a nominal dependency of Turkey, and its seizure by Italy involved war with that country. Egypt, though under British control, was also in name a part of the Turkish Empire, and as such, pledged to support the cause of its suzerain. The position of Britain in Egypt was peculiarly calculated to show her hand. If she wished Tripoli to remain Turkish, she had but to permit Egypt to aid Turkish arms, or merely to open Egypt to the passage of Turkish troops, and Italian conquest would become impossible. Britain could have plausibly explained that she was merely permitting an unquestioned right, and refraining from interference in a matter in which she had no concern. On the other hand, her actual control of Egypt enabled her to close that country to the passage of troops, under the equally plausible pretext of insuring its tranquillity, and her own neutrality, thus assuring Italian success in turn. She chose the latter alternative, against strong pressure from both Turkey and Egypt itself. Britain did not disapprove of the seizure. Indeed when we recall the fact that the masterful Lord Kitchener, whom the Egyptians were wont to obey, was sent by an unfriendly British cabinet to rule that country, and that the Italian expedition

was launched immediately after his arrival, it is difficult not to see in the move the masterly hand of British diplomacy. Could the further rumour be substantiated that Germany was negotiating at the time for a long lease of one of the Tripolitan ports, and that these negotiations had come to the knowledge of the British government, surmise would give way to certainty.

It is easy to see the motive for such a policy. Tripoli, undefended by its suzerain, was a standing temptation to any aggressive power. Its seizure by a responsible Mediterranean power was a substantial guarantee against seizure by an outsider. The fact that Italy was in nominal but precarious alliance with Germany made protest by Germany difficult, while the friendship of England, and in turn, the development of Italian oversea interests which could exist only by her suffrance, must tend to detach her from the central powers and draw her into closer relation to the powers of the West. It may further be noted that France and England are now friends and keenly alive to the importance of maintaining their friendship. We may have disputes with our next door neighbour, but seldom with our neighbour next beyond. Tripoli, lying between French Tunis and British Egypt, is a guarantee against boundary disputes and strain upon the friendship of the two great powers. Its value to Italy is a very different question.

The annexation of Tripoli assures the coast from the Canal westward almost to the Straits. Only Morocco was needed to close the gap. Here again weakness invited aggression, and the interested powers

had long been busy to avert the threatened danger. As the gap narrowed and the powers of the Mediterranean concert seemed about to draw their cordon of steel about the famous sea, excitement became intense. A tentative agreement of the Mediterranean powers for the disposal of the Moroccan question was challenged by Germany, in the person of the Emperor himself, who landed at Tangiers, and in a speech to German sympathisers announced that no agreement from which Germany was excluded could be valid. A conference of European powers, called at the instance of Germany, met at Algeciras, the Spanish neighbour of Gibraltar, and after long debate reached an agreement with regard to the occupancy and administration of Morocco, from which Germany was excluded. Despite many face-saving concessions of other kinds or in other quarters, nothing could disguise the fact or remove the smart of this diplomatic defeat.

Soon the world was startled by the appearance of a German warship in a Moroccan port. Questioned as to the meaning of this move, Germany frankly replied that she meant to reopen the Moroccan question. Again the long diplomatic battle in which, even more plainly than before, the mighty contestants showed their teeth. Again Germany was denied, though with face-saving concessions of more presentable character and possible value than before in remote and unstrategic areas. The possession of Morocco by the Mediterranean powers was confirmed, and the cordon of their undisputed control now stretched from the Egyptian frontier on the east to Gibraltar on the west, and round the north to Italy and the doubtful beyond,

where local problems scarcely less important than that of the Mediterranean itself complicated the situation, and the rotten barrier of Turkey presented the last opportunity for the entrance of Germany into the coveted area. It was plain that peaceful entrance was and would be denied. Entrance by force was feasible only on Germany's element, the land. To this strenuous task Germany's mighty energies were henceforth to be directed. It is no exaggeration to say that the question of the Mediterranean was a principal cause, as these recent diplomatic defeats were the immediate occasion of the present war. At the close of the second struggle it was privately but openly announced by the German emperor that from that time he should adopt a new policy, and preparations, the extent of which the world has but begun to realise, were forthwith hurried to completion.

The subject gives occasion to moralise on the unreasonableness of national ambitions. Why not let Germany in? To which the only reply is that nations fear and suspect one another, and that a German naval station on Britain's line of communications with her great eastern empire might be used to her hurt. But would it be so used? Who can tell? Britain has not used the power she undoubtedly possesses to restrict in any degree the freedom of the seas she rules. Perhaps Germany would be equally considerate. But then why does Germany risk so much to gain that control? Were the Mediterranean in her keeping, nay, were all seas in her power, she would not enjoy a single privilege of peaceful use which is not now freely accorded to her. Why, then, this titanic strug-

gle to assure rights that are not challenged? The suspicion is inevitable that more is intended, that Britain's control of the sea is challenged as a prelude to contesting the possession of her colonies and the very existence of her empire. All with reason, it may be. No matter. Britain stands guard. Any people so challenged would stand guard. Criticise or sympathise as we will, the possessor must be expected to guard his possessions. And after all, does not the most altruistic of pacifists lock his door against the housebreaker?

Meanwhile it is a matter of congratulation to the neutral world that the power now in control is one whose widely scattered and exposed interests compel her to be circumspect. Any attempt on her part to limit the freedom of the seas in time of peace, would arm the world against her, and against such a power she would be helpless. She is the world's mistress only by the world's suffrance. She has given hostages to humanity.

But we are not concerned at present to decide who should rule the seas or the Mediterranean, but merely to note that the Mediterranean is necessarily a debatable ground. So long as men are disposed to fight, so long as they can be induced to fight, the Mediterranean will be a thing to fight about. It is the world's oldest and well-nigh its greatest highway, a highway which has at once the shortest through route and the richest local traffic, and a highway withal which can be easily dominated from a few strategic points. A unified control of the great highway is as inevitable as it is necessary to its proper commercial use. Let that

control fall into irresponsible and inconsiderate hands, and we return, no matter under how genteel a form, to the days of the Barbary pirates. Other alternatives — the rule of a single power, conscious of the dangers of its supremacy, a balance of the powers, each watching jealously from its stronghold, a concert of the powers, an independent commission acting under international guarantees — each has its advocates and its opponents, its advantages and its dangers. But the Mediterranean remains one of the most vital of human interests, and its control is likely to be contested as long as there are rivalries and contests among the families of men.

CHAPTER IV

THE PROBLEM OF THE ADRIATIC

THIS great arm of the Mediterranean is about five hundred miles long and a hundred miles wide. Its detachment from the larger body is marked by a decided narrowing at the southern end, known as the Strait of Otranto, where its width is but forty-five miles. It is thus a spacious and easily entered commercial highway, giving convenient access to the east coast of Italy on the west, to the region of the eastern Alps on the north, and to the several countries on the east, to some of which, and those the most considerable, it furnishes the only direct outlet to the sea.

The western coast of the Adriatic is almost entirely low and unbroken. There are virtually no natural harbours, and such as have been laboriously created are much exposed. The great mountain chain of the Apennines, the backbone of Italy, barely comes within sight of the Adriatic near Ancona, and nowhere attempts to dominate it. To the north of Ancona, the great rivers which drain the Alps and the Apennines, have built and are still building the broad plain of northern Italy. When rivers build land against the sea, there is always a broad debatable margin of lagoon and swamp, and conspicuously so here. In this great swamp lies Venice with her ancient glories and her mouldering present, her toilsomely dredged

harbour feebly enlivened with a sluggish modern commerce.

The east coast is in all respects a startling contrast. Here mountains everywhere crowd against the sea, and as if not content with this dominating proximity, they have flung their outposts far out beyond the frontier in the shape of rocky islets that in long lines parallel with the coast form double and triple outpost defences. For hundreds of miles this wonderful archipelago runs in a strip some twenty miles wide along the mountainous coast, and when these lines of outposts cease, the coast becomes even more precipitous, rising into beetling crags thousands of feet high which open by the narrowest doorways into mountain-walled fjords of incomparable grandeur. In these fastnesses and behind the rocky islets lie harbours, numerous, commodious, natural and impregnable.

To complete our inventory of Adriatic peculiarities, it must be noted that both within and without the Strait of Otranto lie superb natural defences, admirably suited to the purposes of a naval base. To the north, and barely inside the entrance, lies the splendid landlocked Bay of Avlona, the entrance to whose spacious waters is guarded by the island of Sasseno. To the south lies the beautiful island of Corfu whose crescent shaped eastern coast reaches out long mountainous tips which almost touch the mountains of the mainland and enclose a spacious bay of singular beauty. Here, as at Avlona, a navy of any size could find safe anchorage, perfectly protected from an enemy of any strength, and by means of modern craft, completely controlling the entrance to the Adriatic.



To the north of Avlona and therefore well within the Adriatic, is Cattaro, at the end of a deep fjord much like Lake Lucerne in size, shape, and mountain environment. Connected with the sea by a narrow but perfectly practicable passage between huge cliffs, it is one of the best protected and most commodious naval bases in the world. It is noteworthy that in the present struggle, the Austrians have made it an object of chief importance to make sure of Cattaro, the Italians of Avlona, and the British and French of Corfu, the base best adapted in each case to their purpose.

The commercial importance of the Adriatic, always considerable, was at its maximum in the days of Venetian supremacy. In the Roman period it was little more than a route for local traffic, and that with one of the newer and less opulent parts of the empire, though the wealth of northern Italy contributed to the importance of its trade. But Rome was the western goal of Mediterranean trade, and the great trade routes lay to the south of the Adriatic. As the power and wealth of Rome declined, however, Italy ceased to be the purchaser of eastern goods. The empire, dead at the centre and living at the edge, saw the commerce of the East diverted to Britain and France. What was the best trade route between the Levant and the North?

From Constantinople across the Balkans and thence overland to the Rhine and beyond, was one way, a way having some advantages and no small local trade of its own. But it was a tedious and costly way, and there were robbers to be reckoned with, and toll-gates that were quite their kin.

Another way was to take ship by the old Roman route, passing the Straits of Messina with their dread Scylla and Charybdis, and thence on to the Riviera and the North. It was a cheap way, and there were no toll-gates, but the sea had its terrors and took a toll of its own. None the less the route was popular, and Amalfi, Pisa, and Genoa in succession, grew rich on the increasing commerce which passed their way.

But clearly best of all was the intermediate route by ship under cover of the islands to the Adriatic and up its comparatively protected waters to Venice, whence easy routes led over the Alps to the great German cities, Nuremberg, Augsburg, etc., and on to the Rhine. In a word, the Adriatic was at that time what the Mediterranean is to-day, the great highway not only for local traffic, but for through traffic between the ends of the earth. It must not be forgotten that in the thirteenth century when Venice was nearing her zenith, a single ruler controlled the earth from Kamchatka to Singapore, and from the Pacific to the Baltic. Trade routes were open and protected, and Chinese wares could find their way to Britain then as now, if not in the same volume or by the same routes. It is not an accident that a Venetian was secretary to Kublai Khan. The control of the Adriatic made Venice the greatest power in the West, conferring much the same power as does the control of the Mediterranean to-day, and for the same reason.

The mariner's compass, the greater mastery of the sea, and the rounding of the Cape of Good Hope destroyed this advantage, and the Adriatic again became merely a line for local traffic. Political changes

in the East and West, accompanied by devastating wars, urged on the transition with disastrous precipitancy, and the Queen of the Adriatic became a pauper of gentility, who was made to dance in her faded finery for the amusement of a parvenu world.

Slowly, with the development of the modern world, the commerce of the Adriatic has returned. It has not become again the thoroughfare of the nations, but with the development of the great hinterland of Austria and Hungary, the local traffic which had been its modest portion, has grown to imperial proportions. Venice still moulders, but Trieste and Fiume, the rival ports of the dual empire, with all parts of which they are connected by railway, are among the busiest in the southern seas. They are by nature the outlets of a large territory, and this their natural importance has been largely increased by political conditions which have tended to focus upon these two neighbour cities the trade of an immense region, much of which, under different political conditions, would seek another outlet. So long as Austrian frontiers are where they now are, not a little trade will reach the Adriatic which nature intended for the Ægean. To a certain extent, however, this is offset in the southern Adriatic. Ports which are the natural outlet of Servia are withheld and committed to the keeping of the feeble Albanian state whose only recommendation to its sponsors is its feebleness, and Servia accommodates herself as she may with the Greek port of Salonica, which, however, is the natural outlet for most of her territory. All these political factors are unstable and may change between the writing and the reading of this

book, whether with gain or loss to the commerce of the Adriatic, it is hard to say. But in the long run, Servia, under whatever name or flag, must reach the Adriatic and augment its commerce. And if the consolidation of the central powers should essentially efface frontier lines and bring the vast industrial might of Germany through to the Adriatic, something like the old conditions would be restored. The land detour from Bremen to the mid-Mediterranean might in part be spared, and the Adriatic again become a highway between the great creative North and the limitless East. This is more than a possibility.

Having noted the physical peculiarities of the Adriatic and its commercial importance, we are in a position better to understand its problem, as this presents itself to the modern statesman. That problem is, of course, one of conflicting interests on the part of the Adriatic states. These are threefold, commercial, racial, and strategic.

It is clear, from what has been said, that the Adriatic is very partial in its distribution of commercial facilities. On the west the ports that it offers are few and poor, while on the east they are numerous and excellent. There is a certain seeming equity in this, for the narrow peninsula on the west has other and better access to the sea on its western side, while the broad countries to the east of the Adriatic have hardly a second choice. But the difference is easily exaggerated. The great mountain range which meanders through Italy, follows for the most part its western edge, and in the northern and broadest portion of the

peninsula rises like a colossal barrier, its precipitous masses almost tumbling into the sea. These mountains constitute a watershed which sends the great trade currents like the great rivers, toward the Adriatic. The mediocre facilities offered by the ungenerous Adriatic are a real hardship, entailing a constant burden of expense. The great bulk of Italian commerce is carried over the mountain barrier, and Genoa, the once humbled rival of Venice, now far outstrips her ancient conqueror. It is difficult to see how this situation can be remedied, but it is obviously unsatisfactory and a source of discontent. The vague feeling that something ought to be done about it, accentuates any tendency which may arise from other quarters, toward a modification of the status quo. Such tendencies are not wanting.

The racial situation is peculiar. The former political supremacy of Rome has left the Italian tongue as its legacy to the islands and border provinces of the northern and eastern Adriatic. Wave after wave of Slavic migration has come down to these historic shores, only to bow in turn to the memory of Rome, and learn its mellowed speech. Here, then, we have a constant appeal to the dwellers in the peninsula. Here are men speaking their language and occupying the splendid ports which to them are denied. The cry for their "redemption" goes up to heaven. The fact that these ports are not where Italy could use them is easily overlooked. The price which their present possessors set upon them is a sufficient proof of their value, while the speech of their citizens is

prima facie evidence of their rightful ownership. It is easy to show the sophistry of this reasoning, but not to destroy its appeal.

The force of this racial argument is greatly enhanced by other distinct but contributing factors. The much talked of Trentino is a wedge of Italian speaking territory which Austria has driven right into the bulk of northern Italy. It has no seacoast, no indispensable commercial facility. It is not strategic unless for offence against Italy, for to the north rises the still higher barrier of the Tyrolese Alps, which, by virtue of their German speech, are confirmed in Austria's possession. There are doubtless historic and recondite reasons for this territorial anomaly, but they are not such as are likely ever to appeal to the unsophisticated mind. As long as the anomaly continues, the cause of "unredeemed Italy" will have a certain obvious justification, and the movement thus encouraged, will not stop where its justification stops. Doubtless voluntary cession in the interest of mere reasonableness, is unthinkable in the present condition of nationalist feeling, but if the fortunes of war should straighten this inexcusably dented frontier and assign the Trentino to its natural allegiance, it would be for Austria a beneficent calamity.

The force of these considerations is further enhanced by the repressive attitude of Austria toward the clearly perceived danger. Nowhere do men resent dictation more than in the matter of the language they shall speak. Left to itself, language is a matter of practical convenience, but persecuted, it quickly be-

comes a martyr, and powerful sentiments and stubborn partisans rally to its defence. There has been much to provoke and perhaps enough to justify the policy of suppression, but that it has roused the opposition of the Italian-speaking districts and has made unredeemed Italy sympathise with the efforts for her redemption, can hardly be doubted.

But it is in the question of defence that we find the true problem of the Adriatic. This problem presents itself in two very different forms, and deals with interests that are distinct and almost incapable of reconciliation. We may call them the internal and the external problems.

The external problem is the problem of defending the Adriatic against outside powers. This is a problem in which all the dwellers upon its coasts have a common interest, but one which has not produced harmony of action. It is primarily a question of controlling one or more of the naval stations already mentioned, Avlona, and Corfu, and Cattaro. Any one of these in the possession of a strong power, would completely dominate the Strait of Otranto, and thus control the entrance to the Adriatic. Curiously enough, none of these has hitherto been so occupied, and the united effort of the chief nations interested, has had for its aim to prevent such occupation. The reason is clear. Neither wishes an outside power, whose friendship can not be relied upon, thus to hold the key to their premises. Britain once held it by her possession of Corfu, but under the lead of Mr. Gladstone's idealism she surrendered it to Greece, who can

hardly utilise it without controlling the mainland opposite, to which both Italy and Austria have positively refused their consent.

But while united in their opposition to outside control, these countries are unable to unite on any plan of control from within. Each covets this control for itself, and for that reason refuses it to the other, waiting for a favourable opportunity to realise its own ambition. For either to make the attempt would tumble down the whole card house of the European balance of power, a responsibility which each has hesitated to assume. Besides, there were other dwellers in the card house, who would object, perhaps with inconvenient vehemence.

So the makeshift device has been adopted of keeping these strongholds in weak hands. For this purpose Turkey was admirably suited. Impotent and existing under suspended sentence, like a eunuch set to guard the harem, the sick man of the East has held the stakes for which the virile rivals strove. Hence the concern with which these rivals and their backers watched the collapse of Turkey in the Balkan war. The prize was in danger of falling into hands better able to hold and less willing to yield what they grasped. A new and reliable stakeholder must be found. Greece and Servia were uncomfortably assertive, and besides they might have, indeed were known to have, backers. Greece must not get both sides of the Gulf of Corfu. Servia must not have Avlona or any neighbouring Adriatic port. A new state must guard the entrance of the Adriatic, the most incoherent and powerless possible. The burlesque of Al-

bania was not an unconscious joke, nor was there any intention that it should long endure.

If we ask why Italy and Austria have not united to secure control of the Adriatic, the answer is to be found in the problem of internal defence. Their land frontier is fairly satisfactory and could be made altogether so, so far as mutual protection is concerned. But the Adriatic as a boundary can never offer mutual security. The problem of defence is here primarily one of naval warfare. For this purpose it would be difficult to find a greater disparity than that presented by the opposite sides of the Adriatic. On the Austrian side the islands stretch like long barrier reefs parallel with the shore. The entrances are few and narrow, easily closed by mines or submarines. Behind these barriers, in the labyrinth of islands, the secure retreat of pirates and sea rovers in Roman and Venetian days, all the navies in the world could lie secure. Conversely, all the navies in the world could not force these entrances if resolutely held by a few minor craft. This coast is impregnable. For offence, at least within the limits of the Adriatic, it is equally strong. A few submarines issuing from these fastnesses, could destroy any possible opposing force.

These advantages appear still greater when we turn to the opposite coast. Here are no island barriers, no deep harbours of refuge. There is not a place on the Italian east coast where a ship could find secure shelter against an attack from the east, while the coast cities are all exposed to bombardment. In short, while the Adriatic is an ideal base for naval power, naval conflict between its opposite coasts is

impossible. These two coasts are now at war, but although the western power has much the more powerful navy, we hear of very little activity on its part. Austria is the only great power that hardly needs a navy to protect its coasts and its maritime interests.

We are forced to the conclusion that there can be no balance of power in the Adriatic as such. A single people surrounding the entire sea would assure tranquillity, but with the opposite coasts in the possession of different powers, no balance is possible, unless the overwhelming advantage of the eastern power in this area were offset by some counter check in another quarter. The formation of new Adriatic powers is no guarantee, for they can come in only on the eastern side where they are likely to be subservient to their more powerful northern neighbour. Possibly the recent Italian occupation of Avlona, giving her control of the entrance of the Adriatic while Austria has control within, may create a balance of a sort, but it will be difficult to hold this detached territory, and if held, the resulting equilibrium will be precarious and uncertain.

Again we are tempted to muse on the perversity of human nature and the futility of monopolistic ambitions. "If only men would —," but that is another story and would lead us far from our quest. All honour to the efforts that may be put forth to persuade men to reasonableness and mutual concession. But so long as men are selfish and sensitive and suspicious — nay, just because they are so — it will be useful to note carefully the things about which they may quarrel. The great families of men who inhabit the


opposite sides of the Adriatic are rather sharply divided in interests. They are also divided in language, but unfortunately, not quite at the same point. They are unequally situated as regards commerce, still more so as regards defence. Forbearance and circumspection beyond the measure of most, are required to keep peace in the Adriatic.

CHAPTER V

THE PROBLEM OF CONSTANTINOPLE

CONSTANTINOPLE is for us only a convenient name for the passage between the Mediterranean and the Black Sea. This passage begins with the Dardanelles, a strait some fifty miles long and averaging three or four in width. From this strait we pass into the Sea of Marmora, a spacious body of water some fifty miles wide and a hundred and seventy miles long, and then again into another strait, the Bosphorus, some twenty miles in length and even narrower than the Dardanelles. Constantinople stands at the inner or western end of the Bosphorus. The two straits are essentially a mighty river with a considerable current, but they are deep and without dangerous headlands or sunken reefs. The water that flows through them has dropped all its silt in the Black Sea, and so forms no bars to obstruct navigation. The entrances to both straits are broad and plainly visible, the banks being high and distinctive. Navigation is easy for the largest ships.

Constantinople with its tributary straits is the most strategic site in the world. It has been so for three thousand years, and will be so for three thousand years to come. When Napoleon and the Czar Alexander sat down at Tilsit to divide the world between them, Alexander is said to have pled with Napoleon:



"Give or take what you will, but give us Constantinople. For Constantinople my people are prepared to make any sacrifice." Napoleon bent long over the map, and then straightening up with sudden resolution replied: "Constantinople? Never! That means the rule of the world." Nothing has happened since to discredit this judgment. Merchant and strategist alike still rank Constantinople as the most valuable of territorial possessions. It is now as it was a century ago, the centre of the world's strategy, and as such it must be accounted the chief issue in the present world war. And this is not the first war, nor will it be the last to be waged for its possession.

The value of an entrance depends on certain obvious considerations. To what is it an entrance? Is it the only entrance? Can the entrance be controlled? A thumb catch on a bank vault, or a combination lock on a woodshed would be equally worthless, the first because it secured nothing, and the second because there was nothing to secure. On the other hand the best of locks on the most valuable of treasure houses would be of little value to us, if there are side or rear doors unlocked or with keys in other hands.

Judged by each and all of these criteria, Constantinople stands unapproachably first among the gateways of commerce and the strongholds of war. It is the only great highway that has no alternative. It leads to more than any other entrance open to commerce. And it is the most impregnable of all entrances. It is important that we consider somewhat carefully these three extraordinary facts.

First of all, the gateway is unique. There is no

other practicable entrance to the great region which it serves. It is true, as has been noted of late with somewhat exaggerated insistence, that railways may be built, and in part have been built, across the Balkan peninsula and across Asia Minor, roughly paralleling the great waterway, and connecting the Black Sea with the Mediterranean, but these can hardly serve more than local purposes. Rail transportation is at best far more expensive than water transportation, and the disadvantage is at its maximum when rail transportation is only a connecting link between two seas. Railroads may take freight from the lake steamers at Buffalo and deliver it to Atlantic steamers at New York, but never if there were a broad open waterway practicable for the largest steamers from Liverpool through to Chicago. Only in emergencies, when the waterway is closed, can railways serve as an alternate, and then only on the supposition, not yet realised, that they are controlled by a different power and affected by a contrary policy. No doubt such railways serve important purposes of local commerce, and that in the case of places approximately equidistant from the two seas, traffic may be diverted to Mediterranean ports, but to expect more than this from present or future railways is to overlook the inherent limitations of railway transportation.

So far from lessening the importance of the Dardanelles, railway development in this part of the world must tend enormously to increase it. Present and prospective lines are all of the nature of tributaries rather than competitors. The Black Sea basin is an undeveloped country. Around a large part of its cir-

cumference the physical barriers are so great that only a narrow strip of coast land has access to the sea. Beyond this strip men are compelled to be self-sufficing, and their country lies fallow. With the advent of railways these inert lands will be astir with new life, and the unbroken line of steamships that now moves through the Bosphorus will thicken into serried ranks.

Excluding the possibility of railway competition, the Dardanelles can have no competition. Close that doorway, and there is no other entrance. The world must stay out. There is no other like case. New York has a commerce which is hardly rivalled by any other port. This commerce has piled up a wealth there such that if a conflagration should sweep over a certain small area of two square miles, we are told that it would bankrupt every insurance company on earth. Yet if some cataclysm of nature should destroy New York and close her harbour, the nation would suffer but temporary inconvenience. Boston and Baltimore and a dozen other ports would care for the traffic that formerly passed through the Hudson, and the commerce of the country would go on unhindered. So with San Francisco, with New Orleans, with Rio or Buenos Ayres. So with Yokohama or Shanghai or Hong Kong. So with Calcutta or Bombay or Alexandria or Naples, with Liverpool or London or Hamburg. There is not one that has not its alternate, which could take over its task with but temporary inconvenience or local loss. Constantinople alone has no competitor, no probable or possible substitute.

In the second place, the territory tributary to Constantinople is the largest that is served by any single port. New York is undoubtedly its foremost competitor for this honour. The domain over which she extends some degree of commercial sway, includes the Atlantic seaboard and the Mississippi valley, while even the Pacific coast is in a degree within her sphere of influence. But this domain she shares with many active competitors whose rivalry is felt up to her very suburbs, and whose influence, especially to the south, rapidly becomes paramount. We shall certainly be more than fair to New York if we assign her half of the territory east of the Rockies, say a million square miles, or a third of our domain of the States.

The territory dependent on the Dardanelles includes all that borders on the Black Sea back for an immense, though variable distance. It will be worth while to enumerate somewhat carefully.

First to the left on entering (as the museum guide books say), comes that southeastern portion of the Balkan peninsula which at the present writing is still called Turkey. A small area and mere back yard of Constantinople, it is commercially less dependent on the great gateway than districts lying beyond, for it has access to the Ægean with but moderate disadvantage. Still Constantinople is its natural outlet, and under all normal conditions can monopolise the trade of at least its larger portion, the more so as the great trunk line of railway for the whole Balkan peninsula runs through its central district direct to Constantinople.

Next comes Bulgaria, recently enlarged and having

access, temporarily at least, to the *Ægean*, but all of whose lines of least resistance — rivers, valleys, railways, etc.— lead and must always lead to the Black Sea. Of these lines two need especially to be considered, the great international railway already mentioned which traverses central Bulgaria on its way to Constantinople, a line not easily moved or duplicated, and the river Danube which forms Bulgaria's northern boundary and which offers a navigable waterway of the highest importance.

Thanks to the Danube, our quest now leads us far from the Black Sea to the plains of Hungary and even Austria beyond. The dual empire, to be sure, has access to the Adriatic, but the mountain barriers on that side are a serious obstacle, even to railway transportation, and what is more serious, they quite prevent the possibility of canal and river transportation. Only certain kinds of merchandise can overcome the economic obstacles of this route, and the number rapidly diminishes as we go farther east into the broad plains that slope toward the great eastern sea. Meanwhile the broad Danube traverses the entire empire, everywhere navigable, and economical if slow. It is safe to count half of Austro-Hungary as tributary to the Black Sea.

Rumania is wholly tributary and Russia for at least half of its European area, and that the more productive half. Indeed this understates the case, for though Russia has an outlet through the Baltic, that route is almost negligible as a competitor of the Black Sea and the Dardanelles. It has at present the advantage of prior development and the presence of

the capital with its inevitable artificial attraction to population and trade. But the natural outlet of Russia is to the south. All future growth can but confirm that fact.

In considering the relative advantages of the Black Sea and the Baltic, we must not be misled by mere considerations of distance. It is a question of ease and economy of transportation and continuous availability. In this connection two factors of supreme importance must be noted, both strongly favouring the south. First, the Baltic is a summer sea. Its eastern, i.e., Russian, portion is frozen about one hundred and fifty days in the year, an interruption of traffic which icebreakers but imperfectly remove. Not merely navigation but harbour traffic and tributary transportation of all kinds suffers in a measure from the severe Russian winter. It is obvious that the commercial watershed between north and south will move far to the north of its normal during these five winter months.

The second fact is the course of the great rivers which are more usable and more used for commercial purposes in Russia than in any other country. Unlike the Adriatic, the Black Sea is not walled in by mountains, but to the north stretches a vast plain from Odessa to the Arctic Ocean. The great rivers that drain this plain flow mainly to the south, those flowing to the Arctic being shorter and of course of little value for purposes of navigation. The Dniester, the Dnieper, the Don and the Volga, not rivers only, but vast river systems, navigable in both main stream and tributaries, all flow to the south. It is true that the

Volga, greatest of them all, does not flow into the Black Sea, but after having headed that way for almost its entire length, it suddenly bends eastward and flows into the Caspian. But this eleventh hour change of purpose, like most such changes, does not wholly change the result. At the point of deflection, it had almost touched the headwaters of the Don, and a railroad already bridges the narrow interval, while another and longer line avoids the shallow waters of the Sea of Azov and carries the cargoes of the Volga steamers direct to Novorossüsk, the superb new harbour at the northeastern corner of the Black Sea. But this is not all. The Caspian itself is not an outlet, but a mere collecting basin for a vast region which finds its outlet mostly, and must always find it largely, through the Black Sea. It is now possible to take Caspian goods up the Volga and send them down the Don or across to Novorossüsk, as well as to send them across from Baku to Batoum, the Colchis of old where Jason went to get the golden fleece. And this brings us to a second area almost staggering in its immensity, which must own the sway of Constantinople. From the Caspian Sea a Russian railway already reaches nearly a thousand miles due east through the empire of Darius, of Alexander and of Tamerlane, and the end is not yet.

To the south of the Caspian lies Persia, tributary to this same basin. It is true that there is an alternative for Persia in part, and potentially for the whole Caspian basin, in the Persian Gulf which lies only a few hundred miles to the south and will doubtless ultimately be crossed by railways. But the Persian

Gulf is a long way from Europe, and the heavy toll of the Suez Canal adds its obstacle to the extra three thousand miles of distance which separates this outlet from European ports. When we remember that goods shipped at Batoum can be sent to London or New York without rehandling, the probabilities are very strong that the Dardanelles will continue to claim the largest share in the traffic of all this region.

As we pass to the west into Asiatic Turkey, the dependence again becomes absolute until we near the Mediterranean and have the option of ports like Smyrna or Alexandretta.

It is impossible to give any mathematical estimate of this area, the more so as the boundary is wholly vague, modified by each new railway, and even varying with the season of the year. But when we remember that a single one of these countries, Russia, is approximately three times the area of the United States and almost wholly without other outlets, we are certainly within bounds if we say that the area tributary to Constantinople and the Dardanelles is equal to the United States, or three times that tributary to New York. It is true that some of this territory is poor, but so is some of our own. The average is as good or better.

Think what this means. Imagine, if we can, a single port handling all the foreign commerce of the United States. The conception is staggering, so much so in fact, as to arouse incredulity. How comes it, some one will ask, that Constantinople is after all only an inconsiderable city and the traffic of the Dardanelles but an insignificant fraction of what our state-

ment presupposes? The obvious answer is that this country is undeveloped, incredibly so in parts. The newness of Russia is familiar, though the grain ships that feed England to-day start from much the same ports as those that fed Athens five hundred years before Christ. But the southern shore of the Black Sea is one of the oldest habitats of civilised man, so old indeed that it has become new through centuries of abandonment and neglect. The land of Mithridates and Jason is virgin soil again, waiting for peace and protection and modern intelligence to bring it to fruition. But while this easily accounts for the disparity between actual and potential production, the actual commerce of the Dardanelles is much greater than is ordinarily supposed. A dweller on the banks of the Bosphorus told the writer that he had often counted fifteen grain ships at a time making their way toward Europe, while the smoke of others was seen in the distance, the ships concealed by a bend in the channel. Twelve thousand ships a year pass the Dardanelles. That this commerce has maintained such large proportions under political conditions almost the worst possible, is certainly suggestive of what it may become under more favourable conditions.

It does not follow, however, that Constantinople is destined to grow in proportion to the traffic which passes her gates. Cities grow, not by the traffic which passes them, but by the traffic which stops. Modern traffic is ever less inclined to stop en route. Constantinople is not the terminus of navigation, only a way station. Suppose a broad ocean highway free of all obstructions stretched from New York to the Great

Lakes, and once more, that the entire commerce of the United States was restricted to this outlet. Where would be the metropolis? Hardly at New York. Most of the ships would sail past her, scarcely taking time for port amenities. So with Constantinople. Always the centre of a considerable commerce, her measure will not be the measure of the commerce of the Dardanelles. She will stand as the name and symbol, yes, and as the administrative and protecting centre of this vast traffic which, converging from the ports of the wide world upon this narrow channel, radiates again to many ports in the great distributing basin of the Black Sea.

We have finally to consider the defensibility of the famous passage, a question which has suddenly acquired new interest from current events. It is here that we shall be most impressed with the unique character of Constantinople.

The group of the Dardanelles, the Sea of Marmora and the Bosphorus, form a sort of natural Dipy-lon gate, as the Greeks would have called it, a hollow enclosure with an entrance front and rear, which was a favourite trap in Greek devices for defence. Once past the outer entrance, the attacking party found itself surrounded, and retreat might become as difficult as advance. Without insisting on this analogy, it is clear that the complete passage of the straits entails a double task, while access to Constantinople itself, whether from east or west, requires the forcing of one of the two straits.

It is hardly necessary to say that both these straits can be made impassable by means of mines which can

be planted on very short notice. To force the strait, the enemy must remove this obstruction, and to prevent this, as well as to prevent the passage of the ships themselves, heavy ordnance have but to be properly located on the banks. For this purpose the banks are admirably adapted. Throughout almost their entire length the banks of both straits are high and broken into hills and bluffs which offer the military engineer every possible choice of site, while the various windings of the channel offer every opportunity for an enfilading fire. No matter what guns an attacking fleet can bring to bear, there is no reason why equally heavy cannot be mounted for the defence, and with the greater accuracy of their fire and the greater protection and concealment which land mounting permits, the odds are enormously in favour of the defence. To all this must be added the possibilities of the submarine which can be used against the fleet but not against the forts. It is doubtful whether the present defences of the Dardanelles are up to date, yet an attack by a powerful up-to-date fleet has just ended in disastrous failure.

There remains the possibility of turning these positions from the rear. Here again Nature seems to have completed her master work. From the Asiatic side, indeed, such a rear attack would seem to be possible, though attended with all the difficulties of a major campaign in a rough country. But on the north the Dardanelles is bounded by a rocky peninsula running the whole length of the strait and for some distance beyond. This narrow ridge of land, sometimes not over five miles in width, is simply a moun-

tain wall, as inaccessible on the back side as in front, and easily defended at the narrow neck at the eastern end. It would do no good for an enemy to hold the southern or Asiatic side of the strait as long as this rocky ridge was in the defender's hands. Needless to say, it is here that the principal defences have been located. And here again theoretic values have been put to the test. The Allies have endeavoured for many months to force this position with an enormous and well equipped army. These efforts have cost, to one of the Allies alone, a hundred thousand men, and have ended in disastrous failure.

These defences once forced and the Sea of Marmora opened, Constantinople must fall, for it is fully exposed to bombardment from that side, and resistance would be futile. But it is not certain that this would involve the surrender of the great forts at the entrance to the Black Sea and the consequent opening of the Bosphorus. It is primarily to guard against attack from the east, however, that these fortifications exist. Of their strength we have no means of judging, but we may assume that they are adequate, and that a Russian attack upon the Bosphorus would meet with the same result as a British attack upon the Dardanelles. Nature has here done her part quite as well. The southeastern projection of the Balkan peninsula on which Constantinople stands is itself a comparatively narrow peninsula. As you approach Constantinople by rail from the northwest, you traverse for many miles the broad plains of Thrace, stretching from the Black Sea on the east to the Sea of Marmora on the south. But suddenly the two

seas seem to draw together, crumpling the plain between them into ridges, and narrowing it to a neck only about twenty miles wide, through which for fifty miles or more the railway winds its sinuous way toward the minarets of Stamboul. Here are located the dread forts of Chatalja where the starved and half-armed soldiers of the Crescent stopped their rout and arrested the victorious Bulgars in their march on the capital. Here again nothing less than overwhelming forces can turn the defences of the Bosphorus from the rear.


Is it any wonder that such a key to such an entrance is an object of supreme emulation on the part of interested powers? The feeblest of powers, with such a key, can imprison the colossus among the nations, can stop the grain ships that feed fifty millions of people, can do all this and has done it three times within a decade. What wonder that, for Constantinople, the Czar and his people were prepared to make any sacrifice. But, in turn, imagine the key in the hands of the colossus. What preparations might not be made behind those barred gates, what thunderbolts hurled from behind this coign of vantage! "Constantinople! That means the rule of the world!"

CHAPTER VI

THE PROBLEM OF THE NORTH SEA

HAVING considered the Mediterranean and the remoter seas to which it gives access, we may pass beyond the Pillars of Hercules on our further quest. To the south lies the great rounded solid continent of Africa, now almost wholly under foreign suzerainty, and divided among half a dozen nations in three or four times as many separate parcels. It is plain that the continent was made for the purpose. It has no inland seas, no strategic point where the door can be closed against the commerce of inner states. Its northern coast, as we have seen, shares in the dangerous responsibilities of the Mediterranean, but elsewhere there is no especial problem, no vortex into which the inevitable currents of commerce and life are formed in perpetual maelstrom.

If our voyage of exploration takes us to the north, as has more often been the case with explorers, we again find for a long distance nothing to complicate the relations of men. The Iberian peninsula which we first round, is an excellent illustration of the influence of an uncongested coast line. It is quite artificially divided between two kindred peoples who would long ago have been forced into one, or engaged in perpetual broils if they had been dependent upon a



single outlet to the sea. But as they both have sea coast in abundance, they live contentedly side by side, the mere desire for more territory which is felt by all peoples being quite insufficient to disturb their peaceful relations. When we consider that the two peoples are essentially one, thus minimising the difficulties of assimilation, and that the one has always been large enough to overwhelm the other, and exceedingly little hampered by scruples, it is significant that they live in easy tolerance and good will. The same is true of France and Spain as we go farther north. They do not fight because they do not have to fight. Their sea coast is open, and Nature has laid no trap for them.

But as we round the long finger of Cape Finisterre, and follow the coast eastward, we steer straight into one of the most ingenious war traps which Nature has ever devised. Soon there is land upon our left, a long barrier-like peninsula at first, and then a broad land whose compact mass crowds closer and closer to the continent, until but a moderate channel is left through which we pass into a spacious inland sea. This sea has another and broader opening to the north, for the new land we have discovered is an island, or group of islands, spacious, fertile, and exceedingly rich in natural resources. These are the elements of power, and as these islands are immune from land attack, their husbanded resources are potent to control the waters within. Thus the coast line of Europe which has hitherto moved along with a fair degree of directness, as though it were actually going somewhere, suddenly turns far inland, and then

capriciously backs out again, forming a vast loop or pocket through whose entrance must pass the commerce of some of the world's busiest peoples, with the inevitable jostling and conflict that such a congestion implies. And right at this natural toll-gate sits England, the pre-destined gate keeper, strong in her own protected people, and her rich island resources, and immeasurably strong in the resources which this strength and this position enable her to command.

But this is not all. Continuing farther east, we find another gateway. This time the passage is long, narrow and tortuous, and leads us through several deceptive widenings before we at last enter another spacious inland sea, the highway to other and still larger lands, and even more susceptible of control. Here another vast volume of commerce is congested with its local frictions and dangers, and when released, it goes to swell the volume of the larger congestion outside. The Baltic is thus like the Black Sea, a double-locked area, controlled by inner and outer doors, the one at the Dardanelles and Gibraltar, the other at the Danish Straits and the English Channel. Curiously enough, it is the same great power in either case that is thus doubly locked in, and to complete the analogy, the same great power in each case holds the outer key. Is it possible to contemplate such a situation and not see in it the possibility, almost the guarantee of trouble? In one respect there is an important difference. The inner door, though held in each case by comparatively weak powers, is really controlled in the north by the foremost of continental powers. Whoever would force the Danish Straits must reckon

with Germany, a power which, though not actually adjacent, is vitally interested and in a position of full control. In the south Turkey has long been isolated. It is partly for this reason that Russia has long concentrated her effort on the southern entrance, the more so as it was the more serviceable of the two. Germany's recent determination, however, to make Constantinople her objective, completes the analogy between the two situations. Russia, in either case, is locked behind double doors. In each case the inner door is held by a feeble power backed by Germany. In each case the outer door is held by Britain. That is the reason why Russia is fighting Germany now, and the reason why she will be fighting Britain later. When she gets powerful enough, as she almost certainly will, to overpower a single doorkeeper, we shall find of necessity the two combining their forces against her. It is Germany's misfortune or Germany's madness that she has, for the moment, combined the two against herself.

Once more is felt the impatient protest: "Why all this locking up and breaking out? Why not always open these broad doors, through which the commerce of a dozen continents might pass uncrowded?" Yes, undoubtedly, and for the most part they are open. But nothing can ever keep them so except the assurance of reasonableness and fairness among men. In such close pent quarters men have wonderful power to work one another's hurt, and corresponding occasion for vigilance and suspicion. The doorkeepers must ever be watchful till the bear becomes wholly a man.

Such, in the large, is the problem of the North Sea, but the whole circuit of its coast is studded with local difficulties which give to the problem, as thus enlarged, an almost unparalleled complexity. These local problems it is important to notice in some detail.

The supreme fact is the dominating position of Britain. It is interesting to note upon how many factors her pre-eminence depends. Were the area smaller, Britain could not have developed the force necessary to control the North Sea. Equally, if her soil had been barren or her climate unpropitious like that of similar latitudes on our side of the Atlantic, her population would have been scanty and scattered, and control, first of the Channel and then of the islands themselves, would have passed to the more favoured peoples on the continent. Nor is it possible to imagine Britain in her great rôle of to-day without her coal measures and her other mineral resources.

But the point upon which we need especially to insist is that of location and the nature of the British coast. Britain is not only an island, but it is separated from the mainland by a comparatively broad expanse of water. The English Channel is not a river or even a Dardanelles, but a considerable sea, twenty-two miles wide at its narrowest point, and for the most part very much wider. During her period of incubation, while she was still small and self-sufficing, Britain found in this broad expanse of sea an admirable protection against the invasions which ravaged the continent. Even in the early day Britain was seldom invaded, and since 1066 her shores have been inviolate. But as she developed her resources to the

point where contact with other countries was necessary, she could reach them only by crossing the sea. The continental countries, having no such narrow limitations, were slow to take to the sea, to which Britain was forced from the outset. She therefore easily outstripped them in the development of sea power. This result was the more predetermined by the fact that her coast furnishes many and excellent harbours, while those of the continent are few and inferior.

This preponderance of maritime strength naturally determined British strategy in war. Her enemies might have more soldiers, but she had more ships. Hence it was obviously desirable to meet them on the sea if possible. At first this was difficult, except when the enemy attempted invasion, for the enemy ventured but little on the sea, and could not be greatly injured on that element. England's earlier wars were all fought on land, and under the great handicap of having to cross the Channel. This led to some curious results. Under the feudal régime each feudatory had to furnish his quota of troops and equip them at his own expense. This was possible in local wars, but when ships had to be furnished to take these troops across the Channel, it was embarrassing. Hence the custom grew up of commuting this feudal obligation for a money payment. With the revenues so secured, the monarch could maintain a force of professional soldiers which no extemporised militia could withstand. It was with such troops that the battles of Crécy and Agincourt were won against odds that make the tale sound fabulous. This advantage, of course,

was lost when military science developed on the continent, though some shadow of it remains in the undoubted efficiency of the small standing army of Britain, the only professional army in Europe.

But as we have seen, the great characteristic of civilisation is that it takes to the sea. As the nations of the continent developed maritime commerce and became more and more dependent upon it, the situation played steadily into Britain's hands. All powerful at sea and thus protected from the possibility of invasion, she began a full century earlier than her rivals the utilisation of the great resources which are the source of her present power and which have enabled her to utilise the advantages of her unique position.

The French coast offers no serious present-day problem. Earlier wars between the two countries were due to political causes which have quite passed away, and the bitter struggle with Napoleon may be attributed to the fact that France had temporarily pushed out into areas not naturally her own, and had incurred responsibilities in connections that vitally concerned Britain. If strained relations again develop between the two, it will be in connection with colonial interests. Even this now seems unlikely. In any case France has no North Sea problem, for the very good reason that she is outside the fatal gateway. It is fortunate for the world that these two great powers have seemingly reached a delimitation of all their frontiers which involves no real hardship for either. Possibly each may have territories which the other would like to possess, but neither is locked

up or constrained by the other at any vital point. It is not too much to say that mere land hunger seldom leads to war. It is strategic sites, which are conditions of independence, that cause trouble.

East of France the difficulties are at once apparent. The great power here is Germany, last formed and least settled of continental powers. We are concerned at present only with the problem of her sea coast. First of all be it noted that this frontage on the Baltic and the North Sea is her only sea coast. This coast is at best but indifferently suited to purposes of modern commerce. The coast waters are very shallow, and the harbours are all river mouths with their usual barriers of sand bar and silt. Industry, however, has made good the limitations of nature, and the immense importance of the commerce created by these industrious peoples has made these harbours among the busiest in the world.

But viewed in their political aspect, these harbours present a curious anomaly. About midway in the natural coast line of Germany projects the slender peninsula of Denmark marking the boundary between the North Sea and the Baltic. The southern portion or neck of this peninsula was long ago prudently acquired by Germany, and by the construction of a canal across it, she has secured communication at all times for her merchant marine and navy, thus making it impossible to close the inner door against her, as it can be closed against Russia. It also enables her to mass her naval power on either side, an advantage which, in a war like the present, is incalculable.

In the Baltic Germany has no grievance. Her

coast line of over five hundred miles is the full frontage of her domain and considerably more, for a comparatively narrow strip of German territory here projects beyond the German hinterland and robs Russia of a part of her all too meagre frontage. Harbours are numerous, and as the shallow Baltic goes, excellent, while the Kiel Canal gives them much of the advantage of North Sea ports. But in the North Sea the German coast line is curiously curtailed by two small coast countries, maintained in artificial independence, which intercept three-fourths of the natural frontage of the German hinterland. This is Germany's standing grievance, and one which it is impossible to contemplate from a natural or geographical standpoint without recognising its justness. Not only is the territory behind these countries German, but it is the chief industrial centre of Germany, the one in which most of her foreign commerce originates. When we add that the population of both countries is essentially Germanic, the anomaly of their political independence becomes strikingly apparent. Yet there is no anomaly in the modern political world which it will be more difficult to eliminate so long as anything like the present balance of power is maintained. Holland and Belgium owe their existence to no far seeing sagacity of European statesmanship. They came into existence as petty principalities long ago, when there was no Germany, and the territory now united in the German Empire, was itself divided into units no larger than themselves. As these units have become consolidated and highly organised for war, these unabsorbed independencies have acquired

sudden value in French and British eyes. Belgium offers the one feasible route for invasion between France and Germany, while the two countries offer a base of possible offence against Britain which must not on any account be allowed to pass into German hands. When, sometime since, a Dutch port was about to be fortified and converted into a naval base, Britain peremptorily forbade the project under the threat of war. The seeming effrontery of this interference with the plans of an independent power is suggestive of the extreme tension which has long existed between these great North Sea powers. Ever since the expansionist policy of the German Empire began, Britain has realised that that expansion could only be in a direction inimical to her own interests. Germany must get her colonies from Britain or get them in localities which controlled Britain's lines of communication, simply because there were no other colonies or locations to be had. Not being prepared to surrender either colonies or control, Great Britain has realised that war might be the alternative. When Germany began to challenge her naval supremacy, the possibility became almost a certainty. The intentions of Holland may have been most innocent, but the result to Britain would have been not the less disastrous if a power that Holland was unable to resist should seize the base so fortified and use it in a way not intended. It is no criticism of Britain to say that her defence of Belgium was not motivated exclusively by altruism or by regard for treaty obligations.

Of all the northern powers, Russia is the least satisfactorily situated. It is true that she has summer

access through the White Sea to the Arctic Ocean, and hence around the northern end of the Scandinavian peninsula to the Atlantic. It is even reported that a railroad, pushed to completion since the war began, now gives Russia a far northern outlet which, by a caprice of the Gulf Stream, is free from ice the year round. But valuable as this northern route may be at a time like this, its economic value can never be considerable. Even an ice-free port does not wholly overcome the barrier of the long rail haul over the frozen arctic wastes, or the long voyage through a stormy ocean. For commercial purposes, the Baltic is Russia's only outlet to the north. Even within the Baltic her situation can hardly be called satisfactory. The unnatural extension of East Prussia beyond the natural frontier of Germany, thus intercepting the ports which are the natural outlet of the provinces to the rear, is a standing grievance to Russia as Belgium and Holland are to Germany, but without any such plea of necessity. Dull indeed would be the Russian patriot who would not see in the Vistula a more natural and equitable frontier.

But the greater hardship is obviously to be found in the dependence of Russia upon the powers who control the Danish Straits and the English Channel. Russia has made no overt move as yet to secure control of even the inner gateway, for she knows how to concentrate upon one thing at a time. But the same logic which impels her to seek control of the Dardanelles, will in turn dictate her advance to the Danish Straits. The annexation of Finland and its subsequent rather violent assimilation by the great empire

can hardly be construed otherwise than as a stepping stone to the control of the Scandinavian peninsula. This next step once taken, Russia would have not only one side of the Danish Straits, insuring her at least defensive control, but she would have in the fjords of Norway unlimited access to the Atlantic for emergency purposes. Economy, however, would still give precedence to the Baltic and justify to Russian minds all measures necessary to secure its complete control. This could mean nothing less than moving the Russian frontier from the Vistula still further west to the Elbe and the control of the Danish peninsula. This would, of course, affront the principles of race unity, balance of power, and much else, but hardly more than the Russian plan to encircle the Black Sea and control the Dardanelles. It is needless to say that long before this was accomplished, long before even the Scandinavian peninsula was acquired, Russia would meet all the resistance that Germany could put up, and that with her could probably be aligned all the western powers. For with Russia in Norway and Denmark, their independence would be but nominal. It is this certainty that has thus far prevented an advance. But that such an advance has been considered and is kept constantly in mind by Russian imperialists can hardly be doubted. The fear of it is the constant spectre of the Scandinavian countries, a spectre which drives them visibly toward an alliance with the otherwise most unwelcome Germany. It is difficult to imagine a time when Russia will not feel the temptation to turn the Baltic into a Russian lake, a temptation to which we may expect her to yield if circumstances fa-

your. It is impossible to imagine a time when such an effort will not encounter strenuous resistance. In this, as in the relation between Britain and Germany, we see the permanent problem of the North Sea.

The commerce of the North Sea and its tributaries is incomparably superior to that of the Dardanelles, yet its natural domain is smaller and inferior in resources. But it is a developed area, while the other is still crude. Belgium, Holland and Germany, its chief contributors, are among the most advanced nations in the world in the exploitation of their natural resources, and though their development is destined to go much further, no such increase can be expected here as in the domain of the Black Sea. Russia, to be sure, is young, in the north as in the south, though the location of her capital in the north by the fiat of her great Czar, and the continued dependence of the south upon the caprice of Turkey, has forced the development of the Baltic region beyond its due. The future inclines toward the south. Taken all in all, the North Sea is the home of the present, while Constantinople belongs to the past and to the future.

CHAPTER VII


THE PROBLEM OF THE FAR EAST

IT is significant of recent developments that we can no longer consider the problems of the West by themselves. The East has its situations and problems quite like those of the West, and increasingly shows a certain imitative tendency to treat them in the same manner, in itself a fact to suggest the new consciousness in the Orient of western doings and an unconscious recognition of western leadership. But more than this, there has grown up between East and West a vital connection, commercial and political, which makes the eastern situation a part of the great world equilibrium. A disturbance of this equilibrium in the West has its repercussion in the East, as recent events have demonstrated, and in turn a disturbance in the East subjects to increasing strain the always unstable equilibrium of the western world. The East must be heard, therefore, in any serious study of European problems.

The problem of the East has many phases, but interest chiefly centres in the struggle for the control of a single outlet to the Pacific, the so-called Yellow Sea. The southern part of the east coast of Asia presents few special difficulties. This coast, with trifling exceptions, is in the undisputed possession of

China, a populous if not a powerful country, and for the present at least the policy of the nations is to demand only commercial privileges and those on a basis of equality. The granting of these privileges involves economic problems for China of the gravest possible character, problems which may exert a profound influence upon domestic politics, but it does not seem to threaten international complications, save in the ever more improbable event of the parcelling out of China among the Powers. Moreover this coast is much indented and the numerous harbours thus afforded are sufficiently equivalent to make it but little object to any power to monopolise any particular location. All these ports furnish direct access into the broadest of all oceans.

But north of Shanghai, which is about in the latitude of Savannah, all this changes, and geography seems to predestine men to strife. For another hundred miles or more the coast line runs to the north, but affords no harbour. The inhospitable shore wards off the trader, driving his ships northward and along round the mountainous peninsula of Shantung, to the few secluded harbours that nestle in the innermost recesses of the Gulf of Pechili. Meanwhile to the north, all unnoticed, the continent has swept far to the east, then south in the peninsula of Korea, closing in on the trader's rear almost from the moment he left Shanghai. As he passed this port he entered the outer circuit of the great Asian stronghold, and as he passed the rocky heights of Shantung he might have seen on the other side the downthrust mountain peninsula of Liaotung, tipped with the redoubtable Port Arthur,



companion guardian to the stronghold's inner donjon. And lest wary commerce should slip around the outer defences and sailing up the east coast of Korea, approach the continent further north, the icy barriers of climate have been supplemented by the long bulwark of Japan. Nature has simply corralled the commerce of the most active latitudes, and driven all into a single little pen. The creative industry and active commerce of the world lies mostly between the thirtieth and fiftieth parallels of latitude, and in Asia there is not a single really free port, and but one really good approach to the vast continent, within these limits.

It should hardly be necessary to recall, though it is all important to remember, that between these two parallels, the largest of European countries touches the Pacific. It is noteworthy, too, that the neighbouring portions of the Chinese empire, Manchuria and inner Mongolia, are at once rich and undeveloped, and that the best harbours and the strongest natural defences are on their coasts. Finally, as the last requisite to insure trouble, the long barrier reef of Japan is densely populated, highly organised, and keenly alive to all the possibilities of the situation. Let us note more in detail these possibilities.

The Russian empire extends clear through to the northeastern extremity of Asia, and thus has ample access to the Pacific. But this access is worthless because of adverse climatic conditions. The latitude is about the same as that of Hudson's Bay, and the conditions of navigation much the same. Russia has no railroads running to this frozen north, and if she ever

has them, her great commerce will never go that way. Much the same is true of the long frontage on the sea of Okhotsk. This, to be sure, is no further north than the North Sea, but the Gulf Stream of the Pacific is shunted off by the Japan islands, leaving this great sea and its hinterland the domain of ice and fog. There are no good ports and no cities, and such as it may develop can never be an outlet for the great plains of Siberia lying to the west.

Dropping to the latitude of Liverpool, we come to the mouth of the Amur River, the great waterway of the region, and the seemingly predestined seat of a great port. But here again nature is chary. The sea is still ice-bound, and available for scarce half the year. But now comes a new indignity. Just at this point — the first which commerce might consider — begins the great island barrier, thrown like a huge wall around the coast clear to the tip of Korea. The beginning is the long island of Saghalien, more than six hundred miles in length, which starts so near the mainland that it leaves virtually no channel fit for commerce, even if commerce were disposed to look in this untoward direction. If we turn southward in search of an exit, we shall find the first opening in the barrier to the south of Saghalien in La Pérouse Strait, less than thirty miles wide, both sides of which are now in the possession of Japan, who thus can control the strait by a moderate exercise of naval power. But even this entrance only admits to the Sea of Okhotsk, which is closed by the long line of the Kurile islands, also Japanese, whose many gaps are all narrower than La Pérouse. If this exit seems unsatis-

factory, we shall go farther and fare worse. The next break in the barrier is the Tsugaru Strait, only a quarter as wide as the other, long and winding, and guarded by the great Japanese islands of Yezo and Hondo on either side. And besides, in this case as in the other, the passage doesn't take us where we chiefly want to go.

The next opening, the Strait of Shimonoseki, is scarcely an opening at all. It is only a fraction of a mile wide, long and devious, and it opens, not into the Pacific, but into the marvellous Inland Sea of Japan. It is true that this sea gives access to the Pacific by a like narrow passage at the other end, but the whole affair was obviously intended for private use. Like a private premises whose front and rear gates furnish a convenient passageway from street to street, its use for that purpose must depend on the indulgence of the owner. We can hardly complain if at any time he puts up the sign: "No thoroughfare!"

We have moved on like a fly looking for a larger mesh in the screen of his trap. Now is our last and best chance. Between Japan and Korea is a channel over a hundred miles in width. It is not only ample for all possible purposes, but is in the direction which world commerce must always chiefly take. But even here we shall hardly pass without a permit. At intervals in this channel lie several large islands like stepping-stones between Japan and the continent. These islands, which from time immemorial have been in the possession of Japan, break up the larger channel into lesser channels nowhere much more than twenty miles wide. The closing of such channels is

an easy task for modern naval power. It was here that Togo awaited and annihilated the great Russian fleet in 1905.

Having explored the island barrier, let us go back to the mouth of the Amur and follow the coast of the mainland south. The coast is Russian for nearly a thousand miles until we reach Vladivostok in the latitude of Boston. But latitude is a deceptive criterion, and is here no guarantee of an open sea like that off our New England coast. For five months in every year Vladivostok is icebound. Worse than this, Vladivostok and every other port that Russia may create on this, her whole eastern frontier, is Japan-bound. It may be that some day Russia can ignore that fetter, but for the present — for a long time to come — that fetter holds her with a grip of steel.

It may seem depressing thus to think of neighbour peoples as constantly concerned to control individually these broad common thoroughfares that are ample for the convenience of all. To such an objection the answer for the present must be that peoples *are* so concerned, and that any nation which should cease so to concern itself would soon exist on suffrance only. And after all, this concern is not unlike the instinct which governs individual action and which passes as not unneighbourly. As has been said before, no prudent man would be dependent on his neighbours for access to his premises, and that not because he was not neighbourly, but rather because he wished to remain so. If it be objected that the problem of access and of common highways is not so simple for nations as for individuals, it is conceded. Moreover, that is

the very point of argument. But with all their striving and all their concern, the peoples are usually neighbourly enough. It is neither bad blood nor unreasonable ambition that leads them to seek an outfit of commercial facilities which shall make them independent of their neighbours' activities, and minimise the occasions of friction which collisions of commerce might entail. It is certain that nations will not willingly stop short of this goal. It is demonstrable that nature hasn't enough harbours, etc., to go round. Hence the problem of problems — difficult beyond all estimate, but not necessarily insoluble.

The earlier programme of Russia undoubtedly included the extension of her sway over Korea, thus giving her the entire western side of the Japan Sea, and making it impossible for Japan to close the southern entrance to her navy or her commerce. This was thwarted by Japan in her great struggle with Russia, and her annexation of Korea has assured her absolute control of this important access to her own and the Asiatic coast. But long before this consummation it was apparent that this was to Russia only a side issue. The control of the Japan Sea was vital to Japan, for it insured not only commercial advantage, but defence, and so, her very existence. But to Russia, however important, it was not sufficient. Vladivostok was too far away from commercial Siberia, and the long rail haul must be shortened if possible. Above all, an outlet into warmer waters unencumbered by ice, was well-nigh indispensable. For both these purposes, the concentration area already described behind the Shantung and Liaotung peninsulas was ideally adapted.

Transferring Russia's problem to our own territory, we may put it this way. She already controlled the St. Lawrence River. What she now wanted was New York. What would we want under such circumstances? Nay, put the case stronger. Suppose a barrier reef, an island empire under the Kaiser's rule, stretched from Nova Scotia to Long Island, its narrow gate always open to us during good behaviour. What would we think about it? What would we do about it? To secure real independence for our St. Lawrence outlet would be important. To secure New York would be imperative. In reality Russia's case was much stronger than this, for she had no ports, no coast line, farther south.

Hence the great struggle, the scheming, the bullying, the aggression upon helpless China, Japan's deepening suspicion, her silent preparation, her swift and terrible onset, and her victory. Korea is first "protected" and then annexed. Port Arthur, won once before, and lost to the great rival, is won again, and Dairen, its commercial adjunct and the railroad far back into coveted Manchuria. Russia is forced back into her remote hinterland. Her crestfallen cruisers and merchantmen follow the icebreaker through frozen seas into cheerless Vladivostok. The Kaiser's flag waves from Long Island to Nova Scotia, and from New York up the railway to the north, while we go in and out at the frozen St. Lawrence at his gracious pleasure. This is no criticism, no plea. Japan played the game fairly enough, rather more fairly than it is usually played. She played for the greatest stakes that a nation can play for — inde-

pendence and existence itself — for Russia's victory would have meant for her a subjection which no victory of hers could ever impose upon Russia. But be the equities of the case what they may — our sympathies what we will — the great fact remains that interests were opposed, and that conflict was foredoomed. And it is farther clear that the result of the conflict to date offers no permanent settlement of the difficulty. The problem remains, must remain under any possible condition short of general occupancy by a single power. Present policy, and plentiful trouble in other quarters, may induce Russia to submit with good grace for a time to the present situation, but she will not, cannot, should not, accept it as a permanent arrangement, any more than we would accept the analogous arrangement mentioned above. On the other hand Japan can never safely accept less, and each year of possession increases her ability to keep what she has won.

Concurrently with Russia's seizure of the Liaotung peninsula and the entrenchment of her navy and her commerce at the twin ports of Dairen and Port Arthur, Germany seized a commanding site on the opposite peninsula of Shantung. There was at the time a concert between the two powers, a concert which failed them in the hour of their need. These two positions controlled absolutely the broad gulfs of Pechili and Liaotung lying behind, and with them all access to Manchuria and North China, including the commercial metropolis of Tientsin and the capital of China itself, Peking. The danger to China was enormous, but she could not resist it, perhaps did not see

it. The danger to Japan was chiefly from Russia, the trend of German ambitions being obviously in another direction. But the Russian danger once disposed of, Japan could hardly fail to regard the presence of a powerful naval base so near her shores in the hands of an aggressive western power as a menace to her safety. Hence in accordance with the coolest calculations of self-interest, she has taken advantage of Germany's embarrassment to expel her forces from Shantung. This gives her the two peninsulas, and with them the complete control of this gateway to the East. Whether the holding of this detached outpost will be a source of strength or weakness remains to be seen. The alleged intention is to restore it to China. Whether that intention is carried out will depend largely on her future relations with that great oriental power.

In conclusion it is well again to remind ourselves that the problem inheres rather in the geographical situation than in the character of the peoples involved. Russia and Japan are no more quarrelsome, no more ambitious than other peoples. Their most doubtful aggressions compare favourably with our former despoiling of Mexico and our acquisition of Panama. They have had trouble, because there was trouble inherent in their environment. It is the same everywhere. France and Spain live peaceably enough, though neighbours, because each has her own harbours and other commercial outfit, free and unmenaced by the other. Who ever saw a problem in the Bay of Biscay? The same is true of England and France in eastern Asia, though Tonkin and Hong Kong are

close together. Each has harbours enough, and all else that it needs, with no danger to or from the other. So everywhere under like conditions.


But wherever Nature has so arranged the land and sea as to congest the commerce of large areas, and no parcelling out of territory becomes possible without denying necessary facilities to one or exposing another to a neighbour's domination, any arrangement that can be made must involve hardship and inequality, and so invite if not insure conflict. It is in such areas that wars have their usual origin. Such wars are not for nothing, however ill advised, nor are they necessarily marked by great bitterness. The war between Russia and Japan was a conspicuous example of a cold blooded war, fought between powers that perfectly understood the situation, knowing that neither could yield the point claimed without serious if not fatal sacrifice to the growth of its people and the triumph of its ideals. Each respected the other and itself for its insistence. There was nothing to do but try it out. The matter is not settled. The contestants are taking breath. And as here, so elsewhere. Is there any alternative? Not as yet.

CHAPTER VIII

THE CASE OF TURKEY

IN the foregoing chapters we have considered some of the physical peculiarities of the eastern hemisphere, areas so located and so shaped that they tend to congest the commercial and other interests of the different nations and so to bring them into conflict. Other problems might have been considered, such as that of the Persian Gulf, hardly less important than those chosen, but it would have been only one more illustration of principles already much illustrated. There are also problems of defensive land frontiers, of railway and mining concessions, and many others, but they are one and all less important than the great examples chosen, and such notice as we need to give them may well be included under the subjects to which we now turn. Thus far we have considered individual problems as related to many peoples. We shall now find it useful to consider individual peoples as related to many problems. This will necessarily involve some repetition, but repetition of things of which we need to be often reminded.

Turkey is somewhat of an anomaly among the nations of Europe. Its counterpart is to be sought, if anywhere, in Asia, to which part of the world it strictly belongs. In some ways it finds its grotesque



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analogue in the now defunct Papal States, for its ruler is quite as much a pope as an emperor. But unlike the Papal States, it has made a serious business of war and empire building, and its military establishment was long the most efficient in Europe. The substantial reality of its temporal power not only made it a force to be reckoned with, but saved it from the worst vice of a really religious state. For it is a well attested fact that practical empire builders of the purely mundane stamp, set a value upon subjects of productive or fighting capacity, even though heretical, who under a merely religious jurisdiction, would be cast as rubbish to the void. Practicality has ever been more humane than fanaticism.

Contrary to received tradition, this principle has been constantly illustrated in the rise of the Moslem power. No grosser calumny has ever been perpetrated than that which pictures the Moslem conqueror as everywhere offering the conquered the choice of the Koran or the sword. The disproof of the story indeed is found in the existence in every Moslem country of large bodies of followers of the earlier faith. In Egypt, where fanaticism seems to have flourished under every religion, the ancient Coptic church still thrives and whole communities still own allegiance to it as before the days of Omar. The Gregorian and Armenian churches have never been suppressed in Asia, while the religious establishments of the Balkan states have been freely tolerated. Nay, more than this. The history of Moslem conquest contains instances of altogether extraordinary consideration for conquered faiths. In the centre of the city of Damas-

cus stands a vast mosque which was once a Christian church. Like all such religious establishments in the East, it is built, cloister like, around a hollow square, the main sanctuary stretching at great length along one of the long sides. When the Moslems captured Christian Damascus in 635, the days of their fiercest enthusiasm, a traitor admitted them by one of the gates. The commander, seeing that all was lost, hastened to surrender the city to the Moslem commander on the opposite side who had not yet heard of his advantage. Capture then meant pillage, but capitulation entitled the conquered to immunity. The two Moslem forces, entering from opposite sides, advanced, the one pillaging and the other refraining, and met in the church at the centre. The stratagem of capitulation was of course discovered, but its guarantees were respected. The line was drawn through the middle of the church, one-half of which remained a church while the other became a mosque, and Moslem and Christian, entering by the same door, worshipped under the same roof. When some years later this trouble-inviting arrangement was terminated and the whole became a mosque, the Christians were indemnified by a grant of other property for the part they were obliged to surrender.

When the Crusaders captured Jerusalem in 1099, their horses are said to have waded knee-deep in the blood of unresisting Moslems while the Jews were burnt alive in their synagogue. The day closed with a white robed service of thankfulness in the Church of the Holy Sepulchre, spared, be it noted, for five centuries by the Moslems. Next day the slaughter began

again with careful deliberation. Tancred had accepted the surrender of three hundred prisoners with a guarantee that their lives should be spared, but he was overruled and his protégés slaughtered on the ground that promises made to the infidel were not binding.

No one now feels it necessary to defend the Crusaders or to exonerate Christianity of all responsibility for their excesses. Equally, we may concede that such exceptional tolerance as that shown in Damascus is not representative of Mohammedanism. But the contrast is not therefore without significance. Christianity has usually been intolerant of other faiths, humanely so, for the most part, often — it may be — beneficently so, but none the less intolerant, strongly convinced of its superiority, its sole validity, as a religious system, and determined to assure its dominion “where’er the sun doth his successive journeys run.” Mohammedanism has been quite as assured and quite as determined to assert its claim, but less anxious, apparently, that all creatures should share its benefits. May we perhaps say that Christianity has been the more democratic and Mohammedanism the more aristocratic faith?

Be that as it may, the whole structure of Moslem power seems to have been built on a foundation of indifferent, not to say contemptuous, tolerance. The Moslem seems seldom to have been actuated by motives of ferocious intolerance toward unbelievers, and when he has seemed to be thus animated, as in the case of the Armenians, there have always been other grounds for his feeling. On the other hand, he has

never felt under any very serious obligation toward them. They were inferiors and legitimate subjects of exploitation. Moslem policy toward non-Moslem subjects has always been to leave them to shift pretty much for themselves, guaranteeing them only the most elemental rights, and good-naturedly exploiting or plundering them as a superior and governing race might reasonably be expected to do. The organisation of the state being religious, none but followers of the prophet could be expected or trusted to perform military service. The picture has its sunshine as well as its shadow. The writer recently found the Jews of Salonica, a very numerous community, bewailing the transfer of that city to Greek rule. Their condition was nothing like so favourable, they declared, in Christian as in Mohammedan countries. Yet they are infidels to the Moslem quite as much as to the Christian. But the Jew thrives on liberty and unrestricted opportunity.

The Turk is by no means the original Moslem. He has not the remotest kinship of race to the conqueror of Damascus. The Moslem faith has been committed in succession to a number of peoples, the earlier ones Semitic, the later Tartar in origin. Like ourselves, they have waged their fiercest wars with their co-religionists. This has destroyed the unity of the Moslem world and paralysed its influence, but it has not changed this, its original character. Of all Moslem hegemonies, that of the Turk has been most indolently good-natured and indifferent. The Moslem fanatic of to-day is the Arab. It has always been the Arab or his kin. The Turk is seldom fanatical.

Indeed, it is his easy-going temperament that is the great source of his weakness and the root of all his woes. It enables the subject peoples whom he despises and plunders, to recoup themselves many fold at his expense, until, vaguely conscious of their depredations, he loses patience and indulges in an orgy of brutal retaliation. It is with no intent to justify these excesses that resident observers of the daily tussle of Turk with Jew, Armenian, and Greek, usually give their sympathy to the Turk.

To this characteristic of the Turk was due one of the most remarkable, and in later history, one of the most important institutions of the Empire, the Capitulations. These were a series of agreements by which foreigners resident in Turkey were placed under the jurisdiction of their own laws and their own officials. As it has worked out, this has become a valued privilege, securing to the foreigner immunity from the vexations of Turkish maladministration and even from the legitimate duties of citizenship. As such, we have come to think of the Capitulations as concessions extorted from decadent Turkey by the powerful nations of the West. Such they were when, in the later day, the system was imposed on China and Japan, and such they eventually became in Turkey. But nothing could be further from the truth as regards their origin. They date from a time when — can our imaginations picture it — the two supreme powers in Europe were Portugal and Turkey. The first of these agreements was made between the most powerful of Turkish monarchs and a defeated Christian sovereign. Their real purport was this. The

alien and the unbeliever had no standing in Moslem law. Its blessings were only for the faithful. Yet as Turkey possessed the shrines of the Christians and the most important highways of the world's commerce, thousands of aliens were at all times within the empire. These aliens were long outlaws, and got along only by the suffrance of their Turkish neighbours, but the need of regulating their status and conduct ultimately became manifest. Rome had had the same problem in her early history, and had just as unhesitatingly refused to aliens the benefit of her sacred law. She met their needs, however, by developing alongside her own code, a second code called the law of nature, or law of nations, a sort of codification of common sense and the supposed general practice, which, because of its less sacred character, proved infinitely more flexible and opened the door to that wonderful development of Roman law which is the glory of that great people. The Turk, not being a lawgiver, and having an easier alternative, merely refused to bother with these outsiders, and said to the Christian powers in effect: "Here, take care of your own people and see that they behave, and I won't interfere." He was totally unconscious at the time that the task thus laid upon them might later be used to impair his authority.

It was in pursuance of this same policy that he allowed the church, in the various countries which he conquered, to persist, and recognised its patriarchs as responsible leaders and administrators. It was out of the question to continue the temporal sovereigns of these countries. Moreover, it was perfectly congenial to Mohammedan ideas, that a religious functionary

should administer law, for their own law is founded on the Koran and has been largely administered by religious authorities. So each country got its patriarch, and thus was laid the foundation of that tenacious sectarianism which to-day is one of the chief obstacles to the unification and tranquillisation of the Balkans.

The Turk has never been an administrator. The countries that he conquered were all possessed of a better organisation than he was able to devise, so he quite naturally left them much as he found them. His conception of empire at the best was the primitive one which Rome had long ago outgrown, a group of subject states whose duty was to pay tribute to the ruler, and his duty to them to prevent any other ruler from putting them under tribute. To go out into these subject provinces and guide them in the development of their resources, to help them build roads and harbours, to plan their cities and teach them the art of organisation, to take up the white man's burden, in short, all this had had no place in his traditions, and if it had had such a place, his inferiority to the peoples he subdued would have prevented its continuance. In such works as were undertaken by the greater Sultans, it was necessary to depend entirely on Christian subjects for guidance. There is not a single great mosque in Constantinople which was not planned by a Christian architect and motivated by the Christian church of Santa Sophia.

The history of an empire so formed and so administered can hardly be other than a record of decadence, once the limit of conquest has been reached.

Territories administered by men who have neither the genius nor the inclination for organisation and who are intent merely on the collection of tribute, are not likely to be vigilant in the repairing of roads or enterprising in the building of new ones. Irrigation works, harbours, and public works of every kind are used till they need patching, and then patched till they need renewing, and then abandoned. Industry thus crippled becomes less productive, and its lessened product meets the exactions of the tax gatherer with increasing difficulty. Vineyards become fields, and fields become pasture where goats browse on the untended vegetation. The traveller in Turkey who comes upon a rock-hewn winepress in a pasture choked with weeds, or a Roman bridge crossed by a meandering camel-trail, or the tumbled columns of a Herodian city, or a stable in the sanctuary of a Greek temple, certainly has food for thought. The Turk hasn't done it all, but he at least hasn't undone it. Nor can he. He is much more deserving of our sympathy than of our execration. "The incapable Turk" sounds much less dramatic than "the unspeakable Turk," but it is far more just.

The empire reached its zenith in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, just as the assertive tendencies of Europe were breaking bounds. The fabric of the Turkish Empire looked imposing, but it had been built with flimsier and flimsier workmanship as time went on. The Balkan kingdoms had been added without assimilation, and with a minimum of actual sovereignty. The Barbary States had accepted a nominal suzerainty on their own initiative, merely as a matter

of policy. The sultan had arrogated to himself the solemn rôle of the caliphate without a shadow of claim to that kinship to the prophet which the rôle implied, and Mecca gave him but lukewarm support. It was in this state of pompous senility that Turkey was called upon to meet the encroachments of expanding Europe.

Not at once was this weakness apparent. The struggle under the walls of Vienna was a dearly won victory for Europe; the war with Venice a defeat. But the force of the empire, no longer recruited by conquest, rapidly declined. The defeat of Venice was a Pyrrhic victory. From then till now the story has been one of loss and disaster. The Barbary States have shed their allegiance only to be absorbed by western powers. Greece slipped the leash, then Egypt, then the northern Balkan states, then Crete and the islands, then Albania, Macedonia and Thrace; and now the Greek headlands of Asia Minor are threatened, the Dardanelles, even Constantinople itself. Everything seems about to go. The world waits in suspense.

Quite as significant as this crumbling of the territorial fabric is the growing paralysis within. A government may be very oppressive without exercising much control. If "that government is best which governs least," then China and Turkey are among the best governed states, for the citizens of both, though often oppressed, are very little governed. So long as they pay their taxes, they are allowed to do pretty much as they please, the government being quite without the machinery for the detailed direction of

their actions. As western enterprise has pushed its way into their primitive land, the Turkish patriarchal system has proved wholly inadequate to the task of regulating the new relations involved. This palsied grasp of Turkish administration is incomprehensible to Europeans, and leads to frequent misunderstandings. The difficulty will be best understood by an illustration.

It is well known that the most important sites in the field of classical archæology, which remain to be explored are within the limits of the Turkish Empire. Yet the Turk will neither explore these sites himself nor permit outsiders to do so. Meanwhile the invaluable remains of Chaldean, Assyrian, Hittite, Greek and Roman cities are utterly unprotected. Any peasant who wants a stone for a doorsill, is free to pry out a block from a Greek temple. The writer has himself seen a Turkish road gang prying out blocks from a magnificent Roman structure to break up into dressing for a macadam road. Statues, inscriptions, and the like, discovered by chance, become the plaything of their discoverer, or are disposed of for a song to irresponsible collectors through whom they are scattered and their origin and significance lost sight of. How exasperating this dog-in-the-manger policy, this wanton, wasteful neglect!

But an archæologist familiar with the situation, shows us another side to the picture. The Turk has had experience in these matters and has found archæology a dangerous pastime. Dig he cannot, for he lacks the means, though his admirable Museum in Constantinople goes far to refute the charge of indif-

ference. On the other hand, to permit a foreign expedition to explore, quite naturally implies to the foreign mind a guaranty of protection, and this the Turk cannot furnish. An expedition starts to excavate some out-of-the-way site. Its advent arouses the curiosity, possibly the suspicion, of the peasantry, and its equipment excites their cupidity. Soon implements or animals are missing; possibly explorers are robbed, even killed. Then comes the inevitable demand for redress and indemnity, the tedious negotiation with some foreign power, and finally, the inevitable adverse verdict obtained by threat to bombard some Turkish port or seize its custom house until the indemnity is collected. Missionary, commercial, and other foreign enterprises present similar problems. When we add to this the fact that foreigners and foreign powers are in a mood of continual exasperation at Turkish inefficiency, that foreign activities are often predatory, and finally, that under the Capitulations foreigners were practically exempt from the operation of Turkish law, with immunity from taxes, inviolability of domicile, and vigorous support from powerful governments, whatever their undertakings, Turkish antipathy toward the foreigner is not difficult to understand.

This administrative feebleness quite naturally manifests itself toward the larger alien groups within the empire, as well as toward individuals. During the nineteenth century the Greeks, Servians, Bulgarians, and other peoples slowly recovered the autonomy which they had lost in war. The independence of some of these powers is usually dated from 1878,

when their status was formally recognised by Europe, but in fact it is of earlier date. Servia, for instance, exercised practically complete sovereignty for years before she was recognised as independent, even the Capitulations, the binding agreement between Turkey and foreign powers, being practically abrogated in her territory. As there were few Turks there to claim the benefit of Turkish law, a Turkish governor had nothing to do but collect taxes, and as long as Servia paid her tribute, it was as well not to irritate her by the presence of a useless functionary. Nearer Constantinople where there were more Turks, the case was different, but the rein was still a loose one. Few people are aware to how large an extent the Turkish Empire had resolved itself into quasi-independent kingdoms before the Balkan wars announced its imminent dissolution. The island of Samos, for example, was entirely autonomous, being ruled by a "prince" appointed by the sultan; but this appointment was made from an eligible list nominated by the Samians, who retained the practical power of dismissal.

Now comes the great paradox of Turkish history. Turkey has survived because of her weakness. She has been left in possession, even confirmed in possession of her territories, because of her relative impotence. The striking example of this is Constantinople. The value of this possession was recognised, as we have seen, by Napoleon a century ago. In point of fact it was no discovery of his, but a tradition, based on no theoretical considerations, but on two thousand years of experience. His rebuff to the Czar

only delayed the assertion of Russia's claim. Half a century later the time seemed ripe, and the Czar deliberately proposed the partition of Turkey among the powers interested, a procedure for which the partition of Poland furnished a precedent. But with that peculiar mixture of shrewdness and conscience which has proved so effective a combination in the English character, Britain rejected this proposal, and leagued with France and Italy, fought one of the most terrible of wars to confirm Turkey in her possession of Constantinople and her control of the entrance to the Black Sea. English sagacity saw a menace to her own control of the Mediterranean in the force which might issue from these inner recesses of Russian power. The wisdom of her policy may be questioned, but at any rate, it insured Turkish control for another sixty years. The attempt of Russia in 1878 was similarly foiled, though this time by a bloodless battle. Now that British fear of Russia has been lessened, a new protagonist arises for Turkey, a power having more than negative interest in Constantinople, but for the moment still championing the cause of Turkey. The lists are not yet closed. It is by no means certain that the issue of the present war will put an immediate end to Turkish control. A German victory would certainly mean the reinstatement of Turkey, though under virtual German suzerainty, which would perhaps be only a temporary disguise for annexation, while a victory for the Allies, though probably assuring Russia's eventual possession, might not at once open the way for a probate of the Turkish estate.

A less familiar though equally certain case of ad-

vantageous weakness is found in the Balkan peninsula. The slow recovery of independence by these unassimilated parts of the empire has been noted. As certain of these powers acquired national recognition in 1878, there began an active rivalry for ascendancy in the affairs of the peninsula. It was evident to all that the arrangement was not final, that populations were much intermingled and frontiers correspondingly arbitrary, and above all that these new states must sometime be enlarged by the inclusion of territory still loosely held under Turkish rule. Competition for this territory, notably the much discussed Macedonia, became virulent, especially between Greece and Bulgaria. Strangely enough, the competition was pushed mostly by means of schools, the point being to teach the Greek and Bulgarian languages respectively and so assimilate the population to one or the other race in preparation for the time when this might be the deciding factor in an international settlement. Seldom has a country been so overschooled as Macedonia, and seldom has schooling been so doubtful a blessing. Violence and intrigue of course complicated the situation.

Strangely enough, these little states, like the great western powers, while disagreeing on almost everything else, were agreed on the present policy of maintaining Turkish sovereignty. Each hoped to destroy that sovereignty, but not until it could be quite sure that the territory thus liberated would be added to its own. Meanwhile only the indifference and weakness of Turkey could make their propaganda possible. The Turk having no schools, cared nothing how many

the neighbouring powers established, especially as they seemed pretty thoroughly to checkmate each other. If he repressed violence at times with great brutality, this too had its advantage for the rivals, for it was needful to foster dislike for the Turk against the day of reckoning. Thus for reasons quite comparable to those urged in the councils of Berlin and London, these fledglings among the nations voted suspension of sentence for the condemned miscreant. Obviously, if Turkey were a power capable of measuring herself with Germany or England, she would at once become the object of their jealousy or fear, and their motive for keeping Constantinople and the Dardanelles in her control would disappear. Equally if her grip upon Macedonia had been firm and secure, not only would this rival propaganda have been impossible, but their energies would necessarily have been directed against her, rather than against each other.

Such was the situation when in 1908, under the leadership of foreign educated "Young Turks," Turkey suddenly undertook to be something real in the national line. A constitution was proclaimed and the machinery of representative government established, the army was reorganised to include all Ottoman nationalities, religious freedom was decreed, schools were established, espionage and other odious features of the old régime were abolished; in short, the entire national system was revised along lines elsewhere associated with efficiency and power. The world was stunned by the suddenness and seeming completeness of the transformation. There was a

brief period of watchful waiting, to see if the movement would miscarry, but as its sponsors seemed possessed of extraordinary prudence and moderation, incredulity gave way to a belief — or a fear — that a real rehabilitation of Turkey might result. Consternation was manifest in the councils of those governments whose policy for generations had been based on the assumed helplessness of Turkey. It was like the case of rival heirs who have been watching with zealous solicitude round the deathbed of a wealthy relative, and who suddenly learn that he is on the road to recovery.

When it became apparent that the passive agent whom all had agreed upon to hold the stakes of international rivalries, small and great, was about to decamp with the stakes, there was a hurried scramble and much confusion of plan. Austria promptly annexed Bosnia and Herzegovina, two large Slavic provinces which, since 1878, she had been commissioned to administer "for Turkey." Servia stormed and Russia threatened, but both were cowed when Germany laid hand upon the sword hilt. The whole European conflagration was foreshadowed. The Cretans asked admission to the Greek Parliament and were briefly restrained only by the prospect of having to face the undivided power of Turkey. The Balkan States began the difficult task of combining against their new danger, and Italy snatched Tripoli before suzerainty could become sovereignty, adding a dozen islands when Turkish obduracy prolonged the struggle. Like the drug fiend who gets along fairly comfortably until he tries to reform, only to suffer the full

penalty of his vice in the moment of his moral self-assertion, so Turkey, secure in her degeneracy, found in the path of rectitude only a long arrears of retribution. The Balkan wars capped the climax of her disaster, depriving her of all her islands and all her territories in Europe save a fragment dropped by the dissensions of her enemies.

It is difficult for those who are privileged to belong to a healthy and vigorous nation to appreciate the reaction of such disasters upon a people. Under the most favourable conditions the reform movement would probably have failed. Turkish tradition was wholly against it. The new institutions were wholly unfamiliar and corresponded to no clearly defined aspiration of the people. The new parliament is said to have debated all winter without enacting a single measure. It seemed unable to grasp the fact that it actually had the power to enact statutes. Religious liberty was hailed as a boon, a bond of brotherhood between all races, but when it was found that it destroyed the old immunities and entailed the obligation of military service and all the burdens of citizenship in a new and more burdensome government, it wore a different aspect to the Christians now admitted to the pale. Christian and Turk alike were psychologically unprepared for a state in which all elements should meet on an equal footing. Said a Greek in Constantinople when the logical consequences of the new equality began to be apparent: "They are talking of assimilating us all to an Ottoman unity. There are six million Greeks in the Turkish empire and (here his eyes flashed and his voice trembled with pas-

sion) do you imagine that men born with the heritage of the Greek will ever allow themselves to be assimilated into an Ottoman unity?"

The Turk's attitude was different but no more propitious. The writer recalls a conversation with a railway official in Turkey, one of the fairest and most dispassionate observers whom it has been his fortune to meet. Asked what would be the outcome of the new constitution, then recently promulgated, he expressed his misgivings. "The Turk is a man of many virtues, a better man than any other hereabouts. As a family head, a neighbour, a friend, I ask no better man. He will share his last crust with the needy. He will keep faith with his fellow. He will die for his faith. He will respond to every sentiment that we honour, except one. Speak to him of patriotism, the nation, the state, and he will gaze stupidly at you, utterly unable to comprehend your meaning. He cannot conceive of a bond which shall bind together races who do not worship the same god. He is not averse to the new Ottoman unity. He simply cannot conceive it. There is no psychological basis upon which to build the new state." This estimate of the Turk has received abundant confirmation.

Other elements were equally unassimilable. The Armenians have from time immemorial been a problem to the Turk. Unlovely in their race personality, they share with the Jew and the Greek the business shrewdness, not always tempered by humanity, which the Turk conspicuously lacks. Numerous, and inhabiting a considerable territory of strategic importance on the Russian frontier, their tradition of past

independence and their dream of its recovery have kept the Turk uneasy. They have prospered in spite of intolerable handicaps, their pitiless shrewdness being pitted against the dull witted supremacy of the Turk. With abundant provocation, each side has resorted to criminal outrage. When a powerful Armenian conspiracy some years ago seized the Ottoman Bank, the treasury of the empire, the Turks retaliated by a general massacre. The nerve-shattered Abdul Hamid, obsessed with fear of assassination by Armenians, incited wide-spread massacres of Armenians by their traditional enemies, the lawless Kurds, thus justifying the attempt which they afterwards made. It is a sorry story of sordidness and crime, in which neither side can escape condemnation. But whatever the blame, the fact relevant to our immediate purpose is the present unassimilability of the Armenian race to an Ottoman unity.

And now upon this fragile structure of the new built Turkish state fell blow upon blow with sledgehammer violence, breaking off one fragment after another till it seemed nothing would remain, Egypt, Herzegovina and Bosnia, Bulgaria, Crete, Tripoli, the Dodecanese, Albania, Macedonia, Thrace, the rest of the Ægean islands, Samos, Chios — where would it end? Depression became desperation, murder inaugurated revolution, and the government fell into the hands of the more daring instead of the more prudent spirits. That the personal sympathies of these leaders were with Germany counts for little in the final plunge. It is difficult to see aught but disaster in prospect for the doomed empire. Partition

among the Allies — if indeed they are yet ready to go that far — or continuance under German protection, alike mean extinction, unless unforeseen forces intervene in her behalf. But it may be said in excuse of the desperate venture, that she had no choice. When the two German warships were welcomed by the unwitting defenders of the Dardanelles, they passed within sight of the city whose defenders with like acclaim drew the wooden horse inside their walls. There must have been those on board who smiled grimly to think of the great drama which they were privileged to re-enact. Theirs was the first hostile act. With their guns trained on the Sultan's palace, distracted Turkey could neither disarm nor disown them. The Crescent wanes and passes.

CHAPTER IX

THE CASE OF THE BALKANS

NOWHERE else can the difficulties with which the state builder has to contend be studied to such advantage as in the Balkan Peninsula. All the forces which contribute to the formation of the state are here manifest, but in violently dynamic rather than in static form. All factors seem to be working at cross purposes, so that concession to the one means rebuff to the rest. There seems to be no possibility of equilibrium short of a complete rearrangement, possibly a complete synthesis and union, a condition in itself hopelessly remote.


The peninsula includes, wholly or in part, the states of Greece, Turkey, Bulgaria, Rumania, Servia, Montenegro, and nominally at least Albania, to which must be added as very essential component parts the Austro-Hungarian dependencies of Croatia, Slavonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, the last two essentially a unit. Other dependencies of Austria and even certain territories of Russia enter into every comprehensive plan for regulating the Balkan problem, while these two great powers themselves loom large as an overshadowing background, and even remoter states, as recent events have shown, regard themselves as interested parties in all Balkan arrangements. Not

one of these states has a natural boundary; not one of them rules over a single race; not one of them rules over the whole of its own race; not one of them that has a past, has recovered its past possessions; not one of them is large enough to have any real independence; only one of them has reasonable access to the sea or adequate commercial facilities. Worse still, there is not one that can hope to have these things without destructive encroachment on others. It is clear at a glance that present arrangements are not final, and that very consciousness tends toward instability.

All of the territories above mentioned have at one time been included in the Turkish empire. Turkish rule has varied in length and degree about in proportion to nearness to Constantinople. The territory near that city has been theirs almost from the beginning of their empire, and is theirs still. Its assimilation is naturally comparatively thorough. Turks form the largest element in the population, and the administration has been consistently in their hands. Adrianople was their capital for almost a century before the capture of Constantinople and has acquired for them a semi-sacred character.

On the other hand, the districts in the outer zone where Turkish influence fades into that of Russia and Austria, were not brought under Turkish rule until much later, and then but imperfectly and fitfully. Some of them never knew Moslem rule, their governors being either princes of their own blood or Greeks who purchased their posts in Constantinople. Though plundered by these adventurers and sorely





pressed by their fiscal exactions, their race character remained unmodified, and they early acquired virtual independence. To all, however, Turkey has left her legacy which we shall have occasion to note.

It must further be remembered that these countries have been from the first the subject of active rivalry on the part of Austria and Russia, with the other powers of Europe as their allies and backers. All Balkan happenings therefore have a double character. Each state acts as any other state would do, in its own interest, but it also acts as the protégé of one of the greater powers. These powerful backers are often the chief actors, and their several protégés little more than puppets, sometimes playing a rôle quite other than that which they would have chosen. This double character of Balkan activities is inevitable in view of the relation of these states to the all important problem of Constantinople.

RUMANIA

This, the largest and remotest of the Balkan states, is a modern combination of several principalities, or parts of principalities, founded in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries by migration from Hungary. These principalities, lying as buffer states between Turkey and the greater powers to the north, were alternately courted and oppressed by both before their union with the Turkish empire in the sixteenth century. This union, one of the last of Turkey's annexations, was not effected by conquest, but was a voluntary choice between evils, the harassed principalities seeking in a Turkish protectorate immunity

from Hungarian and Austrian oppression. Coming thus voluntarily, they never knew Turkish sovereignty and Moslem administration, but only suzerainty, being ruled often by princes of their own race or by Greeks who had at least the advantage of respecting their religion and their civilisation. This did not save them from oppression, especially under the Greek governors who bought their office for large sums from the impecunious Sultan, and must needs recoup themselves, but it saved them from Turkish colonisation and preserved their language and their culture. Whatever the intrinsic value of these much treasured possessions, they had the advantage of being essentially identical in the different principalities and so a bond of union which, strangely enough for this distracted region, was able later to triumph over all divisive forces and produce voluntary union.

As these principalities were among the latest and loosest additions to the Turkish empire, so they were among the first to leave it. From the end of the seventeenth century the power of the empire rapidly declined. This decline brought little relief from fiscal oppression, but it brought a large measure of practical independence and a constant incentive to increase it. Moreover it suited the purpose of the big neighbours to espouse the cause of Rumanian independence, from mixed motives, no doubt, but not the less effectively. By the beginning of the nineteenth century Turkish suzerainty was reduced to a shadow. Successive treaties between Turkey and the European powers confirmed the autonomy of Rumania, and finally the principalities, already voluntarily united

against the express wish of their new sponsors, declared their complete independence in 1877, and this was confirmed by the Congress of Berlin in the following year.

The origin of the Rumanian people is a matter of dispute, but fortunately, the Rumanians themselves are not troubled by the doubts of scholars. They believe themselves descended from the inhabitants of the Roman colony of Dacia, established by Trajan in the second century of our era and peopled by emigrants from Italy. It is difficult to reconcile this belief with the known facts of later history, when a series of migrations swept over this region, ultimately filling the entire peninsula with a Slavic population, as also with their own tradition of migration from the West, but over against these obstacles are the undoubted facts that Roman Dacia was located here, and that their language is clearly of Latin origin, the only Latin tongue in this part of the world. We may leave to philologists and ethnologists the problem of language persistence along with racial change. It is sufficient for us that the Rumanians believe themselves to be of Roman descent, and as such, related to the Italians and French. They are very proud of this ancestry, and their supposed kinship with the enlightened nations of western Europe exercises a powerful influence over their political affiliations. The chief result of this assumed affinity, however, is to isolate them from their Slavic neighbours and give them an extreme sense of race solidarity. The union of all Rumanians under a single government is a national ideal of exceptional power. Unfortunately the domain of

the Rumanian language, the chief bond of union among these people, is somewhat patchy. The present kingdom of Rumania includes only about half the Rumanian area. Nearly a third of the kingdom of Hungary is peopled by Rumanians, while on the east, the area extends to the Dniester River and even beyond in irregular patches sandwiched in between areas of Russian population. To push their frontier on the east to the Dniester River and make that their frontier to the sea, and on the west to include the broad territory of Transylvania, is the irreducible minimum of Rumanian ambition. The ethnic argument is the paramount one, because, forsooth, it is the one that favours their contention. Rumania, as thus enlarged, would have a compact oval outline and would look exceedingly well on the map.

Unfortunately, the Rumanians are not very consistent in their insistence on the principle of race solidarity, nor can they very well be so, for race migrations have introduced an almost malicious complexity into the ethnic problem. Thus, Bessarabia, the Russian province lying to the west of the Dniester, is peopled for the most part with Rumanians, but there is a narrow strip along the coast whose population is wholly Russian, while just behind this coastal strip are considerable settlements of Bulgars and Germans. Certainly no one would think of carrying the frontier to the Dniester without at the same time extending it to the sea. About two thirds of this area would be Rumanian and one-third alien, an approach to equity, perhaps, but not so clear a case but that the ethnic claim might conceivably be outweighed by other con-

siderations. On the west the case is equally difficult. Transylvania, an area half as large as Rumania itself, is mostly Rumanian in language, but the eastern portion, lying right in the elbow of Rumania and almost exactly in the centre of the larger Rumanian area, is peopled by Hungarians and Germans. These are quite separated from their kinsmen farther west. If Rumania could annex Transylvania she would unite the Rumanians, but she would divide the Hungarians, while Hungary, by retaining Transylvania, unites the Hungarians but divides the Rumanians. As regards numbers and area, the odds are considerably in favour of the Rumanian arrangement, but again these odds may easily be overcome by other considerations. Indeed, to have a Hungarian province the size of Montenegro exactly in the middle of an enormously more numerous Rumanian population, would be a peculiarly vexatious administrative problem and would almost certainly result in oppression of this small but compact minority.

Turning now to the southeast, we find a wedge of territory lying between the erratic Danube and the sea, the oft mentioned Dobrudja. This, which has belonged to Rumania ever since its recognised independence, is Rumanian only in its northern tip. The most of it is occupied by a Turkish settlement, the only unmixed Turkish population, strange to say, in all Europe. No possible ethnic argument could prevail upon Rumania to part with this valuable territory which affords her only access to the sea. For it was a weakness of the progenitors of this people, as still more of the Hungarians, that they did not take

to commerce or appreciate the advantage to their posterity of tenaciously holding the sea coast. At the close of the recent Balkan wars, Rumania still further extended her coastal possessions by annexing a Bulgarian province, Silistria, which contains no Rumanian population whatever. She thus ignored, for the time being, as all nations will do, her favourite argument of race solidarity, in deference to other interests quite as tangible but conflicting.

There are other considerations quite as pertinent which it suits her purpose to ignore. Her western frontier, as we have seen, is not an ethnic boundary. But it is a natural frontier, a well marked mountain range, while the ethnic boundary farther west is little more than an arbitrary line running through open country. So, even if there were no island of Hungarians to be surrounded by this Rumanian sea, the formation of the greater Rumania would have decided disadvantages. Suppose Rumania should realise her ambitions as a result of the present war, and by annexing Bessarabia and Transylvania should double her territory and unite the Rumanians. The ethnologist would now be satisfied. But we may be perfectly sure that before long the strategist would begin to agitate for a more strategic frontier, to be obtained, of course, by farther annexation. The favourite Rumanian argument would no longer be race unity but national security. The natural boundary on the south, for instance, would be the Balkans. The population thus annexed would be Bulgarian, but so is the population of Silistria, already annexed and seemingly contented. The plea of the strategist is perfectly

sound, and under favouring conditions, the annexation would certainly be made. And this accomplished, with half the Bulgars under Rumanian rule, the ethnologist would again have his innings, and the slogan of "unredeemed Bulgaria" would urge them on to the Ægean. The plea of commercial interest would of course powerfully second each argument for advance, and nationality, the great blind idealism of empire and race, which knows no boundaries and reckons not of our reasoning, would become ever more insatiate. Can we not anticipate the exhortation of the latter day patriot orator: "In Rumania triumphant behold Rome come again to rule the world. On Romans, to the fulfilment of your high destiny."

In brief, Rumania is so situated that her most tangible argument for expansion is race unity, though in the East, where it suits her purpose, she ignores this argument in the interest of access to the sea. Hungary is so situated, especially in other quarters, that the less she says about race unity the better, though in this quarter she has something of a case. On the other hand she can urge strategic considerations with much force in favour of the maintenance of the status quo. And perhaps we may add that tenacious as is a people's attachment to its language and customs, these are not quite immutable like mountain and sea. If there must be divisions, it is convenient and prudent to have them marked by natural barriers. It is of course futile to urge such prudential considerations upon the parties to such a contest, but we may perhaps see in them some reason to conclude that natural boundaries will slowly win the day. Moreover the

prudential consideration would not be without weight with a council of outside powers, so far as their action was free to regard it. In any case, ethnic interests can never receive exclusive consideration.

THE SOUTHERN SLAVS

Croatia, Slavonia, Dalmatia, Bosnia, Herzegovina, Serbia and Montenegro, taken together coincide roughly with the habitat of the Southern Slavs, a branch of the great Slavic family which is entirely separated from all its kin. The political boundaries are necessarily somewhat artificial. The Slavic population really extends somewhat to the north of these limits into Carniola and Istria, thus reaching around the northern end of the Adriatic where they mingle with the Italians and succumb to the seductiveness of the Italian tongue. On the other hand, northeastern Serbia cuts a big notch out of Rumanian territory, while the recent enlargement of Serbia is almost wholly at the expense of Albanian and Bulgarian populations. But while not very well represented by present political boundaries, the Southern Slavs occupy a singularly compact territory, and were it not for the exigencies of their great neighbours, nothing would be more natural than to form them into a united nation.

This territory, by virtue of its location and its natural character, has been debatable ground for two thousand years. The Romans conquered and organised it about the beginning of our era, and for five hundred years it remained under their control. Then the barbarians overran and ruined it, a whole series

of them, and finally, after a century and a half of anarchy, the Slavs, ancestors of the present inhabitants, took possession of the wasted land. They either destroyed or absorbed the older population except on the sea coast where the great Roman cities, built by the commerce of the Adriatic and always in touch with Italy, offered a refuge, if not to the population, at least to the civilisation of Rome, and kept, as they still keep, their Roman speech.

These Slavs seem to have brought with them only the most rudimentary political organisation. They had every opportunity to build a powerful Slavic state, but never having known or imagined anything more than a tribal organisation, the opportunity passed unimproved. Slowly they learned to form dukedoms and principalities, but meantime their neighbours got ahead of them, and their history has been one of constant subjection and shifting allegiance according as the great neighbours waxed or waned in influence.

The northern part of this Slavic area, Croatia and Slavonia (ignoring for the moment the fragments in Carinthia, etc.) is essentially a part of the great plain of Hungary. Its present annexation to that country is in accordance with the plain intent of nature, though man has done much to make the realisation of nature's purpose difficult. Here in this large plain was formed the petty kingdom of Croatia which lasted for nearly two hundred years. Then quite naturally, the Hungarians, more numerous dwellers in the same great plain, conquered the country in order to get down to the sea, and held it for over four centuries, until in 1526 the Turks destroyed the power of Hun-

gary and took bit by bit these fair plain lands for themselves. But though they kept encroaching for eighty years they never quite got through to the sea where they would have encountered the redoubtable power of Venice, and their conquests were loosely held. They sent no colonists and no pashas, but like absentee landlords, farmed the country for tribute. When toward the end of the seventeenth century the tide turned and the country returned to its former uncertain status, there were no mosques to pull down and no Moslem institutions to eradicate, only the demoralisation resulting from unintelligent exploitation. Then, with a part of Hungary which had shared its fate of Turkish rule, it passed to Austria where it remained for a century save for a brief interval of Napoleon's supremacy. Finally, when in 1814 the Congress of Vienna sought to settle all these troublesome questions forever, Croatia and Slavonia were given to Hungary, in whose keeping they have since led a restless and uncomfortable existence. Toward the middle of the nineteenth century, Croatia and Slavonia were deeply stirred by the almost world-wide agitation in favour of nationalism, or as we may perhaps better term it, race integrity. Born out of due season, there came the concept of a united Southern Slavic people. Being an appanage of Hungary rather than an equal partner, the seed of the new agitation fell in fertile soil, and the fruit is not all gathered yet.

South of the great plain lie Dalmatia, Bosnia and Servia, stretching from west to east, with little Herzegovina and Montenegro tucked in beneath.

Here all is mountainous, and separate principalities were quite inevitable. Smallest and most interesting of all is Dalmatia, a spike shaped strip of coastland separated from Bosnia by a well defined mountain ridge, and supplemented by the wonderful islands mentioned in an earlier chapter. Here Rome ruled for the first eleven centuries of our era, first from Rome and then from Constantinople, and here were the great Roman cities, the strongholds where Roman civilisation and Roman speech stood at bay, conquering even when conquered. Its history is much the same as that above narrated save for the participation of another power not concerned with the fate of the great plain. From 1100 for more than three hundred years, while Hungary ruled the Slavs of the plain, she was contesting with Venice the control of the islands and the Dalmatian coast. Finally, as the Turks shattered Hungary, Venice won but only to find herself doomed to another three centuries of struggle, this time with Turkey. When the struggle finally ended in her favour, Venice was in the sere and yellow leaf, and her eighty years of tranquil possession ended with the extinction of the republic. After a few years' subjection to Napoleon, Dalmatia passed to Austria, in whose possession it has since remained. It was therefore the least Turkish, but also the least Slavic of these regions. It is vital to the scheme of a united Slav state, but equally so to Austrian defence and to the far-reaching scheme of Italian expansion, with which country it has extensive commercial relations and natural linguistic affinities. What its sympathies are it would be difficult to ascertain, but

there is no likelihood that any of the contestants will concern themselves with the question. Its fate will be decided, as it always has been, outside its borders, and it has acquired the habit of acquiescence.

The mountain ridge that separates Dalmatia from Bosnia and Herzegovina and from Servia farther inland, assigned to these territories a very different fate. They had neither sea coast nor natural highways joining populous and productive regions, and were thus without incentive to commerce or specialised industry. Lying nearer the centre of Turkish power, they naturally felt its impact more heavily.

Here as in the north, there slowly developed something of organisation. Bosnia and Servia became principalities and then petty kingdoms. For brief periods they overreached their boundaries, Bosnia controlling Dalmatia and developing commercial and naval power, and Servia extending her conquests east and south into a so-called empire. For about a hundred years — the hundred years immediately preceding the fall of Constantinople — both were considerable powers, but during the next century the long struggle with Turkey ended in their subjection and incorporation in the Turkish empire.

Meanwhile a new complication had appeared which, especially in Bosnia, was destined to completely change her fate. This was a religious controversy. This whole region had already been divided between the Catholic and Greek churches, Dalmatia and Croatia going to the former, Servia to the latter, and Bosnia part to each. As if this were not enough, however, a new doctrine, known of

course as a heresy, made its way from Asia across Bulgaria to these Southern Slavs. This Bogomil heresy, as it was called, seems to have been similar to certain creeds known in our day. It denied the divinity of Christ, gave natural or figurative interpretations of the miracles, and in particular, denied the utility of images, forms, priests, and ecclesiasticism generally. It won a certain number of adherents and finally was adopted by one of the ablest Bosnian rulers partly for political reasons, and through his influence became the religion of the court and aristocracy. It will be readily understood that the common people remained faithful to their images, their forms, and their priests, and that both Catholic and Greek churches anathematised and persecuted the new religion.

It was in the fierce heat of this controversy that Bosnia fell under Turkish sway. Turk and Bogomil alike had a fierce contempt for the image-worshipping Christian. Moreover there was not a little in common between their creeds. In short, the Bosnian aristocracy became Moslems and were of course confirmed in their prerogatives to the great detriment of the Christian peasantry who were ground down under more than Turkish oppression. Here, therefore, isolated among Christian domains, we have a Moslem, though not a Turkish state. The complications thus introduced into the perplexing Balkan situation will be at once apparent.

Bosnia contributed her share toward the disorders of the nineteenth century, revolting repeatedly against Turkish rule. But the reason was just the opposite

of that which actuated her neighbours. The Moslem aristocracy resented the reforms which enlightened sultans from time to time attempted to introduce, looking toward the modernisation of the country and the ultimate decline of their own prestige. For thirty years, from 1821 to 1851, Bosnia was constantly at war with the sultan, the ultimate result being the destruction of her aristocracy, but of course the confirmation of Islam, which had now become the religion of a large part of the people. So while the collapse of Turkey in 1878 brought emancipation to other principalities in the peninsula, it brought a new subjection to Bosnia. Independence for this strategic province was no part of the plans of Austria, and the sop thrown to her in the Congress of Berlin was the privilege of "administering" these territories, the consent of Turkey being secured by the solemn promise that they would be restored to her sovereignty. But the consent of Bosnia was not so easily won. It took an army of 200,000 men and a war of three years to restore order and assure Austrian control. An admirable administration, followed by greatly increased prosperity, may be appealed to to condone if not to justify the violation of her pledge in their annexation in 1908.

The present mood of Bosnia can only be surmised. Austrian occupation has brought prosperity and presumably has won certain interests to its cause. But patriotism is not mercenary, and material benefits seldom purchase the sympathy of a people. The decay of Islam and the growing prestige of Christianity under present political conditions, contributes to the

Christian element of the population, and so to the removal of the barrier which has separated the Bosnians from their Slavic kin. Meanwhile the spirit of the age powerfully favours the spirit of race unity. Independent Serbia is its visible beginning. The Austrian suggestion that this ideal should be realised by a union under Austrian suzerainty seems in reality the negation of this ideal, and the treatment of Croatia and Slavonia is a further deterrent. It was a Bosnian who killed the Archduke Ferdinand.

The history of Serbia up to the time of the Turkish conquest is not unlike that of Bosnia. But its leaders were not Bogomils and did not become Moslems. It therefore had the semi-autonomous government and the tribute-burdened existence with which we are already familiar in the case of Rumania. Without bonds of sympathy toward her suzerain and with the memory of very considerable achievements in the past, Serbia was prepared to take advantage of the first opportunity to assert her independence. This came as early as 1804, when through the intervention of Russia, Serbia completely shook off Turkish rule. The Turk soon came back again, but not to stay, and after a period of doubtful struggle, recognised the complete autonomy of Serbia in 1830. Autonomy, of course, does not mean independence. Serbia was still counted a part of the Turkish empire, and theoretically at least, was subject to tribute and could have relations with foreign powers only through her suzerain. But she had her own princes and managed her home affairs in her own way. Moreover, in reality she never paid tribute nor recognised the Capitula-

tions, Turkey's agreements with foreign powers. Her recent history with its surprising assertion and large ambitions, is better understood when we realise that she has really been an independent nation almost as long as ourselves.

One new factor which has unobtrusively entered, deserves our careful attention, namely, the intervention of Russia. Since 1804 when she makes her first significant appearance, she has been the more or less constant sponsor for Servia. This strikes us as peculiar, for Servia is not adjacent to her territory. The reason for this tutelage will be apparent when we come to consider the case of Russia and her great rivals. For the present we have only to notice that this relationship is of paramount importance in Servian history. The course of true love has not run smooth, and there have been periods of estrangement, but the whole trend of political forces has driven them back into each other's arms.

The Congress of Berlin in 1878 recognised the independence of Servia. This had been substantially a fact for three quarters of a century. It also handed Bosnia and Herzegovina over to Austria to administer for a limited but indefinite period. Possibly the statesmen of Europe hardly realised that Servia in this period had grown a full set of national ideals and ambitions. She had taken note that her language was spoken from Uskub to Trieste. She had realised that a nation to be independent must have access to the sea, and had noted that the harbours of the Adriatic were in the possession of her kinsfolk. The dream of a greater Servia was already a heritage of

her patriots. An independent Bosnia would have made the realisation of that dream easy; an Austrian Bosnia made it impossible. And Serbia was not reassured by the promise of restitution. Hence the policy of agitation, whose aim was to rouse in unprogressive Bosnia the consciousness of Slavic origin and of Servian kinship, a propaganda which the very benefits conferred by Austria could not fail to promote. In this effort to detach Bošnia from Austria, Turkey was sure to aid in the hope of restitution, but Serbia felt sure that she could intercept the gift on the way. Russia would aid Serbia in her efforts at both detachment and annexation.

To this persistent effort Austria opposed alternate coaxing and coercion, each in vain. Coaxing meant surrender, and coercion only emphasised Serbia's helplessness. Among the latter measures adopted were differential tariffs on Austrian railroads by which alone Servian products could reach their markets. This gave precedence to Austrian and Hungarian competitors and showed Servian producers that they were the vassals of the powerful neighbour who held Serbia prisoner with her own kinsmen for a jailor. It is not strange that Serbia was not reconciled; it is perhaps strange that she was not cowed.

Such was the situation when in 1908 Austria served notice to all parties of her intentions, by annexing Bosnia and Herzegovina. There was nothing unexpected in this, but Serbia had hoped against hope. In the first moment of blind fury she was tempted to risk the chance of war, but finding that Austria was backed by Germany, and that Russia, however de-

sirous, could not help her, she resigned herself, with what feelings we may imagine, to the indefinite postponement of all dreams of Slavic unity, and began to look elsewhere for escape from economic bondage. She must get to the sea. If this could not be accomplished through union with her own kinsfolk, she must strike farther south, through the wild mountainous region of Albania, inhabited by an uncouth and alien people. It was a longer way, a harder path, a more inhospitable neighbourhood. The harbours were fewer and less suited to her purpose. The route was decidedly a second choice, but a possibility, though Europe did not think so. But the co-operation of other powers and the unexpected energy of Servia confounded European calculations, Turkey was driven back to the walls of Constantinople, and a Servian army occupied Durazzo on the Adriatic. Servia had gotten to the sea.

But Servia had yet to drain the cup of humiliation. Europe forbade her to occupy any point on the Adriatic. The Albanians must become a nation, though unprepared for the task, unwonted even to the thought. This was the will of Austria; this was the verdict of Europe; war with the great powers of Europe was the alternative.

It is unnecessary to comment on the sentiments resulting from such an experience, beyond noting their importance as a further political force. Servia was enlarged at the expense of an alien race and at the cost of a new and dangerous enmity. But she got no outlet, no independence, no union with her kinsmen. It would be difficult to imagine a better guarantee of

future trouble. The net result was to drive Servia back to her former programme, to renew and intensify her agitation for a greater Servia and for the union and independence of the Southern Slavs, with results the beginning of which we know.

Montenegro is simply the southern tip of this Slavic domain, the only portion which, on account of its almost inaccessible mountain fastnesses, the Turks were never able to subdue. It has the advantages and the defects of littleness and isolation. Its access to the sea early alarmed Austria, who hedged it about with restrictions, military, commercial and fiscal, which limit its real independence to harmless internal affairs. As a factor in the military situation it is hardly more than an annoyance. In commerce and other connections it is less. As a part of a large Slavic state, it would be of immense strategic importance, commanding the magnificent harbour of Cattaro, which would make an ideal naval base, to say nothing of its commercial possibilities and its marvellous scenic attractions. Its great potential importance is not lost sight of by parties to the great struggle, but as an independent power it is insignificant, a suggestion of the impotence of this naturally powerful country, in its present divided condition which certain European powers are interested to maintain.

BULGARIA

Bulgaria is the descendant, or perhaps we should say, merely the namesake, of a once powerful people who at two different periods and in somewhat different territories, rose to prominence. The people

are a composite. The basic stock is probably the same Slavic element which in the seventh century inundated the whole peninsula except for a small region in the southwest, too inaccessible for them to penetrate. These Slavs we find quite unadulterated in the large territory just considered. We also suspect that they are the real substance of the Rumanian race, though disguised by a Latin speech. Perhaps even Greece is in like case, at least in parts.

But the Bulgars, like the Rumanians and the Greeks, recognise their ancestry in another race, this time a Tartar or Mongolian people who invaded the peninsula in the seventh century, not long after the Slavs had settled there. They were not numerous, but had developed a military organisation superior to that of the Slavs and so easily established their supremacy. In other respects, however, the Slavs were their superiors. The result was that they soon adopted the Slavic customs and language, and merged their race entirely in that of the race they had conquered, just as the Slavs had done in Rumania and Greece. So in the most important sense, we have in the Bulgars a Slavic people. Their language differs from that of Servia hardly more than the language of Naples differs from that of Florence. It would seem, therefore, that the Slavic unionists might look in this direction for the realisation of their ideals. But all accounts agree that the Tartar Bulgars, while leaving the speech of the conquered Slavs almost unmodified, have greatly modified their temperament and character. Perhaps that is because the Tartar blood is so different from that of the Aryan races. In any

case there is little natural sympathy between the Bulgars and their Slavic neighbours.

This natural antipathy is accentuated by their history. The Bulgars formed a powerful state which lasted with one considerable interruption, for over seven hundred years. Twice it was extended to control nearly the whole peninsula. At last it was overwhelmed by Servia in her brief period of imperial greatness and was obliged to continue as a tribute paying state. This humiliation was speedily avenged by the fall of Servia, but not to the advantage of Bulgaria, for both passed under the dominion of Turkey, Bulgaria suffering first and worst from the conqueror's oppression.

In arriving at our estimate of the Balkan situation, one more important fact must be noted, namely, the proximity of Bulgaria to Constantinople. It must never be forgotten that up to the thirteenth century Constantinople was the headquarters of art, wealth and civilisation, not only for this region but for the entire world. Proximity and easy access to this great centre of wealth and culture could not fail to exercise a profound influence upon the Bulgarians, an influence which was little felt in the remoter mountain districts of Servia. History fully justifies this assumption, and here we find another reason for the alienation between these two neighbouring peoples. The Bulgars do not recognise the Servians as their equals.

But after the Turkish conquest, proximity to Constantinople became a curse. Almost the first conquests which the Turks made in Europe were made at the expense of Bulgaria, and by 1396 it was com-

pletely under their sway, more than sixty years before the conquest of Servia and a century and a half before the subjection of the northernmost provinces. And this subjection not only began early, but it continued late. The revolt which essentially liberated Servia in 1804 was not possible in Bulgaria until 1876, and full independence was not acquired until 1908. Worse than this, however, Bulgaria's nearness to the Turkish capital resulted in extensive colonisation by Turks. The eastern portion, nearly half, of the one-time Bulgarian empire has in consequence a mixed population which adds complexity to an already complicated situation.

It is interesting to note that it was a literary revival which roused this almost forgotten people to assert their independence. This revival taught them their history over again and so drew them together. But it taught them also to dislike and despise Servia, their conqueror and their inferior, and so acted as a centrifugal quite as much as a centripetal force. Their opportunity came in the Russian invasion of 1877, precipitated by a Bulgarian revolt and its usual accompaniment of Turkish atrocities which earned for their author at the time the title of "the unspeakable Turk." The peace dictated to Turkey under the walls of Constantinople aimed not only to free Bulgaria but to give her virtually the whole peninsula between Servia and Rumania on the north and Greece on the south.

It must be remembered that this magnificent scheme had its historic background and that Bulgarian ambition had been quite prepared for it by the literary

and historic revival. But so sudden an access of good fortune was too good to last. The powers of Europe knew that the great power that had made the new Bulgaria would also control it, and much as they might approve the emancipation of the peninsula from Turkish rule and its virtual unification, they were not ready to see it accomplished on those terms. So the greater Bulgaria was divided into three parts. The southern third went back to Turkey where it remained for a generation. The middle third was called Rumelia, and was to be autonomous like Bulgaria, the northern third, under the suzerainty of the Porte. Bulgaria, made and unmade by outside powers, acquiesced of necessity, but the making had of itself defined her manifest destiny. All subsequent effort has been directed toward the attainment of the Russian programme of 1878.

But there is one essential feature of that programme which Bulgaria has quite ignored, namely, subordination to Russian influence. Neither the people nor their monarch have proved docile, and Russia has had reason to be thankful that her plan for a greater Bulgaria was thwarted. Of late the peculiar relation has grown up of dependence of Servia upon Russia and of Bulgaria upon Austria. The reason is perfectly obvious. Russia and Austria are rivals; so are Servia and Bulgaria. If the little country in each case would be subservient to its big northern neighbour, the neighbour would be well pleased to be its friend and backer. But if instead of furthering the ends of its great neighbour, it insists upon blocking its way, then the neighbour will not befriend it but will help its

rival. It is the bitter feud between Servia and Austria which insures Russia's friendship, for she sees in Servia, thus minded, a barrier to the advance of Austria toward the *Ægean* and the outposts which she herself hopes to occupy. Conversely, it is Bulgaria's hatred of Servia which has earned Austria's friendship.

GREECE

Unlike Servia and Bulgaria, Greece can point back to no empire, for the territories which she calls hers were never united under a single Hellenic rule. Yet her historic background is far greater than theirs and more compelling. Despite her political incoherence, her name is above every name, and the Greek, though half Slav in blood, sees in that name the promise of a limitless destiny. No definite necessity, political or strategic, impels the Greek to a definite advance, like Servia's striving for the sea. Yet equally, there is no compelling reason for stopping where he is.

A farther incentive to this unmeasured ambition of the Greek, is found in the character of the people. They are the merchants of the eastern world, and in all the seaports and commercial centres of the Levant, they sit in the seats of the mighty. They are almost nowhere in the majority, but are everywhere numerous, and influential out of proportion to their numbers. This population would furnish a plausible pretext for annexing almost any port of the littoral of the eastern Mediterranean if the occasion should arise. And inasmuch as it is impossible to take the littoral without taking some country with it, the pretext could be

stretched to cover the requirements. Greeks, too, have always governed Constantinople. Even after the Turkish conquest they continued to plan its build-ings, to control its commerce, and to monopolise its wealth. They do so to-day. When the vicious system prevailed of selling the governorships of the provinces to the highest bidder, it was always Greeks who secured the prize. What an argument for solving the insoluble problem of Constantinople by adding it to the kingdom of Greece! There is not a Greek alive who has not had the thought. And if Constantinople, then assuredly the country in between, Macedonia, Thrace and Gallipoli, and of course whatever is necessary beyond the Dardanelles to assure control of the great waterway of which Greece would thus become the trustee. Only such an ambition can explain the completely unstrategic extension of Greek territory to the east following the second Balkan war.

Like all the countries we have been considering, Greece has belonged to Turkey, but she came later and left earlier than any of the rest. In this quarter Turkey found herself pitted against the redoubtable power of Venice, and it was only after a prolonged and bitter struggle that her ascendancy was established. But conquest in this case was even more disastrous than possession. The ruins of the Parthenon, wrecked by a Venetian bombardment in the course of the struggle, are its tragic reminder.

Despite the demoralisation of Turkish rule which was here at its worst, Greece was prompt to revolt at the first opportunity, and after a romantic struggle lasting for eight years, Greece became, with the aid

of the Powers, an independent kingdom in 1829. Her insufficient territories were later extended by the same outside agency, but an attempt at further forcible extension in 1895 ended disastrously, and the newly made kingdom was obliged to fall back upon its European sponsors for protection against the Turkish attack which it had provoked.

Greece seemingly owes her existence and also her later growth largely to sentimental considerations. The romance of her history, her literature and her art, the much prized heritage of the western world, were mainly responsible for the sympathy and ultimate intervention of the western powers a century ago, without which she could not have achieved her independence. The same influence operated to secure her later extension of territory and to protect her from the wrath of Turkey which she had recklessly incurred. But if sentiment has wrought powerfully without, it has wrought still more powerfully within. It was this same sentiment that induced the Ionian islands to join the new and precarious kingdom instead of continuing under the prosperous rule of Britain, and it was again this sentiment that induced Britain to release them when they had expressed their preference by a plebiscite. Above all it was this sentiment which impelled the large island of Crete to hazard war with Turkey, and disaster for Greece herself, to secure admission to the Kingdom of the Hellenes.

It was the Cretan question more than any other which induced the Greeks to join with the other Balkan states in attacking Turkey. There were other islands to be had for the taking, and an extension of

territory north and east was of course contemplated. The risks of the undertaking were immense, but Greek fortunes were in the hands of a statesman both daring and resourceful, and she boldly entered the arena, to win new territories and create new problems beyond her hopes and fears.

THE BALKAN WARS

The hope of the Balkan allies to overcome Turkey was not unreasonable, and was better justified by the result than they or their friends expected. They expected to secure Albania and Macedonia, that is, the western part of European Turkey as far east as the present confines of Greece, besides Crete and other islands. They do not seem to have expected to acquire Thrace, the large eastern plain dominated by Adrianople, and perhaps in view of its large Turkish population and its command of the Dardanelles which would be sure to involve the intervention of Europe, they were at first prudent enough not to desire it. The territory once acquired, they had their several ideas about dividing it, but save in one case, they seem not to have arrived at an understanding in advance. Greece would have Southern Albania, the ancient Epirus, perhaps as far north as Corfu, thus consolidating her possessions, and Servia would have the northern portion with its much needed seaports. The division here would hardly make trouble. Servia in turn secretly agreed with Bulgaria on a line which would leave the latter a free hand in Macedonia. That is, she would not try to get a port on the *Ægean*. There remained only the question of questions, the

division of Macedonia between Bulgaria and Greece. The long continued struggle between these two powers to establish their claims here has been referred to. The struggle was carried on by every device available to either contestant. Each had large ambitions to which the possession of Macedonia was essential. Bulgaria sought to regain her olden empire so lately promised by Russia, and also by acquiring ports on the Ægean, to free her commerce from dependence on the Dardanelles. Greece sought to open a pathway to Constantinople.

They got all they expected, and Thrace in addition. But while fortune added Thrace in the East, the Powers clipped off Albania in the West. Servia was the loser, Bulgaria the gainer, as agreements stood. Servia made the reasonable suggestion: "Let us all move on a step." Bulgaria demurred. Servia's loss was no fault of hers, her gain no merit of Servia's. An agreement was an agreement. By way of compromise the dispute was referred to the arbitration of the Czar of Russia, and while his decision was pending, Bulgaria sought to force the issue by a surprise attack. Hence the second Balkan war, the discomfiture of Bulgaria, the extension of Greece over all the littoral of Macedonia, the extension of Servia south into territory occupied solely by Bulgars, the separation of the Ægean hinterland from its natural outlets, the creation of long and indefensible frontiers and a new harvest of grudge and hate. Probably not one of the powers involved accepted the solution as even measurably satisfactory or permanent. Bulgaria's attempt to surprise the allies angered the

Czar, the chosen referee, and her subsequent defeat disappointed Austria at whose instigation she had probably acted. The great war was already foreshadowed.

ALBANIA

This burlesque product of embarrassed diplomacy, it is hardly necessary to add, was formed in no spirit of deference to the Albanian people. They are not a unit in race, language, religion or any other vital interest. They have refused to accept the political unity of the state, and have not progressed in thought beyond the stage of clan organisation. But they are a unit in not being related to any one else in the peninsula. When the invading swarms of Slavs, Bulgars and the like swept over the peninsula, they swept the earlier inhabitants before them and in the almost inaccessible mountain fastnesses of the extreme Southwest, those who refused to be conquered or absorbed found a refuge. So in the Pyrenees and the Caucasus we find remnants of earlier races which the immigrant hosts have crowded out of their path and left as a glacier leaves its terminal or lateral morains.

It was with this human remnant that Austria, seconded by Italy, proposed to construct a state, whose sole reason for existence should be to hold the key to the Adriatic, as the Turk has so long held the key to the Black Sea. Servia might have served the purpose, but Servia was unfriendly, and besides, Russia was her backer. To give the key into her keeping was too much like giving it to Russia. The custodian must be a power without friends, a weak power, no

matter how weak, only so that it could maintain a semblance of existence and hold the key until Austria got ready to take it. The time would be short; the world did not then know how short. Italy reasoned similarly, knowing that the upheaval was near. The kingdom of Albania has had an inglorious existence, but it has lived out its appointed time and has finished the work that was given it to do. To Italy or to Austria, it would seem, must now pass the custody of the Adriatic.

CHAPTER X

THE CASE OF AUSTRIA


UNDER this name popular usage is wont to designate the great dual empire of Southern Europe, though the susceptibilities of the Hungarian people demand with much insistence the fuller name, Austria-Hungary, or the Austro-Hungarian Empire. It will be convenient to follow popular usage, the more so as we have to deal with a historic people of very varying extent who have but recently organised the partnership designated by the longer name. The state which we are considering is one of the oldest in Europe, while the Austro-Hungarian Empire is but fifty years old.

Austria began not as an empire, not even as a duchy, but as a mark, the pettiest of principalities, with a territory about as large as the state of Rhode Island. It was founded about eleven centuries ago by the ruler of the Franks, the great Charlemagne, in an effort to protect the empire which he had built against the Slavs whose migrations had already inundated the whole Balkan peninsula, and now threatened to overwhelm all Europe. It may perhaps be said that this has been the historic mission of Austria from first to last, that it is still the cornerstone of her policy, and that fear of the Slav is still the ground

of the pro-Austrian policy of certain nations of Europe.

The mark grew into a duchy, and ultimately into a kingdom, moving its capital eastward as it pushed its campaign against the Slav, until it settled it in Vienna, where it has remained for nearly eight hundred years. Other marks and duchies were of course established about the same time and for the same purpose, and it was long before it became clear which would outgrow the rest, but at last the advantage was with Austria, as indeed was inevitable, for Austria was planted on the Danube, the great commercial highway of this vast region, and trade brought wealth, population and power. There were numerous annexations and consolidations, sometimes through conquest, oftener through marriage, and almost as many divisions among the monarch's too numerous sons, for rulers then regarded their territories as private estates to be transferred as dowries or legacies according to family exigencies. But slowly consolidation gained on disintegration, and Austria became a great domain. She was not without rivals, however, for Bohemia and Hungary, kingdoms built largely with non-German peoples, had passed through much the same experiences. These in turn, however, passed under Austrian sway, and gradually other territories were added, large parts of Italy, the Belgian provinces, a part of Poland, then Croatia-Slavonia, Dalmatia and, finally, Bosnia and Herzegovina. Concurrently some of these possessions were lost, notably Belgium and Italy, neither of which were appropriately included.

This process of growth and consolidation was much



influenced by two great forces from without. The first of these was the Holy Roman Empire. This was, in the minds of men, a continuation of the empire of the Cæsars, an empire which had suffered eclipse during the Barbarian invasions, but which could not pass out of existence, to the minds of men inheriting the traditions of the long world rule of Rome. Under Charlemagne that empire had again assumed tangible form and become a real power. It rapidly lost power, to be sure, but its prestige remained considerable down to the time when, with so many other time-honoured relics of the past, it was destroyed by Napoleon. The choice of Charlemagne as emperor had this important result, that it permanently removed the seat of that empire to Central Europe, where certain princes of that much divided land gradually acquired the prerogative of electing the emperor. Their choice, limited by a Frank tradition to a German prince, soon fell upon the Austrian monarch, and ultimately became a prerogative of the dynasty, the famous house of Hapsburg. Not till 1804, when it became apparent that Napoleon, as dictator of Europe, would either abolish the title or compel its bestowal upon himself, did the Austrian monarch decide to forestall possible humiliation by substituting the title, Emperor of Austria, by which he has since been known.

It will be apparent that this long recognition as titular head of Europe and of the German states in particular, at a time when these states were numerous and weak, could not fail to be of advantage to Austria. The tradition of the Holy Roman Em-

peror as the ruler of all Europe disappeared with Napoleon, but the tradition of Austria as the head of the German states continued until Bismarck, by a crushing defeat, demonstrated the supremacy of Prussia, and relegated Austria to the position of a non-German state. But while this double leadership continued, it was used, not always scrupulously, to aggrandise the Austrian state.

The second fact was the rise of Turkey, whose steady advance northward in the Balkan peninsula ultimately brought her arms to the walls of Vienna. Here the advance was stayed, not however by the Austrian arms, but by the prowess of Poland, at that time a powerful neighbour, whose interests were menaced by this advance. Generally speaking, however, Austria was too far away from Turkey to be in much danger of attack, and the fact that the attack did not come until 1683, nearly two centuries after the absorption of the Rumanian and Southern Slavic principalities, shows how strong were the buffer states across which the Turk must advance to the attack of Austria. As a matter of fact, these two centuries witnessed the decline of the Turkish power and insured the triumph of her remoter enemies.

But while Turkey harmed Austria little, she rendered her the great service of exhausting and subduing her eastern and southern rivals, especially Hungary. But for the appearance of the Turks in the peninsula, there can be little doubt that this vigorous people, the descendants of Attila's Huns, would have forced their way east to the Black Sea, and perhaps south to the Ægean, becoming in turn a menace to

Austria on the west. But Turkey broke their power in a great battle in 1526, and thus set permanent limits to their expansion. Fear of the Turk impelled them to make common cause with Austria and ultimately merged their kingdom in the Austrian empire. It was this large and reinforced empire which the Turks attacked in 1683, only to suffer the great defeat which was the prelude to their slow retirement from the peninsula.

Austria suffered severely from the onslaughts of Napoleon, but in turn was chiefly responsible for his overthrow. This fact, coupled with the great ability of her representative, left her in a very strong position at the resettlement of Europe. But as so often happens, relief from outside pressure only released disruptive forces within, and these were abundantly present in her heterogeneous population. Formed as a German bulwark against the Slavs, the Germans at this time constituted hardly a fourth of her population, while the Hungarians, an utterly alien people, were about as numerous, and the Slavs within the empire outnumbered either. There were also at that time almost as many Italians as Germans, and altogether the empire could count ten fairly distinct nationalities. Necessity had driven them together, and with its disappearance they drifted apart.

Now appeared upon the stage another influence, all unobtrusive and quite innocent to the minds of the very suspicious statesmen of that day, namely, the revival of interest in literature and history. This interest was even encouraged by the government as a vent for the energies which were beginning to assert

themselves in dangerous political agitation. Nothing better could have been devised to increase this agitation. The different peoples in the empire, Galicians, Bohemians, Hungarians, Southern Slavs, etc., began to clamour for larger recognition as against the overweening German leadership which Austria had known for a thousand years. There was a revolution in 1848, that year of revolutions all over Europe. This was put down in a way which virtually played off one race against another, leaving the Germans in control as before. But when in 1866 Prussia virtually expelled Austria from the family of German nations, the German prestige in Austria was shattered and recognition of the equality of other races became inevitable. The result was not a dissolution but a partnership. Curiously enough, only one people, the Hungarians, secured the desired recognition. The Slavs were more numerous, but they were separated by broad intervening territories into southern and northern groups, and these again by long standing political or religious barriers, into lesser groups very little inclined to unite for any purpose. Meanwhile Germans and Hungarians not being thus handicapped, quite naturally preferred to monopolise the advantages of supremacy, and so formed a dual empire. Austria and Hungary form two distinct nations, each having its own parliament, laws and administration, but having a common sovereign. The most ingenious precautions have been devised to prevent the possibility of a closer union. But it was reluctantly concluded that a united army, a united customs service and a united foreign representation were

necessary for national efficiency. The Slavic provinces were divided between the two self-chosen partners. Austria got all the northern Slavs, Bohemia, Moravia, Galicia and Bukovina, the whole constituting a long irregular strip of territory which wraps itself like a tentacle half round the compact oval of Hungary. She also got the southern Slavs in Carinthia and Carniola, territories partly German which she had ruled for centuries. Even Dalmatia, the long strip of island and coast stretching far to the south and henceforth quite detached from the rest of her territories, she was able to retain. But Croatia and Slavonia went to Hungary for two reasons. First, because Hungary must get to the sea, and all her true Hungarian frontiers lay far inland. Second, because it was necessary to keep the Slavs divided. If all had gone to either partner, they could, by combining, have outnumbered the other race, a result which Germans and Hungarians were alike minded to prevent. Even this carefully guarded partnership scarcely stayed the divisive tendencies. For years it was generally believed that the death of the present sovereign would witness the dissolution of the dual monarchy, the more so as there was constant difficulty in apportioning the expense of the common services already referred to, between the two partners. Of late, however, the tide seems to have turned, and a dissolution is now no longer expected. Less trouble is experienced in making the necessary adjustments, and meanwhile a new interest has developed to hold the two together. This is the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. This vast ter-

ritory, with its Slavic population, it should be noted, has not been assigned to either partner, but is jointly administered by a special bureau under the direction of the finance minister who presides over the joint affairs of the empire, i. e., customs, army and navy, and foreign representation. In this way the new Slav provinces have no representation in either the Austrian or the Hungarian parliaments. Again it is easy to surmise the reason. Such an addition would increase the Slav vote and so the ultimate danger of Slav ascendancy.

It is needless to say that the Slav provinces have not taken kindly to this arrangement. Especially is this true of Bohemia, a populous and compact territory conscious of a great and independent past. The demand for partnership rights has been insistent and bitter. But this demand is made for Bohemia alone, and a glance at the map will make it clear that a united demand on the part of all the Slavs, or even on the part of all the northern Slavs, is well-nigh impossible. To make Bohemia a third partner would still leave half the northern Slavs and all the southern Slavs to be distributed among the partners, with the certainty that the agitation for further partners would continue. Against such an extension of the partnership there are the weightiest reasons. It would increase the cost of government and decrease its efficiency. In particular, it would render dilatory and uncertain all concerted action which would always halt waiting for some partner's consent, for it must be remembered that there is no federal government to impose concerted action on all the states, as there

is with us. This is precisely what the Hungarians have refused to tolerate.

To these sound reasons of general policy, there are others less admirable but even more influential. To admit the Slavs to full partnership would give the Hungarians no access to the sea. Worse still, it would reduce Austria to comparative insignificance. The Germans are a minor part of the entire population, and their territory a still smaller part. The Hungarians would outnumber them and that increasingly, for their territory is vastly greater. That the people who have so long ruled the whole empire and even stood at the head of all Teutonic Europe should voluntarily accept a minor place in the partnership is not to be expected. So both countries stand pat, and will doubtless continue to do so until a revolution or some other extraordinary event, perhaps the present war, compels them to yield.

There are not wanting, however, in high places, those who anticipate the inevitable decision. They are advocates of what is known as trialism; that is, a threefold instead of a twofold partnership. The late Archduke Ferdinand, heir to the throne, was said to be a trialist. What action he would have taken had he become emperor, or how he would have overcome the geographical and other obstacles, to the participation of the Slavs as a unit, we can only guess.

The discontent of the Slavs has manifested itself in very different forms in different districts. Bohemia wishes to become a distinct kingdom, co-operating with Austria and Hungary on even terms. Galicia, once a part of Poland, would perhaps prefer to with-

draw from the empire altogether and be reunited with German and Russian Poland to form an independent state, though this is not so certain. Croatia, Slavonia and Bosnia see in a union with Servia a prospect far more attractive than union with the northern Slavs or subjection to Hungary. How harmonise these discordant ambitions?

A plan attributed to the Archduke Ferdinand is at least interesting. It was to permit the realignment of the Balkan powers on racial lines, but under the suzerainty of the Austrian crown. Servia, Bosnia, Croatia and Slavonia, with Dalmatia or Albania or both, would thus be united with Hungary, Austria, Bohemia and Poland in a vast federated empire, to which it was his hope that Rumania and Bulgaria would be added, each with enlarged boundaries. Each would retain its own king and its independence in matters of internal administration, while resigning to the central government the control of all matters affecting the empire in its relation to other powers. The plan appeals strongly to the unbiased imagination, but it does not seem to have been welcomed by the present partners, who are perhaps less concerned with the development of the empire than with the maintenance of their present advantage. Nor was it satisfactory to the southern Slavs, who feared that this concession to the Slavs would defeat their plans for independence.

The first step in the way of realising this plan, or any plan, is necessarily the control of Servia. The greater Servia is not to be thought of as an outsider and possible enemy. If the Slavs are to be united it

must be by bringing Servia in, not by letting the others out. Hence the attempts at alternate conciliation and coercion to which Servia has been exposed. We have already seen how all these efforts have failed and how the stand which Austria has believed it necessary to take to assure the freedom of the Adriatic and the loyalty of her Slavic subjects, has aroused a resentment in the Servian mind which probably has no parallel in the existing family of nations. This resentment has manifested itself, not in epithets and insults only, but in carefully laid plans to detach the southern Slavs from their allegiance, and to unite them to Servia to form an independent state. It has been charged that secret societies have been formed which included not only Servian citizens, but large numbers of Servian officials, with a programme definitely hostile to Austria. We can hardly expect, as things now stand, ever to know the truth of these assertions, but they probably contained a large element of truth. It would be strange if the Servians, twice baffled in their efforts to attain their most elemental requirements, should not risk much in a final and desperate attempt. It would be strange in turn if Austria, threatened with the loss of everything, should not stake all in an effort at self-preservation.

For let us not overlook the fact that Austria must lose all if she lost here. The loss of the southern Slavs would have meant the loss of the northern Slavs, for nothing would have withstood their claims, if similar claims had been conceded elsewhere. Worse still, the loss of the southern Slavs would completely shut off both Austria and Hungary from the

sea. We have seen that even within the confines of the empire, where no customs barriers are permitted, it is still deemed important in the interest of harmony, that each of these countries should have its own sea-ports, and that Croatia and Slavonia had to be ceded to Hungary by Austria on that account. How much more important, therefore, if the alternative is to have all ports in the hands of a completely separate power, able not only to erect customs barriers, but even to strangle traffic by differential railway tariffs or refusal of adequate railway facilities, as we have seen done to Servia. Even were the Slavs to be moderate, and take only Croatia, Slavonia, Dalmatia and Bosnia, leaving Carinthia and Istria, the less Slavic states, in Austrian possession, and giving them Trieste as an outlet to the sea, the loss would still be fatal. The great archipelago of Dalmatia, now the incomparable defence of Austria from naval attack, would be lost, and with it the tiny sea outlet would be wholly in the power of the new Slav state. Moreover, an Austria so weakened would at once become the prey of Italy, whose designs on the Istrian peninsula with its Italian population are loudly proclaimed. It is perfectly certain that any government which has the weakness, or even the misfortune, to lose territory so vital to the life of the empire would be overthrown, that the disruptive forces within the empire would be no longer restrainable, and that the empire would fall asunder.

No government can be expected knowingly to commit suicide. It may have the scantiest possible claim upon our sympathy, the most doubtful right to exist,

but these facts do not lessen its instincts of self-preservation or invalidate its right to act in self-defence. The statesmen charged with its defence cannot be expected to question its right to exist. Its action must be measured not by its merits, but by its needs.


But Austria needs no apologist for its existence. No government in Europe is so constrained, so artificial, yet none is so indispensable. It will hardly be claimed that the two great partners have treated considerately the other great incoherent race that is in their keeping, but they have kept the peace over a large area in the most chaotic part of Europe. It is not the faults of government that create the dissonance in this sore troubled realm; it is the dissonance that creates the faults of government. And this dissonance inheres in the situation, in the shape of the land which it is here given to men to inherit and to fit to the needs of harmonious national life, in the narrow sea front which accident has given into one people's keeping, in the medley of races which the cross currents of race migration have here piled in sorry confusion, in the raw material which nature has furnished the builder, and not in the builder's mistake. Unhappy Austria, with her family jars, and her babel of tongues! Yes, no doubt, as compared with England and France with their united purpose and their common tongue. But happy, yes, thrice happy, as compared with the Balkan states, with their chaos of purpose, their carnage, and their smouldering hate! And that is the alternative. It is a hazardous venture to dissolve even the imperfect cohesions among men.

CHAPTER XI

THE CASE OF RUSSIA

THE Russian Empire is the largest body of contiguous territory in the world. It is approximately three times the size of the United States. The British Empire is larger, but its parts are widely separated, the largest single area, Canada, being considerably less than half the size of Russia. The Chinese Empire, even counting such shadowy dependencies as Manchuria, Mongolia, Tibet and Turkestan, is less than half the size of Russia, while China proper, the so-called eighteen provinces, is less than one-fifth the size of Russia. Superimpose the map of the United States on that of Russia, placing San Francisco at Warsaw, and then start eastward for New York. When you have reached your destination, you are just about in the middle of the Russian Empire, half way to the Pacific.¹ A young man boarded our train at Irkutsk. The sound of English speech aroused his visible interest. "Do you speak English?" we asked. "Sure." "An American, then." "Yes, from Pennsylvania." "What are you doing out here?" "Oh, working in a mine."

¹ The United States (excluding outlying possessions) extends over 57 degrees of longitude, the Russian Empire over 174 degrees. The distance from San Francisco to New York by rail is 3180 miles, from Warsaw to Vladivostok 6221 miles.



"Where?" "Up north a ways." "How far north?" "About two thousand miles." "How long does it take you to get here?" "About a month."

Two thousand miles north of Irkutsk, i.e., north of London or Labrador! And farther west he could have gone twelve hundred miles south of the same parallel without leaving Russian territory. Extend our country northward to the Arctic Ocean, trimming off the Gulf states, and then stretch it northeast to Liverpool, and you have the Russian Empire. It would hold our country dropped in cross wise, and then the empire of Cæsar on one side and that of Alexander on the other, and still there would be room for all the states of western Europe.

But this is not all. The traveller from San Francisco to New York crosses hundreds of miles of country which no conceivable effort can make largely productive. The long journey from Warsaw to Vladivostok crosses scarcely a mile of untillable soil. Even the Urals, the alleged mountain barrier between Europe and Asia, are hardly mountains at all, but merely wooded hills which the railway crosses without a single tunnel. Even allowing for the Arctic wastes, which are less extensive than is commonly supposed, the Russian empire probably has a larger percentage of tillable land than the United States. For more than five thousand miles the railway traverses a country like Iowa and Nebraska.

This vast domain has a population of about one hundred and seventy-five millions, mostly crowded into the southwestern corner. Siberia, with more

than half the territory of the empire, has a population of less than ten millions. Most of this vast population, say a hundred and fifty millions, consists of white men, having all the potentialities of the white race. This is the largest body of white men living under one government in the world. Yet it is but the beginning of what seemingly must be. China has but a fifth the area, and more than half of that is mountainous and refractory. Yet with resources but partially developed she supports a population of four hundred millions. Japan has one-sixtieth the area of Russia, and only one-sixth of her soil is or can be cultivated, yet she supports a population of fifty millions. At the same rate as China Russia would support a population of two thousand millions; at the rate of Japan, three thousand millions. Neither is impossible. The Russian people seem conscious of this possibility, for they are expanding at the most rapid rate anywhere recorded. At the rate of increase of the last hundred years, the total of two thousand millions would be reached about the year 2000. Only one other white population can, under present conditions, increase to any such extent, and that population is not politically united.

It would seem certain, from the foregoing considerations, that Russia, with reasonable development and organisation, was assured an easy supremacy among the white races of the world. No one of them can possibly withstand her, and a combination which should long thwart her purposes would seem to be most unlikely. Not altogether presumptuous was the prophetic utterance of the great spokesman of the

Russian people: "We have come to take up the burden of civilisation. We have come to relieve the tired men."

Yet we have here to note the great paradox of modern political geography. Russia has the largest white man's land, the most productive of empires, the largest white population, the most prolific white population, the most room to grow in, and the best assurance that she can never be outgrown by any rival — and yet, *there is no country in the world to-day that needs more territory as badly as Russia.*

The reason is plain to those who have followed the reasoning of the earlier chapters. Territorial sufficiency is not a question of area, but of organic completeness. Spain is a little country, yet her territory is admirably complete. Union with Portugal would leave her territorially almost perfect. On all sides but one, the sea coast, and on the other, a mountain frontier easily delimited and defended. But a kingdom of Dakota the same size would be one of the most helpless and unstable political units imaginable. It would live in constant danger and would end by absorbing adjacent territories or being absorbed by them. Nature has, indeed, set no absolute limits to states, as the British Empire now demonstrates, but there are enormous differences of convenience and stability among the possible boundaries that she offers. Reasonable facilities for defence, and, above all, for trade, are indispensable to satisfactory territorial equipment. To stop short of this is to forego true independence and to invite trouble. These requisites Russia does not possess. Her constant expansion,

much of it unwilling, despite common opinion to the contrary, is no insatiable land hunger, but the effort of a smothered people to get out to the air and light.

It is easy for us, almost ideally situated in these respects, to discount Russia's need, to advise co-operation in the use of facilities, and reliance upon neighbourly offices. But it is doubtful whether we, in like situation, would find our own advice palatable. We are hardly able, perhaps, to imagine ourselves transferred to Russia and confronted with her problems. Let us try the easier task of reproducing, as nearly as we can, the Russian situation here.

We have imagined in a former connection a chain of large islands stretching from Newfoundland to Long Island, and completely controlling access to the mainland — these all under German rule. Next, we will assume that all the Atlantic seaboard south from Maine to Georgia, and back to the Mississippi, with the Gulf States, is an independent and not too friendly country, far more populous than our own territory to the north and west, while Florida and Cuba belong to France. Mexico and the Pacific coast states are all in the hands of Japan, while Alaska, with its long "panhandle" extended much farther south and inland, is also under foreign control. In compensation for all these losses, we will imagine that political accident has given us Canada, with its narrowed western exit at Puget Sound, and the freedom of Hudson's Bay. We should have an ample territory stretching from Ohio through Montana, and from Oklahoma to the Arctic Ocean, but the very extent of this territory would be an embarrassment. The only exit to the

eastern sea actually ours would be the semi-frozen St. Lawrence, and this an exit to a sea under German control. On the west our sole contact with the sea would be at the back end of Puget Sound, from which we could issue only between the pincers of foreign forts. Actual commerce would have to be bonded across foreign territory to New York, to New Orleans, to San Francisco.

Imagine such a situation. The very thought is suffocating. No doubt we should accommodate ourselves to the necessities of the situation while we were too weak to change it. No doubt we should get used to it, and some among us would come to think it highly satisfactory, heaven-ordained, and would denounce as insatiate greed and unholy ambition all attempts at imperialistic or jingo policy. But can any one imagine that such an arrangement would be satisfactory to the American people? To a nation so hampered, peace could be but a truce; diplomacy could be but duplicity. Any number of wars would be fought to win New York, our Port Arthur. We should cherish every acre of the Nevada desert that brought us nearer to the Gulf of California, our Persian Gulf. No statesman would retain our confidence who did not seek control of the headlands that guard Puget Sound, our Baltic; while expansion toward the Gulf would become the cornerstone of our national policy. To a United States thus gripped by the steel shackles of militant Germany and Japan, how silly would sound arguments for arbitration and international brotherhood. How universal would be the gospel of our manifest destiny! How easy the conviction that na-

tions are not sentient beings whose existence is sacrosanct, but mere arrangements for administrative convenience, to be discontinued when they defeat rather than promote that end. If we have other policies and other convictions, it is because we know nothing of Russia's needs. Put us in her position and we will soon learn to think her thoughts and do as she does. The same land hunger and insatiate imperialism, the same bureaucratic management, the same shameless subterfuge and diplomatic intrigue, above all the same military organisation and intermittent warfare, would be our portion until one writ ran from coast to coast, and through the open windows of the world we breathed unhindered the breeze from the outer sea.

It is Russia's doom to be big. She has no choice, no nearer stopping place. To escape from her inland prison, the common aim and need of all peoples, she is compelled to stretch nearly half way round the world. Even so she is but meagrely supplied with outlets for her commerce. The immense stretch of her Arctic coast line is negligible as an outlet. Archangel, at the southern end of the White Sea, serves minor purposes during the summer months, and it is rumoured that the exigencies of war have created another outlet, this one ice-free for all the year, though within the Arctic Circle. But such an outlet can hardly serve the purposes of commerce in normal times. It is too remote from the destinations of commerce, and involves for all ordinary purposes too vast a detour.

The Baltic is a natural and valuable outlet, both because it penetrates through the great barrier of west-

ern Europe far into the interior of Russia, and because it gives immediate access to the great markets of Europe. The first great move of Russian statesmanship was the decision of Peter the Great to move the capital and business centre of Russia from inland Moscow to the shores of the Baltic. That was the keynote to the policy which Russia has pursued ever since.

But the Baltic is a grudging outlet at the best. Nature is churlish during the dark winter months, and the icebreaker but poorly compensates for her withheld favour. Above all, the Baltic is doubly bound by outlying territories, first by the Scandinavian countries whose grip is a very close one, and then by the looser but mightier grip of Britain beyond, while Germany is in a position to exercise her powerful pressure in either sea. For this naval grip of Britain and Germany there seems to be no remedy, except to match it in kind, which Russia may not unreasonably hope sometime to do. But the Scandinavian grip is of a different character. Here no naval power is necessary for her enemies, and no naval development will avail for her defence. The one solution is to control the shores of the Danish straits, both sides if she is to control the straits, and one side if she is to prevent others from controlling them. This can mean but one thing, the control of the great Scandinavian peninsula, and that this extension of Russian dominion is in the background of Russian state consciousness few will doubt. Certainly it is the constant spectre of Scandinavian statesmanship. The annexation of Finland, a country harmless and useless in itself, and the

suppression of liberties liable to impede farther Russian advance by this route, can have no other rational interpretation. The long halt at present confines means simply the necessity of husbanding national resources, for when the attempt is made it can hardly be expected that neighbouring powers will be indifferent. Then, too, there are more urgent if not more important tasks on hand. Obviously the full programme would require the annexation of East Prussia, Schleswig-Holstein and Denmark, which would convert the Baltic into a Russian lake and put the great empire, as regards this part of the world, into the strongest position of any of the great powers, whereas her position there now is probably the weakest. When we recall the fact that Russia already rules in her Baltic provinces a large German population, and that East Prussia is a somewhat unnatural coast extension overhanging Russian Poland and itself containing large elements of Slavic population, the proposition ceases to seem preposterous. But it is a large proposition, and one to which Germany will inevitably oppose the most strenuous resistance. It is an ambition, therefore, which the Russian can hope to see realised only in a remote future, when growth of population and development of internal resources shall have greatly modified the relative strength of the rival powers. But Russia is accustomed to far projects and distant hopes. That this is one which she is cherishing, no one familiar with her ideals will question. And in fact it is the first measurably strategic frontier.

Russia's Far Eastern problem is simpler if not eas-

ier. Here there can be no question as to the need and the natural goal of her ambitions. Commerce requires imperatively that the vast resources of Siberia and Manchuria should find unhindered access to the markets of the world through a port whose waters never freeze, and this can not be found north of Korea. It has been shown already that nature has contrived with peculiar thoroughness to concentrate the commerce of all the northern half of Asia in the small waters of the gulf behind the Korean peninsula. Any power having interests in this region must therefore make this gulf its objective. The only question can be as to the way of reaching it. In this, the nearby districts like Manchuria and Pechili have no choice. They border on the gulf and of course reach the gulf at their borders. It should be noted, however, that their access is quite unequally favourable. Manchuria has the north shore of the gulf. At each end of this littoral a large river enters, the Yalu at the east and the Liao at the west, offering fairly good harbours, Antung and Newchwang, while between them the long peninsula of Liaotung projects far to the south with its great harbours of Port Arthur and Dairen. Railroads now run to all these ports. Moreover, by a curious caprice of the ocean currents, these harbours never freeze. To the west, however, where the gulf bends far inland in the rich province of Pechili, there is but one access, that offered by the sluggish Pei-Ho river, with the river port of Tientsin some miles up stream and the gulf port of Taku at its mouth. Both of these leave much to be desired, and that increasingly as the size of ocean car-

riers increases. Moreover, they are somewhat encumbered by ice.

As Russia faced the problem of an outlet to the Pacific, she had her choice of three routes. The first and longest lay through her own possessions to Vladivostok. This was unsatisfactory because the port is available only seven months in the year, and is completely in the power of Japan. Moreover, the route was long, and if kept within Russian territory, a connecting railroad would derive but little revenue from local traffic. But as an alternative route this was not to be neglected, and from the first, as the great Trans-Siberian Railway was pushed eastward, a terminus at this Russian port was contemplated.

The second route lay through Manchuria with a terminus at Port Arthur and Dairen. Merely as a terminus this was incomparably superior. Not only did it offer an outlet to ice-free waters, and a protected harbour, but it offered a second and highly defensible harbour suitable for the naval base which was indispensable for the protection of Russian commerce in these distant seas. Finally, it was a more direct route than that to Vladivostok and, above all, the required railway would traverse one of the richest agricultural districts in the world with corresponding advantage to its revenue.

The third route was from the southern end of Lake Baikal, the most southernly point on the Trans-Siberian, southeast across Mongolia to Peking, Tientsin and Taku. This route had the single advantage of being short — much shorter, in fact, than either of the others. There were advantages and disadvan-

tages in the farther fact that it ran through the populous province of Pechili and the capital of the empire as well as the commercial metropolis of the North, the great city of Tientsin. But harbour facilities were inferior and Mongolia was largely a desert. The all-important consideration, however, was that this route offered no opportunity for Russian control. The railroad from Peking to the gulf was already built, and was under thinly veiled British control. Tientsin represented immense foreign interests, mostly non-Russian. Above all Peking, the capital and symbol of Chinese sovereignty, interposed a barrier which nothing short of the partition of the empire could remove.

The reader whose thought is attuned to the piping times of peace may find depressing this constant allusion to the necessity of political control. It would quite suffice our purpose to remind such objectors that we are dealing with men as they are, and that nations in fact do feel that political control of commercial necessities is indispensable to the security of their commerce. But it is also pertinent to recall the fact that this belief is specially justified in this part of the world. In the case of China, political organisation is defective, and with the best of intentions (which are not quite assured) she has neither the power nor the intelligence to provide such facilities as modern commerce requires. Japan is not lacking in these requisites, but her desperate need of strengthening her position is likely to give, as we shall see, a peculiar virulence to her self-interest and to make her an unsafe custodian of the interests of commercial rivals.

In view of these facts, there could be no hesitation in seeking the main terminus of the Trans-Siberian Railway in the Liaotung peninsula. Long before the completion of the all-Russian route to Vladivostok, this was decided upon, the necessary concessions were secured from China, the Vladivostok line was carried straight across the great northern projection of Manchuria, and a branch line — the real main line — was built to Port Arthur, from which Japan, the recent tenant, had been somewhat unceremoniously evicted. Russia's scarcely concealed intention of annexing both Manchuria and Korea, a strategic necessity if her new outlet was to be secured, resulted in the war with Japan and the loss of both, in which Russia was now compelled to see entrenched, not impotent China, but militant Japan.

We are here interested, not in recording the result of this war, but in noting its possible relation to future wars. There can be no blinking the fact that this war left Russia with a maximum incentive to again try conclusions with Japan at a convenient season. Aside from the wound to her pride and her national prestige, her concrete loss is incalculable. The outlet thus lost has no satisfactory alternate, and it has passed into the control of a rival of maximum efficiency, skilled in the art of formally permitting, while effectively preventing, all real competition with her commerce, and constrained to this egoistic policy by a desperate need. Russian statesmanship would be imbecile if it renounced the ambition to retrieve this disaster.

For the present, however, no move is contemplated, or can be. There are other things to do. But while the *modus vivendi* with Japan is accepted, the Trans-Siberian has been double-tracked, a sufficiently ominous portent which Japan must perfectly understand. In the meantime attention is turned to the third route as an alternative, useful in itself, and likely to prevent Japan from becoming too exacting. A railway from Lake Baikal to Peking is a thing of the near future, a considerable part being already in operation. In this connection mention should be made of another project which, all unnoticed, is being advanced toward completion. Mention has already been made of the railroad which Russia has built from the Caspian Sea eastward through Samarcand to Tashkend. The primary purpose of this railroad, like that of most Russian railroads, was undoubtedly strategic and military, but its commercial possibilities are not the less important. There can be little doubt that its extension eastward across China, either as a Russian extension or in co-operation with some friendly interest, is contemplated. Meanwhile one cross line has already been built from the Siberian line lying far to the north and others are sure to follow. Such a railroad would assure an outlet to the Pacific in southern Chinese waters, far from the contested waters of Pechili. But the length of the haul and the nature of the country to be crossed render it doubtful whether such a route can advantageously compete with the more northern route as an outlet for Siberian produce. On the other hand, its influence in opening up an undeveloped

country must be enormous. Incidentally, be it noted, it creates new problems which may reject all arbitrament save that of the sword.

As we pass westward from the Pacific round the huge peninsulas which project from southern Asia, Russia seems to retire into a remote background. Trackless deserts, stupendous mountain barriers and overwhelming masses of humanity, dwelling in areas scarcely less extensive than her own, interpose their vast bulk between Russia and the sea. For sixty degrees of longitude — one-sixth of the circumference of the globe — there is not the faintest prospect of an outlet. But at last comes the deep indentation of the Persian Gulf. From the head of this convenient waterway it is less than five hundred miles as the crow flies to the Caspian Sea. When it is remembered that the Caspian gives access to the mighty Volga which is navigable almost to Moscow and Petrograd, and that it is easily accessible from the Black Sea and all its tributaries and is the only outlet at present for the whole region of central Asia which is tapped by the railroad last described, the importance of the Persian Gulf as a possible outlet will be apparent. Moreover, the railroad required across Persia would traverse a region rich in mineral resources and remunerative in local traffic.

It is hardly necessary to add that Russia has long had her eye on this outlet, and that her policy has been shaped toward this end. That it has not been given more prominence in her programme is due to several facts. First, the outlet, though practicable and ultimately indispensable, points just now in the wrong

direction. What is desired in this quarter is an outlet toward Europe. From the Persian Gulf Europe can be reached only by circumnavigating Arabia and passing the Suez Canal, a long and expensive route, as compared with that of the North Sea or the Dardanelles. When trade with Asia assumes larger proportions, this outlet will be more valuable, and Russia has no mind to see it pass hopelessly under other control. But for the present other facilities are more desired.

A second reason is the present difficulty of securing it. This would involve at the outset the control of Persia, a serious undertaking in itself, and far more important, an inevitable clash with Great Britain, who sees in the establishment of a strong power in the Persian Gulf a serious menace to the security of India. So emphatic has been her objection to this move that it was long the accepted belief in all quarters that Russia, insisting upon the occupation of the Persian Gulf and knowing that Britain would never consent, would seek to realise her ambition by an attack on India. British distrust of this period is accurately expressed in Kipling's remarkable poem, "The Truce of the Bear." For a generation the two empires manœuvred for position and glared at each other across the Himalayas until the appearance of new actors on the stage made them allies, and for a time held Russian ambitions in abeyance. These new actors were Japan and Germany, the former cleverly used by Britain to distract Russia's attention and make her amenable to reason; the latter looming suddenly as the rival and the enemy of both. Of these more in their place.

The present result is an agreement upon "spheres of influence" in Persia; that is, a virtual partition of the country as regards its relation to international problems and foreign trade, an arrangement which leaves Britain in undisputed possession of the Persian Gulf. But Russia's renunciation undoubtedly has its mental reservations. The end is not yet.

We come now to the question of Russia's access to the Mediterranean, a problem which so far exceeds the others in importance, that it has held for a century or more the first place in Russian policy. The significance of Constantinople and the Dardanelles has already been dwelt upon at length. It remains to be noted that Russia is chiefly interested in this gateway to the inner continent. It is true that other countries like Rumania, and to a less degree Bulgaria, are dependent upon this outlet, but it is difficult to believe that their present isolation or even their existence is permanently assured. Without altogether subscribing to the brutal dictum that "the day of small nations is past," we can hardly overlook the fact that small nations in general lack the conditions of true independence, and that they tend more and more by virtue of agreements and alliances, if not through conquest, to become dependent upon other powers. It is difficult not to see in the Balkans an example of incomplete integration, with Russia or German overlordship as a more probable prospect than separate independence or even the formation of a Balkan state. The same is even more true of Turkey, whose territories still include the most of the southern littoral of the Black Sea. A revived Turkey, an independent Ar-

menia, a protectorate by some other great power? Any of these is less thinkable than an extension of Russia until her long arms at last embrace the Black Sea and clasp hands at the Dardanelles. It is needless to say that Russian imagination hardly contemplates any other outcome as possible. To her mind, therefore, the Dardanelles is the predestined gateway to Russia, and Black Sea interests are exclusively Russian interests. A recent semi-official utterance has clearly enunciated this view.

This, therefore, is the supreme goal of all Russian imperialism. To secure this she would, now as a century ago, make any sacrifice, even to the extent of losing for the present her position in the Baltic and the Pacific — the more so perhaps because the possession of Constantinople would almost certainly insure her possession, in the end, of anything else she might seek. It was to secure this outlet that she fought the Crimean war against four great powers whose sole object in their turn was to prevent that possession. It was for this purpose that she attacked Turkey in 1877, and her participation in the present war is motivated solely by her interest in the same highway. She will fight any number of wars for that end.

It is perhaps the appreciation of this fact, in part, which induces Britain to desist from her long continued opposition to Russian policy, if it be true, as reported, that she has consented to the Russian occupation of Constantinople. If in addition Britain has secured for herself a long control of the Persian Gulf, her action is still more intelligible. But perhaps after all there is another reason for her concession than

even the Persian advantage or the German menace. For the Dardanelles, if impregnable, is easily blockaded, and, after all, Russia in the Mediterranean is still imprisoned, and Britain holds the key.

Russia is certainly of those who have greatness thrust upon them. How can she stop short of acquiring Manchuria and its perennial ports? How can she accept less than the control of the Dardanelles? less even than the possession of the Danish straits? Less, of course, if less she must, but never willingly less, so long as political control has any value to commerce, or any influence in shaping the destiny of a cherished civilisation. Even with the four outlets which we have considered, all in her possession, Russia would be but meagrely supplied with doorways to the world. Favoured with overwhelming mass, the temptation of this Samson must still be to snap the bonds that irk but do not hold the giant's powers. Will the Adriatic seem a convenience? The southern Slavs will furnish the pretext. And then, where next?

CHAPTER XII

THE CASE OF GERMANY

THE German Empire was established in 1871 under the powerful stimulus of a great personality and a great victory. This late realisation of the manifest destiny of the German people was in an unusual sense the work of one man, the greatest statesman — perhaps the only great statesman — that modern Germany has produced. The task was deliberately undertaken, the various steps advisedly chosen, and the consequences clearly foreseen. All these elements entered into the formation of Bismarck's policy which is the necessary background of the existing situation.

The first requisite was leadership. Most of the German states were too small to command the respect and confidence of the German peoples. The traditional leader of the German states, Austria, was unsuited to the task. Its population was not German and was very slightly united by sympathies or other bonds, while its traditions, all built around an obsolete ideal, were a fatal handicap for modern leadership. Prussia, on the other hand, was young, vigorous, and unhampered, with a brilliant record for successful expansion. Prussia, too, was German and commanded the confidence of those who were concerned for the triumph of German ideals. Above

all, Prussia had a Bismarck who could work from that base as he could not hope to do from that of Austria. It was much like a dynastic struggle between a commonplace legitimate and a competent upstart. The elimination of Austria was effected by two wars, the first with Denmark, for possession of Schleswig-Holstein. This outpost was valuable for strategic reasons, as permitting the union of the Baltic and the North Sea by a canal under German control. But as it was claimed by Austria who had not yet outgrown the idea of a dismembered European empire, it was perfectly understood that it would lead to a war with that country, and was doubtless sought partly for that purpose. Bismarck knew that Prussia was prepared for such a struggle, and the quick and decisive victory which followed justified his confidence. The result established incontestably Prussia's superiority, and taught the South German states, some of which had imprudently shared Austria's fortunes, that their choice lay only between Prussia as a leader and Prussia as a master.

A greater struggle was clearly foreseen and was not unwelcome. France had long been the acknowledged foremost power on the continent, and apart from general probabilities, diplomatic relations had clearly indicated that she would not look with indifference upon the rise of a rival such as a unified Germany would be. For this struggle Bismarck had need of all his resources. Hence incredible magnanimity was shown toward Austria and her south German allies. Contrary to all the traditions of war, seemingly contrary to the policy of German unification, Bismarck

refused to consent to the annexation of any hostile territory. This magnanimity seemed so monstrous that he found all interests against him. His desperate determination carried the day, we are told, only when his threat to resign was followed by a threat to commit suicide in the emperor's presence.

The war with France, which found Austria neutral and the south German states in alliance with Prussia, justified to the minds of all, Bismarck's marvellous foresight. It resulted in the formation of the German Empire as the unquestioned first power on the continent, and the relegation of France to a place of seemingly hopeless subordination.

With this consummation Bismarck seems to have rested measurably content. He seems not to have thought of further annexations as feasible or desirable. There were still some millions of Germans outside the empire, notably in Austria, but considering their entanglements and their traditions, the empire was stronger without them than with them. Moreover, they were likely to do more for Germany by holding down the dangerous Slav and Hungarian peoples under their partial control, than by withdrawing, to leave them in probable hostility. To take over the whole medley was certainly no part of Bismarck's ideal. Nor did Belgium and Holland seem to tempt him, despite their Germanic population and geographic convenience. To the superficial apostle of Pan-Germanism they make a specious appeal. They are also vital to a policy of far reaching aggression. But neither Pan-Germanism nor far reaching aggression entered into Bismarck's ideal.

The empire as thus constituted occupied an exceedingly strong position for a conservatively managed power. Against its one implacable enemy it was defended by a short and impregnable frontier. Its central location involved certain dangers, to be sure, and imposed the necessity of strong organisation and clever diplomacy, but given these conditions, its position was commanding. Surrounding powers, if united, could crush her, but there was little reason why they should be united. The feud between Britain and France was centuries old, and in Bismarck's time was acute. Britain and Russia were traditional enemies, opposed in all their race instincts and in their conflicting interests. Russia and Austria were gravitating toward inevitable conflict over the Balkan approaches to the Dardanelles. Austria and Italy were fresh from war, and had perpetual cause of strife. Even Italy and France, an innocuous combination at best, seemed none too cordial. With abundance of inherited feuds and plenty of apples of discord, it would be a very clumsy manipulator who could not keep these warring rivals in check. Meanwhile, whatever the dispute, the mere menace of Germany's powerful intervention should suffice to secure a settlement in accordance with Germany's wishes. It was the old problem of the maintenance of the balance of power, a problem familiar to European diplomacy, and one in which Bismarck was exceptionally skilful, while Germany's central location offered unusual advantages for the exercise of his skill.

The foreign policy of Germany, as Bismarck saw it, followed logically from the geographical and his-

toric environment with which we are familiar. Toward France, whose hostility must be expected, Germany must maintain a bold front and strengthen to the utmost her admirable strategic frontier. Belgium and Holland, incapable of being enemies, must be kept as useful friends and invaluable defences. The seaboard need fear no attack unless wantonly provoked. The southern frontier was the safest imaginable. To the east and southeast lay Germany's problem. In the absence of a defensible frontier, Germany's safety must be sought in a careful maintenance of rivalry between her powerful neighbours. This was the easier because their interests were sharply opposed. The great danger was that by lack of diplomatic skill, Germany might be drawn into this conflict of interests, thus acquiring the permanent enmity of the one party or the other, as has in fact since happened. But at the outset there were no such entanglements, and the relations between the three great empires were cordial. There was immense advantage in the fact that Germany had no colonies or distant territorial ambitions. It was thus that when the war between Russia and Turkey kept Austria on the anxious seat and almost drew her into the conflict, Germany looked on in friendly indifference, and later, in the capacity of benevolent host, invited the Powers to meet in Berlin for the vexed settlement. It is easy to see how the commanding figure of Bismarck, unhampered by German claims, could impress all with the importance of Germany as the great arbiter, and of Berlin as the diplomatic capital of Europe. So in the strained relation of Britain

and France over Egypt, Germany looked on from the safe position of disinterestedness. It is true that this ideal attitude was not easily maintained. Even while the great chancellor was still at the helm, relations with Russia became so strained that an alliance with Austria seemed necessary to avert an open rupture, while Bismarck's suspicion of the too rapidly recovering France led him to coerce unwilling Italy into the combination. But it was announced with all possible emphasis that the alliance was purely defensive, and there can be no reasonable doubt that it was so intended. Of course the value of such an intention may quite disappear, if it suits the purpose of the allies to construe defence in a liberal sense, as we have seen in an earlier chapter, but there is no reason to believe that there was any disposition at the outset so to construe it. Nor did the alliance prevent Bismarck from throwing out an anchor to windward in the shape of a secret agreement with Russia of quite contrary purport, suited to secure Russian acquiescence and leave Germany free to choose in an emergency.

It is impossible to survey this early German policy without speculating as to its possible alternates. Suppose Germany had leaned to the side of Russia instead of siding with Austria. What a vista that opens up to the imagination! There would have been no Franco-Russian alliance, but a Franco-Italian alliance instead, with the possible addition of Austria. Or again, could not Germany have conciliated France and made her an ally? Of course this would have required an exercise of magnanimity like that so lately shown to Austria. There could have been no

annexation of Alsace-Lorraine. There is reason to believe that this would have been acceptable to Bismarck, and though coercion rather than conciliation is associated with his name, his powers in the latter direction were not inconsiderable, as the case of Austria and the South German states shows. Might he not have succeeded here by magnanimity and patience? A working alliance between Germany and France would have been a combination of immense strength and its consequences would have been revolutionary. But no such policy was possible, not because France could not be conciliated, but because Germany could not be magnanimous. It has often been said that the annexation of Alsace-Lorraine was Bismarck's one fatal mistake. So be it, but it was a mistake which he was compelled to make unless he renounced his whole purpose. He had had experience with resisting the passions engendered by victory, and he knew that resistance was now impossible. The strategists demanded the fortresses of Strassburg and Metz as necessary to the defence of the realm; the South German states refused to enter the empire unless these mountain provinces were interposed between them and hostile France, while back of all, and more potent than all, was the demand of an unthinking but exultant people who would not see the flag come down where the prowess of German arms had planted it. If we could not lower our flag in the Philippines where there was so little except war sentiment to justify its presence, surely the annexation of Alsace-Lorraine could not be avoided. A mistake perhaps, but a mistake that had to be made.

Bismarck's career involved so much of coercion and aggression, that we are apt to overlook the most pronounced characteristic of his policy, namely, its conservatism. His vigorous self-assertion was always tempered by a remarkable self-restraint. This restraint was manifest in the exclusion of Austria as unmanageable and unassimilable. Most significant of all, however, is his apathy toward colonies and all remote and detached interests. His ideal was a compact empire of the solidly unified German people, strong to resist the surrounding peoples who by virtue of superior organisation had so long tyrannised over a distracted and divided Germany. That an empire so organised and strong to maintain itself within established limits could play its due part in the world and get its share of the good things of life, admitted of no reasonable doubt. He did not see that colonies or further annexations in Europe would contribute to that end. If they had another value, it was one to which his experience and his habits of thought made him insensible. He seemed to lack imagination of the modern sort. Or did he see the modern vision and judge differently its feasibility and its promised good?

If Bismarck had died with the old emperor in 1888, he would have closed his eyes upon a seemingly finished work. There was plenty still to do in perfecting administrative machinery and winning the sympathies of a long divided people, but this was only the normal routine of statesmanship. Foreign relations presented a difficult problem and must continue to do so, but with boundaries fixed and a conservative tra-

dition established, success might be expected. All tasks should be easy, now that the supreme task was accomplished.

But Bismarck lived to see himself retired in humiliation and his great work endangered if not undone. His conservative policy was abandoned for a policy of adventure, whose perils he clearly saw, and whose outcome he profoundly distrusted. This was the policy of expansion or imperialism, the marked characteristic of political life in our time. It is unnecessary to seek any other cause for it than this universal tendency, the contagion of which no country could resist, even though held in leash by a Bismarck. The fact that the change coincides with the accession of a new emperor, doubtless has a certain significance, though the influence of individuals, even in high position, is usually exaggerated. The new policy has found in Emperor William its most conspicuous, but not its extremest champion. The policy which a Bismarck could not prevent, a William could not inaugurate. The spirit of an age never owns an individual as its creator. Nor would Emperor William have first claim to that honor if awarded.

But our concern for the moment is not with origins but with facts. What does the new policy propose?

In its mildest form it looks to the extension of German commerce, and to that alone. It seeks no colonies, no neighbour provinces. All energies are to be devoted to the development of industry at home with the fullest extension of its concomitant foreign trade. The power of government is to be exerted to secure trade privileges and protect trade interests. Dis-

ciples of this school would leave to other powers the empty and costly honour of administering the territories of backward peoples, and bearing the white man's burden, but would insist that German commerce be admitted without handicap in the regions thus subdued. This, it is argued, it would be increasingly easy to do. The nations that scatter their forces and waste their resources on distant colonies, weaken themselves thereby, while those that forego such expensive luxuries and conserve their resources, have the colonial powers increasingly at their mercy. Their argument is that so often urged in England by the so-called "Little Englanders," who contend that the British colonies entail a heavy burden upon the national exchequer for imperial defence, and that they are valuable chiefly to outsiders who enjoy commercial privileges at Britain's expense. That there are those in Germany who hold these opinions, is probably true, but their number is limited. The writer, after several years' residence and numerous visits there, has been unable to find a single representative.

It may be noted in passing, that imperialism in this mild form is quite consistent with Bismarckian conservatism. It proposes no change in political boundaries, and demands nothing which is not freely accorded, in theory at least. It derives its importance from the enormous development of industry and commerce in recent years, which has doubtless quite exceeded anything that Bismarck expected. This in itself, making Germany a great manufacturing and food importing country, instead of the self-sufficing area which Bismarck knew and possibly preferred, quite shifts the

centre of gravity of German interests and entails important changes in German policy. In fact it leads quite inevitably to the next form of imperialism which we may call the commercial-colonial policy.

The champions of this policy still recognise commerce as the goal of imperialism, and deprecate any extension of rule or exercise of authority for other ends. But they maintain that foreign commerce cannot safely be left in the control of rival powers. Commercial privileges are not willingly conceded, and promises are easily evaded by those in control. The pressure of governmental authority is always necessary, and this cannot be exerted far from its base. Therefore colonies, at least as bases of authority, are a commercial necessity. There need be no annexation of neighbouring provinces or states, but there must be naval and commercial bases overseas. This is the contention of Herr Ballin, the greatest captain of industry in Germany and the head of her united foreign commerce.

It is clear that this theory also is quite compatible with Bismarckian tradition, and it is in fact to this mild policy of peaceable colonial expansion that Bismarck seems to have given his adherence in his later years. It induced him to appropriate certain unclaimed territories of little value overseas, but we have reason to believe that he was opposed to a colonial policy which risked a conflict with other powers. This policy of moderate colonial expansion solely in the interest of commerce is the faith of a certain element in the German people. Their number it is impossible to ascertain, but that they are a small minor-

ity can hardly be doubted. The writer recalls meeting one or two representatives of this faith.

The third party repudiate commerce as their objective. Their object is rather the maintenance and extension of the German civilisation, the much maligned "Kultur." They are essentially idealists, though their ideals are of the humble sort which are common to common folk in all lands, rather than the visions of great minds. To them the German speech is familiar, and it holds their thoughts, their songs, their prayers, in its keeping. They have heard it from their mothers' lips, and in all the fondest relations of life. They are wonted to German ways in the home, the school, the church, the market place, the camp, in the thousand and one indifferent things that, taken together, make up the substance of their lives. These things are congenial in the forms in which they know them, and repugnant in other forms. To pass judgment on their real merits is utterly beyond their power. They know these, and because they know them, they love them and wish them to prevail. This love and this wish are their patriotism, the common characteristic of all sane and healthy peoples. While they love, they cannot judge, yet love they must, or there will soon be nothing left to judge. The judgment will be passed in due time by a more impartial tribunal, and something is likely to be found among these accidents of their blind devotion which is worthy to endure and find wider acceptance. We will not carp at their overconfidence. Have we not urged American democracy as a cure for German militarism, and how many a foolish prescription besides?

We have all alike the same confidence that things and ways are adapted to all, merely because a few of us have adapted ourselves to them. The positiveness of our faith and the fervour of our faith measure the vitality — nay, they are the vitality of our civilisation. We do well to endue this offspring of our race with all the vitality we can. Civilisations, like individuals, have a right to live — if they can — merely because they are born, a right to grow to their full stature, and a right to outgrow and outlive those of less vitality, subject only to the live-and-let-live limits which the great struggle itself imposes.

It is in this cult of Germanism that we trace the origin of the newer imperial policy which is not an outgrowth of the Bismarckian tradition, but a distinct negation of it. It repudiates the sordid motive of commercial gain as the mainspring of national policy. To prove that a proposed territory or province will not become profitable, is no deterrent. It is enough that it become German. The purpose of the German empire is not merely to make comfortable and secure the Germans of to-day, but to make them the leaven that shall leaven the lump. It is a larger and more difficult ideal, and if we can look at it from the standpoint of our own ideals, a far nobler one. It is the natural and spontaneous expression of the instinct of nationality in a powerful and exceptionally progressive people. Such a people can hardly help feeling the temptation to culture aggression. If people refuse to recognise a good thing when they see it, there is need, it may be argued, for benevolent coercion. In some such sense must be interpreted the reported

statement of the German envoy to Sweden, that the German people, as the greatest of all organisers, had "a right" to organise the less advanced peoples of the world. The national cult thus becomes propagandist in its character, and, conscious of a mission, it goes forth conquering and to conquer. Again, be it remembered, that there is nothing exceptional or illegitimate in this attitude. The German zealot is no more ambitious or presuming than a Cecil Rhodes in South Africa, or a Whitman in Oregon. The one champions "liberty," and the other champions "order," both good things, and both sometimes bought too dear.

To men thus minded — and they are the enormous majority of the German people — it is clear that the conservative programme of Bismarck and the materialistic programme of the commercial party were alike inadequate. It was not enough to be cosily housed and secured from menace in Europe while other flags, other tongues and other ways took possession of the unpeopled spaces. Every year spent in this prosperous seclusion lessened the chances that German civilisation would be one of those to inherit the earth. National growth, no matter how vigorous, must soon be arrested by the narrow habitat of a land no bigger than Texas, while the redundant energy of the race went in a never ending stream to reinforce the life of alien and seemingly inferior civilisations.

But it was not merely a question of the expansion of the German civilisation. It was a question of its ultimate existence. The vast area of Russia and the rapid increase of her people have been noted. For

the present they do not endanger Germany, but suppose Germany adopts the conservative policy of Bismarck and the commercial pacifists, and for a couple of centuries remains peacefully within her boundaries? The Russian people may well number two thousand millions by that time, while Germany, with less than a fortieth her area, will scarcely be able to muster a tenth that number. What will be the relation of the two countries at that time? Simply that which it pleases Russia to permit. It will be merely a question of what Russia will do, for she *can* do anything. All such considerations are wont to seem fanciful and unreal to those whose national situation exposes their civilisation to no such dangers and prompts them to no such reflections. But the German people have become wonted in a high degree to consider such dangers and to reflect upon problems of race evolution and ultimate destiny. They have come to appreciate keenly what the rest of the world has scarcely perceived, that *mere quiescence on their part spells doom for their national civilisation*. Granting that they are never the victims of war, the mere push of national protoplasm will reduce them to insignificance, if it does not crowd them into the sea.

Confronted with this danger, the whole instinct of national life rouses them to secure a broader base for their civilisation, ere it is too late. Unfortunately their rivals have stolen a march on them. The Spanish and the Portuguese, least competent of colonists, absorbed all of South America and the Anglo-Saxon nearly all of North America while Germany was still unborn. Then came Australia, New Zealand and the

Cape, while still Germany showed no sign. India and Egypt, countries suitable not for colonies but for commerce, passed under the British flag. Less noticed and less hindered, the great void of Siberia was pre-empted for the growth of the Russian people. France, worsted in the struggle with Germany for the primacy of the continent, sought empire and future greatness in Algeria, in Tunis, in Morocco, and drew her frontier round the rich African tropics. All this time Germany was busy with her problems of unification and internal organisation. When at last she awoke it was to discover that her future had been fatally compromised, that the white man's land had dwindled to the vanishing point, and that her rivals had left her no "place in the sun."¹ To get that place has been the constant aim of her statesmanship for the last twenty years. To get that place she will make — any intelligent people will make — any sacrifice. Her achievements to date, the seizure of Tsingtao and of some colonies of doubtful value in Africa, have been insignificant, but her designs have been stupendous, and the present conflict is but a supreme effort for their realisation.

Nothing brings us so near the heart of the European problem as a brief survey of the plans for ex-

¹ This phrase has become classic. Its meaning as here given is familiar to all Germans and to all students of German policy. One of the subtle sophistries of Herr Dernburg in his appeal to the American people was the statement that Germany was fighting "to *keep* her place in the sun," the implication being that she sought only to retain what she had held and so was on the defensive. In the larger and remoter sense above indicated, Germany is fighting for her existence, but not in the more immediate sense that these and other like utterances imply.

pansion which Germany has had up for consideration. We are of course dealing only with projects, and are in the realm of diplomatic disavowal, but there is fair certainty with regard to the following at least.

Attention first turned naturally to South America, the second largest grand division of the globe and one from which the original colonisers had virtually been expelled. Their feeble efforts had neither peopled nor organised the country in a way legitimately to deter a virile colonising people, and the absence of claimants among the European powers seemed to render the enterprise easy. To Germany's surprise and unconcealed annoyance, objection was encountered on the part of the United States, the Monroe Doctrine being conveniently extended for the purpose. The opinion prevails in America that Germany reluctantly backed down in the face of our opposition. The conclusion is quite unwarranted. The Monroe Doctrine was indignantly repudiated as having no standing in international law — as indeed it has none — and the project was continued, but with the circumspection and the prolonged preparation which our attitude necessitated. Probably our objection has made very little difference. A long preliminary of peaceful penetration was required in any case, and this has gone steadily forward. Foreign commerce in the South American countries has passed steadily into German hands. Few persons are aware that an entire province in Southern Brazil is almost wholly peopled by Germans who preserve their language and their civilisation intact. With such a start it requires little imagination to picture a grievance, an ultimatum, an intervention

and a permanent occupation with subsequent indefinite expansion, all as convenience may dictate. Whether the United States could or would oppose effective resistance to such an enterprise would probably depend on political accident. The prospect is not such as effectually to deter its promoters.

South Africa offered a second tempting field. When German expansionist policy was first formulated, the Boer republics were still autonomous, and much at odds with their British suzerain. The possibilities of German expansion in this quarter looked promising and were eagerly canvassed. Britain's knowledge of these designs and of the widespread German intrigue connected therewith, had much to do with her drastic action in bringing these republics under her sway. Germany still counted, however, on their secession whenever the British should be embarrassed. Probably no incident in her expansionist career has been so disappointing to Germany as the voluntary adherence of the Boers to the British cause in the present war.

Northern Africa remained in part, though Algeria had long been appropriated, to be followed first by Egypt and then by Tunis. As the Mediterranean powers began to draw their toils around Morocco, Germany roused herself for the effort that could no longer be postponed. Landing at Tangiers, as we have said before, the German emperor announced to the world through an address to the German colony there, that there could be no settlement of the Moroccan question without the participation and consent of Germany. On German initiative a conference of

the Powers was called at Algeciras, Spanish neighbour of Gibraltar, and the struggle began which is not ended yet. Britain and France knew that a German foothold in Morocco meant a base there for the German navy, within easy striking distance of the line of communications both to Suez and to the Cape. Every effort was made to soften the refusal, but the desired foothold was not granted. Morocco passed under the sway of Spain and France.

Two years passed, and the world was startled to learn that a German warship lay at anchor in the Moroccan port of Agadir. Questioned as to what she meant by this expedition, Germany frankly stated that she intended to reopen the Moroccan question. Again the long struggle, with weeks and months of grim preparation and terrible suspense. Again Germany went home with other and lesser fruits than those sought, specious concessions in other quarters, where her rivals felt that concession was possible. The dangerous concession asked could not be granted. Germany's chagrin was unconcealed, and none could fail to see that she was resolved no more to parley, but to use at her convenience the weapon which seemed alone fitted to her hand. That she did not then draw the sword was due to the fact that her rivals had skilfully ensnared her in the toils of finance. When the emperor, long a tenacious advocate of peace, saw the futility of negotiation, he is said to have asked the German bankers whether they were ready to finance a war, and learning that they were not, he replied: "Then get ready. From now on, I shall adopt a new policy."

Meanwhile another and vaster project had been elaborated and slowly advanced toward realisation. The prospect for white man's land in America or Africa was none too good, and if secured it would long be a source of weakness rather than of strength. The empire, even if successfully enlarged, would be a sort of inverted pyramid, resting on too narrow a base of homeland to be stable or assured. Against odds, however heavy, the German home frontiers must be extended. But how, in what direction? To west, to north, to east, all was alike impossible, or at best remote. Belgium and Holland, sometime, no doubt, but they would add little at present, and if grudging, nothing at all. They could safely be left till circumstances might give to annexation the guise of protection and deliverance, the more so as there was small chance of other claimants. The one chance which beckoned was Austria, half German and now sore bested. And after Austria, lesser and weaker folk with emptier and richer lands, on, on to the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles, to the valleys of Asia Minor and the long neglected plains of Mesopotamia, to historic Bagdad and Nineveh and Babylon and finally to the Persian Gulf. The German plan as thus outlined was to mow a swath as wide as Germany itself across two continents, from the Baltic to the confines of India. At least twenty years ago this plan was outlined in the mind of the versatile young monarch who made his début in world politics by a sensational visit to Constantinople and the Holy Land. Since that time the vast project has been unremittingly pushed.

This was at once the most daring, the most difficult, and the most hopeful of German plans of expansion. It involved a practical merger with an old and proud empire still sore over Prussian aggression, and the absorption through conquest or friendship — each alike deadly — of numerous and increasingly alien elements. Its demands upon the capital and organising energy of the dominant power were prodigious. But worst of all it involved the control of Constantinople and access to the Persian Gulf against which both Russia and Britain were sure to set their faces as a flint. But there were encouraging features as well. Austria, if not the leader in the enterprise, was sure to be its immediate beneficiary and to see in it the realisation of her cherished ambitions. Constantly in fear of Russian advance through the Balkans toward Constantinople, she might justly hope to see in alliance with the puissant northern empire an easy superiority. The domination of the southern Slavs would be difficult for her singlehanded, impossible if they were backed by Russia, but with Germany's aid it would be a matter of course. Turkey, too, always between the devil and the deep sea, would be likely to accept a German protectorate half unconsciously, under the guise of an alliance, German officers in the army and German warships in the Bosphorus lending emphasis to the emperor's wishes. Finally, the certain opposition of Russia and Britain might easily neutralise itself in some moment when the two were at loggerheads, and Germany might by judicious assistance purchase the consent of the one and compel the consent of the other. And if once

realised, what a consummation! An imperial domain with whole provinces of virgin territory, with ample harbours and great highways of commerce, and with Constantinople above all. Surely an imperial concept.

It is needless to say that any such design would be repudiated by the German government. Formally, the repudiation would be warranted. Germany contemplates no immediate subjugation of Turkey and the Balkan states, no formal merger with Austria. Susceptibilities are not to be thus openly affronted. Alliance, naval and military "missions," entangling financial arrangements, and above all investments of German capital in railways and other industries, are the means wisely chosen for the great work, the whole being supplemented by military force as emergencies might require. The much contested Bagdad railway concession, the subject of a battle royal in which Britain finally secured the southern end and thus retained control of the Persian Gulf, has been the mutter before the coming storm. Diplomatic manœuvres have made Constantinople once more the centre of European interest. And finally the great act in the drama is before us.

It is important to note in connection with this many sided policy of German expansion, the inevitable conflict which has developed between Britain and Germany. Under Bismarck's policy Britain regarded German development with comparative indifference. So long as Germany did not become really master of the continent, Britain could be neutral in her contests, could even quarrel safely with Germany's foes. But

when Germany's designs upon South Africa became evident, Britain became circumspect. An incredibly foolish telegram from the German emperor to the Boer president, greatly aggravated a delicate situation. The determined attempts upon Morocco, upon Tripoli, and above all upon the Persian Gulf, brought out energetic opposition. Thus balked, Germany turned at her new antagonist. Secure against land attack, she determined to contest Britain's control of the sea. Then began the race for naval supremacy which ended in Germany's withdrawal from the race, when Britain's colonies began to send battleships to her fleet. Meanwhile the new danger forced Britain into the arms of her age long foe, and the entente cordiale, strangest assorting of bedfellows that necessity has made, was the result. Then Russia, menaced in Constantinople, and Britain, menaced in the Persian Gulf, made up their quarrel, and parcelled out Persia between them, to forestall further trouble. The mine was laid for the great explosion.

CHAPTER XIII

THE CASE OF BRITAIN

OUR purpose does not require us to review the building of the British Empire. It will be sufficient if we take note of certain important changes that have taken place in the century just passed. By the beginning of that century the vast fabric was nearly complete. The empire had received nearly all of its accessions, and had suffered its one great loss. England had also attained that industrial leadership and that naval supremacy which have characterised her throughout the nineteenth century, and which it is now her great effort to maintain.

This empire had been unplanned, unwilled and unforeseen. Every step of the advance had been stoutly contested and stoutly defended, but rather as an incident to some other cause than on its own account. It is doubtful if a single one of its annexations would have been countenanced by a deliberate vote of the English people, if it had been anticipated. A typical case is seen in Gibraltar, that key to the Mediterranean, which Britain now guards as the apple of her eye. It was captured by a British force acting purely as the agent of Austria, and being fiercely attacked in efforts for its recovery, and held until British sentiment was aroused and its importance at last realised, it was retained. Not unlike is the

story of the empire. Even so late an acquisition as Egypt was made beyond question with neither expectation nor wish that it be retained, yet the British public with practical unanimity now insist on its retention. This blind and often blundering imperialism whose wisdom has always been taught by the event, rather than the event guided by its wisdom, is characteristic of this "largest empire that hath been."

It is noteworthy that the territories absorbed have never been those of peoples whose civilisation was on a par with that of the imperial power. They have all been essentially unpeopled, like Canada and Australia, and therefore suitable for a rapidly expanding British colonial population, or like India, peopled by a race less organised and less advanced than the British. The one has expanded the British race, the other has expanded the British genius and increased British wealth, both with perfect legitimacy, for British administration has everywhere been better than that which it displaced, and Britain has never derived wealth from a colony which did not itself grow richer in the process. Be its legitimacy what it may, this peculiar character of the empire requires careful note. Nowhere have the British attempted to bring under their rule a race that could be accounted their peers. They have repeatedly fought such races and as often defeated and despoiled them, but they have never tried to subject or assimilate them. We may attribute this to cowardice or to wisdom according to our sympathies, or more justly than either, to the fortune of their insular position which permitted expansion of the kind noted. The result has been peculiarly fortunate.

The enlarging structure of the empire has been built upon an ever broadening base of British population, whose loyalty the world over is unquestioned, and who are safely trusted with an unparalleled degree of real independence. It is even possible to grant to colonies of alien population a degree of independence which would not be safe if it were not for the proximity and the example of colonies peopled by the British race. Witness the case of the Boers, who were granted autonomy on the morrow of defeat, and have so amply justified the gift.

The result is a remarkable looseness of organisation easily mistaken by the superficial observer for weakness. The world is familiar with the oft-repeated words of a hostile critic that the British empire was a sham which would fall to pieces at a touch. What could be expected, it might be argued, from an empire whose parts called themselves dominions and reserved the right to decide for themselves whether they would stand by the empire in case of war? The British empire has in fact placed its reliance to a remarkable degree in purely psychic bonds. Canada could not have been induced to pledge her aid, as Italy pledged her aid to Germany, but she gave it, and Italy did not. Perhaps here again we have to do less with British wisdom than with favouring circumstance, but the advantage is none the less real. The empire as thus constituted, involving a maximum of liberty and a minimum of race suppression and smothered grievance, is a unique historic phenomenon. It is in sharpest contrast with the would-be empire of Napoleon, made so largely of conquered equals, or with the

Russian empire, which subjects higher to lower civilisations, or with the German empire, which begins by a vain effort to assimilate Alsace-Lorraine, continues with Belgium, and looks forward to Austria and its proud alien wards. It is not implied that these empires are attempting the impossible, for Rome absorbed Carthage, her superior in civilisation, and even taught the Greek to boast of his Roman citizenship. But their task is an infinitely harder task than that of Britain, and assimilation of the Roman sort is painfully like destruction. Have we not heard from the empire builders of to-day words startlingly like old Cato's: *Carthago delenda est*. Only at this price can empires be built out of developed and divergent races without their free consent. The result may be worth the price — the world owes much to Rome — but we have here to note that whatever it owes to Britain, it has purchased at a far lower price.

The challenge of Napoleon having been successfully met, the British empire was occupied for some decades with problems of internal organisation. These included such revolutionary changes as the transfer of India from the British East India Company to the direct control of the British Parliament, and the establishment of trade relations with the Far East, but these were too logical to attract attention. Meanwhile England herself unwittingly gave hostages to fortune in a way that sold her into bondage to imperialism. In 1846, as the result of prolonged agitation and local famine, the corn laws were abolished, and food was allowed free entry to the United Kingdom. The purpose, aside from relieving the famine

in Ireland, was to provide cheaper food for the industrial population of England, already sufficiently numerous to make its wishes prevail over the strenuous opposition of the landowners. The appeal of so large a part of the population for cheap food was a strong one, but it is doubtful whether the public-spirited statesmen who effected this change, appreciated what its secondary effects would be. It may be said that the whole problem of statesmanship, as indeed of all human wisdom, is to anticipate secondary reactions. The immediate reaction of giving to beggars is to relieve want, by relieving the beggars' needs. The secondary reaction is to create want by increasing the number of beggars. Something like this is involved in many of the statesman's problems. In the present case the immediate reaction was to better the condition of the labourers. The secondary reaction was to increase their number. In 1851 the population of England and Wales was less than eighteen millions. In 1911 it was above thirty-six millions, or 619 to the square mile, a population more dense than that of China, India or Japan. To this increase all factors contributed. England had learned the new secret of machine industry, and was stimulated by its huge initial profits to expand her industries as rapidly as possible. She had abundance of coal, iron and tin. A concurrent development of agriculture in new countries kept food cheap and interposed no check to the expanding population. With an increase of wealth even more rapid than that of population, it was difficult to see in it all a sign of anything but prosperity and matter for congratulation.

But it goes without saying that this population could not be fed from English fields. Slowly, England became one vast industrial plant, great cities almost touching one another, chimneys scarce ever out of sight. Meanwhile the grain ships from America, from Argentina, from the Black Sea, in never ending procession, made their way into her harbours, bringing the nation's food. The arrangement was all very satisfactory if uninterrupted, but there was the rub. Slowly it dawned upon the British consciousness that the procession might be interrupted. The thought occurred to her enemies too, and they made no secret of their intention some day to strike at this vulnerable point in England's defences. Slowly the consciousness deepened, until it has become an obsession of the British mind, one thoroughly justified withal, for there is no need like the need of food, and starvation is the most frightful of spectres. We are witnessing at present the attempt which England has feared. Few persons realise how appalling is England's danger. It is probable that if her foreign food supply were cut off to-day, she would feel the pinch of famine this day week, and a month hence she would surrender on any terms whatever. Other nations, it may be urged, are in something the same situation, but the difference is great and fundamental. Other nations depend on foreign products for many of the conveniences, not to say necessities, of life. They do in fact import considerable quantities of food. To cut off their foreign trade causes them enormous inconvenience and loss, through the dislocation of industry, the cessation of normal employment, and temporary shortage of food,

due to imprudent specialisation. But given time for readjustment, and there is probably no great nation except England that cannot raise enough to exist. People would suffer, but it is doubtful if any would die from hunger. But in England a year's isolation would result in actual death for millions of persons.

It will of course occur to the reader that no power, not even the most brutal conqueror, would thus actually permit England to starve. Undoubtedly not. The conqueror would distribute rations, and England would eat, but she would eat the bread of a slave. More literally, if a hostile power succeeded in wresting from England the control of the sea, England would make peace on terms dictated by her enemy. That would mean, we are told, in certain eventualities, the loss of all her colonies, probably also the loss of her special functions as the financial headquarters of the commercial world, and the continuance of the island kingdom as a centre of busy but waning industry, and having a voice in world affairs like that of Holland or Denmark to-day. Her people might still be prosperous and comfortable, and there are those who think these are the essential things. It is the obstinate peculiarity of the British people that they do not.

England's problem is therefore the control of the sea. No other power and no combination of powers which is liable to be hostile to England, must be allowed to overmatch her. Why should England control the sea, rather than Germany or the United States? The answer is easy, at least to a Briton, perhaps to the disinterested as well. Control of the sea

would be an advantage to any power; it is a necessity to England. Others may be inconvenienced without it; England is ruined without it. This may not be a reason why Germany or others should grant it. It is certainly a reason why England should seek it, die for it if she must.

We have now reached the most vital point in our inquiry. The European conflict is settling down into one vast struggle between these two aspirants for the purple. Other powers, even mighty Russia, range themselves under the one or the other leader. Why this implacable feud? Why should Britain head off Germany, no matter what move she makes? Why should Germany seek to build an empire whose benefits are problematical, upon the ruins of one whose benefits are assured? Why, it may be asked, can they not work harmoniously together to subdue the waste places, instead of bending all their energies, the one to prevent, the other to destroy its rival's work? If there is no real reason why this harmonious co-operation might not be, we must indeed deprecate the senseless rivalries which have convulsed the world.

Once more remembering that we are dealing with very finite men, the answer to our inquiry is to be found in two great facts already noted, the necessity for Germany to expand, if the civilisation which is in her keeping is to have a real chance to count for anything in the world and her own people is to be really independent alongside her growing neighbour, and the necessity for England to protect her food supply and so her civilisation and her independent existence by maintaining control of the sea. Looked at broadly

and over long periods of time, the problem is for each a problem of existence, not physical existence, of course, for the citizens of either country are welcome to live and multiply under the rule of the other, not economic existence, for people that forego the privilege of culture leadership and avoid its burdens may easily make money by so doing, but national existence, the privilege of embodying great ideals of national life in the shape of enduring institutions and concrete civilisation. To do this — and it is something that every people may justly and commendably aspire to do — England must be secure on the sea, and Germany must have room for a thousand millions who are committed to her “Kultur.” Can these things be?

We must assume, however reluctantly, that neither can at present trust the other to provide what it requires. No matter how great Germany's need of territory, England would hardly surrender Australia or Canada, even though in excess of her own requirements. (We would not even sell the Philippines to Germany, no matter how tired we might be of them.) Nor could England trust to Germany to protect her grain ships, for that would be to surrender the independence that she seeks. Each must do for herself.

Such being the case, it must be clear that England cannot view without apprehension the acquisition by Germany of possessions overseas. Such possessions create problems of sea communications, and inevitably raise the question of sea control. Even though interruption of sea communications might not mean starvation to Germany, as it does to England, it would

mean great loss and inconvenience, and Germany would certainly desire to put herself in a position where she could not be interfered with, which would mean a position where she could interfere with England's communications. The fact that France, Holland and other powers have such possessions, of course furnishes plenty of precedent, but it does not in the least reconcile England to having more of the same sort of thing. Even with the harmlessness of Holland and the friendliness of France, she has her hands quite full enough.

In the second place, she cannot consent to any expansion of Germany on the continent of Europe which would bring her terrible army and her always considerable navy within striking distance of her own vital possessions. This negatives all plans that include Belgium or Constantinople or the Persian Gulf. From Belgian or Dutch ports Germany could organise an attack against which it is doubtful if England could possibly protect herself. The invasion of Belgium was a sufficient reason for England's entering the present conflict, quite without assuming any altruistic interest on her part in treaty guarantees or the existence of small nations. When some years ago Holland started to fortify a certain harbour as a naval base, England, as we have seen, peremptorily forbade it, knowing that Germany could seize and use it against herself.

Constantinople would be equally dangerous, controlling absolutely the grain shipments from the Black Sea, and hardly less effectually, all shipments passing through the Mediterranean, while possession of the

Persian Gulf would expose India to attack from which nothing but a large navy could protect her. It was cheaper and safer to prevent the naval base than to maintain a big navy against it. And if territories tipped out with naval bases were inadmissible, still more so were naval bases as such. The possibility of a German base in Morocco or Tripoli from which commerce raiders could issue to attack the steamships plying to Suez or the Cape, and to which they could run to cover, aroused England to the most strenuous and hazardous exertion to protect what could not otherwise be safeguarded, and whose loss would have jeopardised her existence.

Nay more, it was hardly possible for Germany to get the territory that she wanted and needed without taking it from Britain herself. The growing room of the white man was pre-empted by other races. There was room in America, but the obstacles were great, and for the present it was not the line of least resistance. In the old world all the white man's land was held by Russia or Britain. The Russian territory was compact, and the whole Russian people had camped, as it were, close to the German frontier, as a guard to the virgin acres in the rear. Australia was British; South Africa after a moment of tantalising uncertainty, became British; Egypt was British; Morocco remained, but as Germany grasped, Britain gave it to her friend, lest it neutralise Gibraltar. There was nothing else. Unlike the Russian land reserves, Britain's dependencies were as accessible to Germany as to Britain on the same condition, namely, the development of sea power. Britain must disgorge.

Germany said it, and England heard. Here was no mere conflict of malicious wills. The very existence of the British empire was a checkmate to every German move. The very existence of Germany, as the embodiment of imperial purpose, menaced the empire of Britain. The British fetter, however unintended, must be broken, or Germany must renounce all hope of an imperial future in the realm of matter or spirit. Germany must be deprived of her sting, like her earlier rivals, Holland and Spain, or Britain must herself lay aside the purple and step down to a humble seat among the has-beens. Here was a conflict due not to misunderstanding, but to understanding, a conflict not imagined, not even willed, but inherent in the permanent nature of man, and predestined in the shape of the planet.

It was from considerations such as these that Germany reached the conclusion that she must challenge Britain's control of the sea. The attempt seemed foolhardy, for England's navy was double that of any other power, and as she made it her fixed policy to lay down two ships to her competitors' one, it seemed hopeless to try to overcome her lead. For a long time the expensive rivalry continued, when, curiously enough, England, by a great improvement in naval construction, suddenly gave away her lead, and the two rivals stood almost shoulder to shoulder. This was due to the building of the *Dreadnought*, a ship so superior to previous constructions that it virtually consigned them all to the scrap heap. While England was congratulating herself on the new weapon, Germany was quick to seize her opportunity. Naval

battles would henceforth be decided by dreadnoughts. The older ships would not count. England had but one dreadnought, and had therefore a lead of but a single ship. Could not Germany perhaps build dreadnoughts as fast as England? She would stake her all on the attempt.

Probably never since Waterloo has England felt the alarm which she experienced when she discovered that Germany had thirteen dreadnoughts in course of construction. With a convulsive effort she quickened her programme of naval construction, pressing all available shipyards into the service, and away went the mad race. Soon her superior facilities told, and she gained on her opponent, but she was never able to regain her old lead of two to one. Not till the colonies began to bring their contributions, New Zealand, for instance, presenting a dreadnought that cost a gold sovereign for every man, woman and child in the colony, did Germany give up the hopeless race. This decision was announced in the statement of Admiral von Tirpitz, her naval head, that the ratio of sixteen to ten (the lead which England had attained) was entirely satisfactory to Germany.

The new rivalry had, however, driven England to other and unprecedented expedients. By her league with Japan, she was enabled (not without misgivings, we may imagine) to withdraw her ships from the Pacific, leaving Japan to guard. By her understanding with France, the latter became custodian of the Mediterranean, while England undertook to defend the French coasts in the north and west. She paid us the compliment of withdrawing her ships from Ameri-

can waters without other guarantee than our friendship. This concentration of her forces in home waters greatly increased their effectiveness against the one enemy, but it added a new dependence to her other causes of anxiety, for Japan and France were now guarding her empire, an arrangement not wholly reassuring to some of her Eastern dependencies.

England went even farther and held out the olive branch, in the shape of a proposition of mutual limitation. This offer was contemptuously declined. It did not require very profound insight to perceive the purport of all this. Even von Tirpitz' acceptance of the ratio of sixteen to ten was not a surrender, as England very well knew, but a change of tactics. It was the submarine and not the battleship in which reliance was placed, and the race was continued underseas, which had been abandoned on the surface.

Seldom does the problem of national rivalry and national existence become as feverishly concentrated as here. Let the British navy be once outclassed, and a single battle might decide the fate of England. No invasion and prolonged siege would be necessary, only a naval patrol to intercept the grain ships until starvation broke the spirit of the proud foe. The spoils of the world's greatest empire would thus be staked upon a single throw of the dice. If she wins, Germany becomes another and a greater Rome, and Britain must learn to kiss the hand that imposes the *pax teutonica*. If she fails, she becomes merely one of the powers who, under the slow pressure of the Muscovite advance, are merged into the unity of the Western world.

Whatever the outcome of the great conflict, it has already altered the position of Britain in the world in a way not to be overlooked. It is but a few years since British statesmen spoke of the "magnificent isolation" of England. Impregnable for defence, and all-powerful as a deciding factor in any continental conflict, she stood aloof, proud and self-sufficient. She not only ruled all seas but policed them from the least unto the greatest. To-day she dares not scatter her navy, and confides the custody of her most frequented seas to powers whose co-operation is based on mere mutual need. She seeks alliances, and so gives hostages to fortune. It is doubtful if England will ever again be able to dispense with allies. She has seen the last of her magnificent isolation.

CHAPTER XIV

THE CASE OF FRANCE

THE situation of France in the European family is unique. Territorily she has been rarely favoured. Her territory is one of those that have been sharply delimited by nature, and of all those so delimited, it is the largest. It is a characteristic of such territories, that their population becomes sooner assimilated to a single type and organised as a political unit than territories whose boundaries are artificial. The early unification of France and the very late unification of Germany are cases in point. The influence of Rome may account in part for this difference, but centuries of feudalism so disintegrated Roman Gaul that it is doubtful if the Roman tradition exerted much influence on the modern development from the time of Philip Augustus to that of Louis XIII, when the present unification was effected. On the other hand, a certain considerable size is necessary to secure and maintain this unity. Italy is a natural unity, but its small size, coupled with important historic accidents, which we need not stop to consider here, have made her the prey of larger powers.

France has been further fortunate in her location. Her frontage on three seas gives her commercial advantages which no other nation enjoys. She is the

only great European nation that can reach both the Atlantic and the Mediterranean without making the detour of the Spanish peninsula and passing the Straits of Gibraltar. Both by land and sea she is in closer touch with both Northern and Southern Europe than any other power.

In war also she enjoys marked advantages. On the south her only neighbour is smaller and necessarily less populous than herself, and even when allied with other powers has never been a redoubtable antagonist, while the sharp crests of the Pyrenees make boundary lines easy to draw and easy to defend. On the east, where the vast bulk of Central and Eastern Europe could seemingly overwhelm her, nature has provided admirable defences, and further, has split the opposing territory by the great barrier of the Alps in such a way as to make combination almost impossible. The fate of France would have been very different had Switzerland been a plain and a single power been able to marshal all the forces from Hamburg to Naples. The sea frontier has been less fortunate, partly because of proximity to Britain, whose insular character made the development of maritime commerce and naval power much more imperative than in the case of France, and partly because France has fewer and less satisfactory harbours than her rival. It is for these reasons that the rôle of France upon the sea, though always considerable, has been constantly inferior to that of Britain, and that the centuries of naval rivalry between the two powers have been for France an almost uninterrupted chronicle of defeat. But while the sea has not opened to France an oppor-

tunity for successful aggression, it has on the whole proved a sufficient defence. France has had little to fear in recent times from invasion by sea.

In this favoured position, the French people, unified at a much earlier date than their eastern neighbours, became for a time the first nation of Europe in point of both wealth and military power. They experienced in consequence the inevitable temptation to aggression, often obtaining ephemeral success, but as constantly losing, when the pressure exerted by their aggression united for a time their scattered enemies against them. Then, just as regularly, the French were driven back within their boundaries. The extreme limit of French aggression was reached under Napoleon, who also witnessed its complete defeat. But no rebuff seemed permanently to repress this tendency to aggression, or to destroy the superiority of France on the continent until Germany, in 1870-71 inflicted upon her a defeat which put an end to her primacy and left Germany unquestionably the first military power of Europe.

It is important to note why this defeat has had seemingly permanent results. In itself the defeat was no more crushing than that sustained by France at the close of the Napoleonic era and perhaps on former occasions. But until now the combination which had overwhelmed France had always been temporary. Once their purpose effected, the allies had resumed their independent and even hostile attitude toward one another. This of course removed the pressure on France and left her free to renew her attempt when opportunity offered, as it always did. Now for the

first time her rivals formed a permanent combination of greater extent and better organisation than her own. This made permanent the result which had hitherto been but temporarily accomplished.

Since this great defeat, France may be said to have been on the defensive and to have become measurably reconciled to staying at home and taking the second place among continental powers. It is true that the loss of Alsace-Lorraine left bitter heart-burnings, and that France continued for a generation to breathe out threatenings and slaughter against Germany, but it is difficult to hand down such sentiments and pass on such resolves from father to son, and as the generation that first felt the smart has passed away, the reconciliation with the spoiler and renunciation of the spoil has seemed increasingly possible. For after all the French title to Alsace-Lorraine was much the same as the title which Germany had acquired, only older, an important difference, but one that tends to disappear with time.

This tendency was greatly accentuated by certain peculiarities of the French people which are in marked contrast with the German stock. For a long time the French birth-rate has been diminishing, and at last the population has become stationary, possibly even declining, in marked contrast with that of Germany, which is increasing at a rate which, though lessening, is still second only to that of Russia. Hence the population of France, which in 1870 was about equal to that of Germany, is now hardly more than half as large. This, of course, has discouraged plans for the forceful recovery of Alsace-Lorraine, or other mili-

tary adventure in Europe. Further, the rapid development of German industry has furnished a profitable field for the investment of the large surplus capital of France, an opportunity of which her financiers have not failed to avail themselves. All this has tended increasingly to make friendly relations profitable and war hopeless. If the two countries had had nothing to quarrel about except Alsace-Lorraine, there is reason to believe that peace might have become permanent between them.

But no nation in this age, if indeed in any age, contentedly relinquishes the hope of expansion. No matter how often rebuffed, the impulse soon reasserts itself with the renewing youth of the people. This impulse the French people have felt to the full. Their devotion to their language, their literature, their art, to all the warp and woof of their national life, is perhaps more intense than that of any other people, and the common homage of mankind goes far to justify their passion. They are as eager to make the world French as their neighbours are to make it German or British, and with quite as good reason. This impulse of culture expansion is to the national life what the impulse of growth is to the individual life, an impulse heedless of protest and careless of justification. Repressed at one point, it reasserts itself at another. When French expansion was checked in Europe, it went overseas.

During the period of colonisation and commercial expansion which followed the age of discovery, France was the rival of England in almost every field, in America, in India, and in the islands of all seas.

Their wars were waged in these fields as well as in Europe, the advantage in both cases being usually with England. Nevertheless at the close of the eighteenth century France still possessed valuable colonies. The Napoleonic era saw most of these outlying interests sacrificed, partly as the result of French defeat, but in part as the deliberate policy of the emperor, who knew that in the struggle in which he was engaged in Europe, colonies could not help him to win, but could be had for the winning. This sound policy of concentration therefore witnessed an almost complete subsidence of colonial effort.

Conversely, the downfall of Napoleon and the cessation of his efforts to master Europe witnessed a revival of the effort to acquire foreign possessions. Of these, Algeria, occupied in 1827, was the first and most important. As a nest of pirates and a menace to ocean commerce, it had given every provocation, but while the seizure found in this its pretext, it was doubtless motivated by different considerations. The country was rich, undeveloped, and conveniently situated. The insatiate desire of the French peasant for land might reasonably tempt him to settle here, thus expanding and strengthening the French race. These were reasonable expectations, though they have been but partially realised. There was the farther consideration of defence. There was no telling what other power might get a foothold there if not forestalled, or what complications might thus be introduced into the Mediterranean situation. The extension of French control to the east and west was undoubtedly contemplated from the first. A glance at

the map will show that the Mediterranean is almost completely divided into two great basins, and that the possession of the African coast from Gibraltar to Cape Bon puts the great western or French basin completely into the control of France, the much weaker powers of Italy and Spain being the only other interested parties. The importance of this control was apparent even to the dimmer consciousness of early diplomacy, and has been much emphasised by later developments.

Under the second empire a series of European wars again fixed attention upon nearer interests, but with the renewed and final collapse of imperial ambitions in that field, this irrepressible people again turned its attention to more distant possibilities. This time Tongkin and Annam were annexed to the earlier colony of Cambodia and Cochin China. Even British interests were threatened, and Britain hastened to annex Burma. The much attenuated buffer state of Siam seemed destined to be a prey and perhaps a pitfall to the strenuous rivals, when the presence of a new and dangerous competitor brought them together in a common policy of colonial defence and an agreement to settle their claims and divide the remaining opportunities of expansion between them. The result of this agreement and various measures preceding and following it was to give to France, in addition to Algeria and her possessions in southeastern Asia, the island of Madagascar and vast possessions in equatorial Africa, then Tunis, and last of all Morocco, a colonial empire twenty times the size of France herself. This colonial empire, to be sure, is

decidedly a second choice, the first choice having passed to Britain as the result of discovery, success in war, and the policy of Napoleon. Only certain portions of northern Africa are suited to colonisation by the French people, and the remainder is sparsely inhabited, containing only about one-tenth the population of the British colonial empire. Even so, it was immensely valuable, and has proved quite sufficient to excite the cupidity of her newest rival.

We have already noticed that Alsace-Lorraine, the traditional cause of hostility between Germany and France, had ceased to divide them in the same degree as at first. While France had never definitely renounced her ambition to recover the lost provinces, she had in fact become largely reconciled to the existing arrangement, while financial arrangements of a profitable nature contributed farther to their reconciliation. Nevertheless, the one certain thing in the forecast of the present war was the hostility of Germany and France. Germany hoped to avoid war with Britain, but she never thought — no one thought — of the possibility of peace between herself and France. Why this undying hostility in the face of a growing co-operation and a dying grudge?

The explanation is to be found in the growth of the French colonial empire. This growth took place quietly during the time when Germany was absorbed with the problem of organising her empire at home. It did not occur to her that her humiliated antagonist was stealing a march on her and forestalling the next step in her advance. When she woke up to the situation, it was just in time to see her two great rivals

grasp the remaining morsels of the world which they had already pretty much divided between them. Germany's efforts to secure a foothold in Morocco and her disappointment and consequent decision to try the arbitrament of the sword, have already been recounted. We have now to notice merely the new relation thus established between Germany and France. France had been conquered at Sedan and Paris, but Germany had been conquered at Algeciras and Agadir. She was humiliated and aggrieved. Her grievance did not pass, but grew with time.

It is therefore folly to assume, as is sometimes done, that the restitution of Alsace-Lorraine would remove all cause of war between the two countries. It would remove an ancient grievance to France, but that is well-nigh a dead grievance in any case. To remove it would remove the desire of France to attack Germany, but France has no desire — has long had no desire — to attack Germany. The trouble comes from the other side. It is Germany that has the grievance, the living and growing grievance, and the desire to remove it even at the cost of war. To deprive her of Alsace-Lorraine would only add another grievance, a living grievance, to the one already felt, and so increase her impulse to disturb the peace of Europe. The social philosopher who still sees in Alsace-Lorraine the crux of the Franco-German problem is simply a Rip Van Winkle who has slept for forty years.

If then the real problem is colonial, is there a chance of appeasing Germany by reasonable concessions in this quarter? Were it a question of mere

acreage, such a concession would be thinkable, though extremely difficult, for national sentiment clings to territory with unreasoning tenacity and has so long been wont to yield it only to the conqueror, that even the most reasonable surrender is apt to inspire feelings of humiliation and disgrace. It is noteworthy that a certain amount of concession has been made in the very connection and for the very purpose here suggested. When the German warship was sent to Agadir to reopen the Moroccan question, the resulting negotiation which brought Europe to the brink of war, was finally settled by the cession of a considerable tract of the French Congo to Germany. But this concession, unsatisfactory as it was to the French people, was even more unsatisfactory to Germany. Even this was not accepted until Germany found that the French financiers had her foul, and that war was momentarily impossible. So far from being appeased, it was at that very moment that Germany resolved upon war and even set the tentative date, as was later revealed. France and her allies seem perfectly to have understood that the concession was futile and that war was only postponed. That such a concession was made merely to postpone war is one of many proofs that France had become thoroughly pacific toward Germany, as indeed she had every reason to be. Under no probable circumstances would she have risked a war to recover Alsace-Lorraine. The dead past had buried its dead.

Why then was Germany so dissatisfied? Because she wanted Morocco, where her people could live and multiply, and not equatorial Africa, where they could

only buy rubber. The new acquisitions were lauded, of course, as of immense value, that the government might snatch victory from defeat in the eyes of a sorely disappointed people, but the disappointment was none the less apparent.

Why, then, was not Morocco, or some part of it, conceded in the interest of a possible permanent peace? Because Morocco is more than a dwelling for white men. It is a guardian of the Mediterranean, a neighbour of Algeria, and of France, a naval base; in short, a position from which Germany with her powerful navy could have dominated the French Mediterranean and more. Nor were German ambitions so modest that France could hope to satisfy them by any such concession as Morocco. This would be merely a base from which the German advance would be pushed farther, with results not difficult to foresee. It would be the camel's head inside the tent. Until there is a marked change in human nature and in German nature particularly, all the counsels of traditional prudence will caution France and Britain not to permit Germany to secure a foothold on the shores of the Mediterranean.

Such being the new and potent ground of conflict between the two great western powers, the increasing disparity of forces between them could not fail to drive France, and in turn, Germany as well, to combine with other powers. We have seen that Germany at first maintained friendly relations with both Russia and Austria, but gravitated to the latter, when Balkan interests began to antagonise the two, the more so as the new German imperialism began to

identify itself with that of Austria. Russia, thus estranged, became the ally of France for the sole reason that each feared Germany. This accession of power to France and her unexpectedly rapid recovery made Germany uneasy in turn, and Italy was added under duress as a counterweight. The Alps no longer divided the enemies of France. Still Germany grew in power, in wealth, and in efficiency — grew as no other nation in Europe grew. And as she grew, her demand for a place in the sun became ever more importunate. The power of the Triple Alliance from its immensely strong central position to enforce its demands became ever more threatening. The ambitions of Germany and her allies, as more clearly outlined, crossed the interests of every great power in Europe. She crossed swords with Russia at Constantinople, with Britain in Mesopotamia, with France in Morocco, and with both in Belgium and throughout the whole extent of their colonial empires. She had entered the dreadnought race with England for the control of the sea. Banking too confidently upon the long standing enmities between these countries, she incautiously forced a combination against herself which nothing else would have made possible. France and England have been longer enemies than any other two nations in Europe, and on the recent occasion when they co-operated, it was against Russia. Britain and Russia had conflicting interests, and for years each had seen its chief danger in the other. Russia grasping and untrustworthy, Britain suspicious and stubborn, France proud and sensitive, all chiefly

toward one another, what a menace must have been required to unite them in a common cause!

Russia, humiliated by Japan, with farsighted connivance of Britain, becomes tractable, and the feud of the Persian border is settled with mutual concessions that possibly pave the way for a durable peace. French susceptibilities are courted by the tactful Edward and humoured by the clever courtesy of the Algeciras conference, and the quick response of French enthusiasm results in the *entente cordiale*, so soon to loom large in the European consciousness.

It is noteworthy that the new bond upon which so much depended, was an *entente*, an understanding, rather than an alliance. It may be safely assumed that in like case Germany would have sought an alliance, a more definite agreement. The more definite pledge would seem to be stronger. It is characteristic of English diplomacy to prefer the looser agreement. The unsympathetic will see in this a desire to play fast and loose. The more penetrating will see in it a recognition that the vaguer understanding is the stronger. An alliance must be specific. It is necessary, therefore, to foresee exactly the situation to which it applies. But the situation has a perverse way of shaping up somewhat unexpectedly. This gives to the party adversely affected a chance to quibble and evade the spirit of the agreement. "Is it so nominated in the bond?" is a favourite evasion, the more effectual when insistence has been laid upon the nomination in question. It is noteworthy that treaties of so recent origin as that between Servia and Bulga-

ria and between Servia and Greece, not to mention the recently renewed Triple Alliance, have been evaded on technical grounds, while the "cordial understanding" has held, because it was a cordial recognition of mutual interests and had no technicalities.

Of France even more than of Britain it must be noted that the old time possibility of independent action is past, seemingly forever. The nations will no longer be played off one against the other, but stand in more or less permanent groups, groups so large, so solid, that no one power can hope to resist them, or singly to be safe from their inevitable aggressions. France has enjoyed a wonderful advantage in her position and her resources, but these can no longer suffice. Her advantage has passed forever to a group, possibly of changing constituency, of which she must form a part.

CHAPTER XV


THE CASE OF ITALY

ITALY occupies a somewhat uncertain place among the powers of Europe. Usually included among the first class powers, her rank is quite plainly the sixth or lowest in the group, a position almost as easily included in the second class as in the first. Her population is not very different from that of Britain or France, but her wealth is far inferior to either, and she has but a feeble beginning of their vast colonial empire. Her recognition as a first class power has doubtless been due quite as much to her association with Germany and Austria on terms of nominal equality as to her actual resources. This association at the outset laid upon her a burden under which she perceptibly staggered, but one to which she successfully adjusted herself in later years.

Italy furnishes a striking example of geographical predestination. Civilisation first appeared at the eastern end of the Mediterranean. When, under the eighteenth Egyptian dynasty, it first discovered the possibilities of the sea as a medium of diffusion, the eastern Mediterranean became its seat, with Syria and Greece as its limits, and Crete as its dominating centre. Its farther advance, of necessity toward the west, carried it to Italy, and Greece became its centre.

The next limit was Gibraltar, with the Mediterranean as the connecting area, and now Italy, the geographical centre, became dominant. Beyond Gibraltar progress was not easy, and it was impossible to take the long stride across the Atlantic until civilisation had gotten a firmer footing, and had mastered the resources of all western Europe. Then, at last, reinforced and reorganised, the great step is taken across the Atlantic, and western Europe becomes the inevitable centre, while Italy suffers neglect and long eclipse. We need not follow civilisation on its next long stride or note its inevitable new and broader base. To indulge in American complacency is no part of our purpose. Besides, the last step has not been taken. America is not the broadest nor the last base of civilisation. The largest and best endowed area must seemingly dominate world counsels in the end, and that is not our own. There is no danger of our losing our primacy for some time to come. Indeed we have not won it yet. But the great advance is passing our way, and must needs bivouac for many centuries with us. Beyond that, prophecy is profitless and premature.

Thus naturally superseded, Italy was peculiarly sidetracked in the onward movement of civilisation. That movement now necessarily swerved far to the north as its line of least resistance, and Italy was left far to one side, a long finger pointing toward nothing, and a road leading nowhere. For be it noted, civilisation in pursuit of farther conquests had found it expedient to abandon in a measure the western Mediterranean basin, the latest addition to its domain.



From the Levant to the headquarters of western civilisation the Adriatic furnished the most direct available route with some point at its head as the natural trans-shipment station. Italy was only a breakwater.

This passing of Italy was accentuated by other factors, natural and political. Abandoned as a political headquarters, it remained as the headquarters of the more conservative religious establishment, whose immense influence, if unable to rule, could still ruin any possible competitor. It is unlikely under any circumstances that Italy would have been the seat of a strong political power, say from the sixth to the sixteenth centuries, but if there had been such a possibility inherent in land and location, the presence of the papal establishment would have frustrated any attempt of the kind. The fiction of universal spiritual dominion necessarily translated itself into a feeble temporal rule, too local and half-hearted to meet political requirements, yet sufficiently substantial to be intolerant of a real political competitor. The attempt of the Lombards in the seventh century to reorganise the distracted and devastated country was frustrated primarily by the presence of this ecclesiastical power whose policy it was then as always to keep Italy divided and the papacy locally supreme. The same policy was continued with the same result for twelve hundred years.

A second important fact is the comparative meagreness of Italy's natural resources. The surface resources utilised by earlier civilisations, timber, fertility of the soil, etc., had been much depleted, especially by mediæval improvidence, and the deeper resources

are wanting. When material culture, after the long prostration of the middle ages, revived through the medium of the textile industries, the petty city states of Italy experienced a new accession of wealth and power, with the Italian Renaissance as their permanent achievement. But as the centre of gravity of modern industrial civilisation passed from the textiles to iron, and its motive power from human muscle to coal, Italy was again set aside, for Italy has neither iron nor coal. Her case seemed hopeless.

Strangely enough, Italy in the last hundred years has risen steadily to new influence and power. Almost every political crisis in Europe has turned to her advantage, whether as the result of her own wisdom, or through mere luck, it is sometimes difficult to determine. Certainly her wisdom has been of an extraordinary kind, often contradicting the best established maxims of political prudence.

The reconstruction of Europe following the Napoleonic era, proceeded on the general principle of restoring the conditions antecedent to that era. This, although only partially accomplished, left Italy divided into a number of petty states, some of them independent, in the measure that small states can be independent, while other and important districts were under Austrian rule. The movement for unification started early in the century and under the remarkable leadership of Cavour, was well advanced, when the outbreak of the Crimean war presented to astonished Europe the spectacle of this fledgling power in alliance with England and France, fighting for a cause in which she seemed not to have the slightest concern.

She was poor, but feebly organised, with problems near home of the most pressing urgency, which seemed to prohibit a policy of foreign adventure. The conservative critic found an easy mark in the jingoism of Cavour. But the result justified the foresight or the fortune of the daring statesman, and through the allies thus secured, Cavour was able materially to advance the cause of Italian unification against a power which Italy could not hope to meet unaided.

But if France aided the unification of Italy as against Austria, she sternly resisted any encroachment upon the Papal States which now bisected the new kingdom in a most embarrassing manner. To maintain the papal power, France kept a garrison in Rome as a sign of a power which Italy was compelled to respect. The war between Germany and France compelled the withdrawal of this garrison and gave Italy an opportunity, which she promptly utilised, of putting an end to this anomaly in the political organisation of Europe. The peninsula was now united under the rule of the House of Savoy, except small areas in the Alps where the Italian language is spoken, of which the oft mentioned Trentino is the most important. These territories, with their somewhat indefinite extension round the north and east coasts of the Adriatic, formed the remaining subject of agitation on the part of the unification party now called irridentists, that is, champions of *Italia irridenta*, unredeemed Italy. It may be noted in passing that the process by which Italy has been unified, has been a gradual one, additions having been made piece by

piece, with considerable intervals of time between. It is therefore quite natural for Italian patriots and enthusiasts to think of the recent quiet as merely one more lull in the intermittent process, and to look forward to the next step as quite inevitable, especially as long as they hear Italian still spoken across the border. When these are added and Italy is fully redeemed, it is to be feared that other arguments will take the place of the one that has thus far done duty, and that the redeeming process will still go on.

It is but fair to add, however, that something more than race kinship or community of language impels Italy to push her Austrian frontier somewhat farther back. As at present located, that frontier makes Austria invulnerable, while leaving Italy comparatively defenceless. All the strong natural defences with which this region is so abundantly provided are on the Austrian side of the line, an arrangement in which Italy can hardly be expected to acquiesce willingly.

We have already seen how the stern resolve of Britain and France that Germany should not acquire a base on the Mediterranean coast, required the appropriation of the Tripolitan coast. The natural thing would have been to add this to Egypt, and so bring it under British control. But the problem confronting Britain is far too complex to permit of such an easy solution. Such an appropriation would have been deeply resented by Turkey, no matter how carefully the fiction of Turkish suzerainty was maintained. This resentment would have disturbed the Moslem population of other lands, the great majority of whom are under British rule. In turn, it would have been

resented by Italy whose aspirations in this direction have long been recognised, and so would have driven her into closer relation with her allies. Finally it would have brought British and French possessions into contact, with the likelihood of friction and estrangement.

Conversely, to install Italy there would gratify her and tend to detach her from her not too well liked allies. It would stop the mouth of Germany, who could hardly protest against this aggrandisement of her ally. It would make Italy the enemy of Turkey, with the likelihood that the threatened accession of Turkey to the Triple Alliance would be prevented, or the defection of Italy precipitated. And it would lay upon Italy the odium of this new attack upon Islam which England and France would have found embarrassing. Once again the political necessities of Europe played into the hand of Italian ambition, and irridentism passed into imperialism, with what result to Italy's future remains to be seen. The immediate result was an addition to Italy's burdens quite beyond what had been contemplated, but equally, it launched Italy on the path of imperialism quite beyond the limits that had been set. The Tripolitan defence was unexpectedly prolonged and stubborn, with resulting heavy cost, but when finally broken, the Turkish government obstinately refused to make peace. Turkey was cornered, but she was not to be driven from her corner. So Italy looked about for some other opportunity to put pressure on her foe. An attack on Albania, then under Turkish rule, was considered, but Austria, jealous lest her ally establish herself on both

sides the Strait of Otranto, vetoed the move. Ultimately the required coercion was applied by the seizure of twelve islands at the southeastern corner of the Ægean, the so-called Dodecanese. These islands were far from the contemplated sphere of Italian influence, and their seizure was purely a war measure. Turkey still remained obstinate, however, and refused to make peace until the attack of the Balkan states drove her to a hurried reconciliation with Italy, in order that she might the better meet the new danger which threatened her. Even so, the adventure was not concluded. By the terms of the peace then arranged, Turkey was to pay an indemnity to Italy, and the latter was to hold the islands until this indemnity was paid. The close of the Balkan wars left Turkey in no condition to pay indemnities, and meanwhile continued occupation of the Dodecanese, with the establishment of steamship lines and a more fixed administrative system, found the Italians less and less disposed to withdraw. Soon it was reported that Italy had decided not to withdraw, unless in exchange for substantial concessions on the adjoining mainland of Asia Minor. In other words, she would give up her foothold in the Dodecanese only in exchange for a better one on the mainland. Italy was in Asia to stay.

Meanwhile with the outbreak of the present war, Italy at once perceived that she could not risk an attack from France and Britain whose naval power had her utterly at its mercy. Having therefore decided that her alliance with Germany and Austria did not bind her to aid them against the Allies, she became the

object of an assiduous courtship on the part of both the contesting groups, the one urging her to neutrality, the other to co-operation. Her final decision to enter the lists against her former allies was the result of prolonged deliberation and followed negotiations of the most exhaustive character. It would be unsympathetic and probably untrue to say that Italy sold her aid to the highest bidder, for Italy had sympathies quite as pronounced and quite as disinterested as those of any other power, but it is none the less true that while following her inclinations and seeking her most coveted ends, she was in a position to sell her services on most advantageous terms. It was the misfortune of the Central Powers that the things that Italy wanted were among their most valued possessions, and they were therefore in no position to bid against their enemies. The Allies could promise Italy almost anything she wanted at the expense of Austria and Turkey, especially if she would be to the trouble of taking possession, while Austria and Turkey could hardly be so generous. So the Allies won, just as the Central Powers later won with Bulgaria, because they could promise anything she wished in Servia, whereas the Allies, being friends and allies of Servia, could hardly be so liberal. The terms of the agreement between Italy and the Allies can only be surmised, but it may be safely assumed that they cover three important points.

First, the Italian speaking provinces of Austria, at least as far as Trieste, and the western half of the Istrian peninsula, possibly including the Austrian naval base of Pola. Undoubtedly the limits of this

concession will be determined largely by the actual results of the campaign, as indeed upon its successful conclusion must depend any concession whatever. There can be no question that Italy will carry her arms around the Adriatic as far as she is able, and in particular, that she hopes to annex all or parts of the Adriatic islands, thus turning the tables on her enemy. To this programme it will be difficult for the Allies to object.

Second, it is certain that Italy hopes to secure a permanent foothold on the Albanian coast, thus completely controlling the entrance to the Adriatic. Even before entering the war, she had seized Avlona, the famous key to the Adriatic, and it is difficult to believe that the Allies, having received her with Avlona in her possession, can fail to support her there in the event of their joint success.

Third, as the success of the Allies can hardly fail to result in the partial or complete dismemberment of Turkey, it is all but certain that Italy will be a sharer in the spoils. She has probably been promised both the Dodecanese and a territory on the mainland.

So much for promises. Fulfilment must depend, of course, on the power of the Allies to "deliver the goods," and largely on the prowess of Italy herself. The realisation of these hopes is not impossible. Even if but partially realised, they will have permanent results. Already Italian statesmen have ceased to talk about unredeemed Italy and are affirming that Italy must realise her "legitimate national aspirations," a phrase of eminent good form and indefinite

elasticity. Whatever the territorial acquisitions of Italy in the present war, it is pretty certain that she will acquire quite a new set of "legitimate aspirations," and that these are likely to have a momentous effect upon her political future, perhaps even upon the future of Europe. Let us note the position in which she is thus placed.

Until the outbreak of the war with Turkey, Italy was one of the best defined territories in Europe. Her boundaries were nearly all seacoast, and included not only the peninsula but the adjacent islands. With the possible exception of Corsica and Malta, nature's intentions seemed to have been realised, and these exceptions were not strategic for her purposes. The short Austrian frontier needed some straightening, particularly by the transfer of the Trentino to Italy, but it was admirably defended by natural bulwarks. The territory thus sharply defined is not large, nor is its soil exceptionally productive, being largely mountainous, while the absence of iron and coal limits the development of an industrial society. This last defect, to be sure, is partly compensated by abundant water power, which, with the development of electrical transmission, largely takes the place of coal. But when all is said, the country seems intended by nature for a modest state, self contained and admirably defended, but neither large enough nor richly enough endowed to be the secure base of a large modern imperial dominion.

Such a dominion, however, it seems the present purpose of Italy to establish. The accessions now

sought, the "legitimate aspirations" now asserted, quite exceed the limits thus indicated by nature. This it is important to notice in detail.

The extension of Italian territory round the head of the Adriatic will immensely lengthen the frontier to be defended, against an enemy of vastly greater size and resource, and rendered ever more hostile by these encroachments. The farther the Italian tentacle wraps itself round the head of the Adriatic, the more implacable becomes the enemy and the more indefensible the frontier. When it is remembered that this is Austria's only seacoast, a short one at the best, and that it is all but indispensable to Austria, while all but useless to Italy, who would never export a pound of merchandise from the peninsula by way of Trieste, it will be apparent that the mere use of the Italian language on this eastern coast is a slender base upon which to build the claims of unredeemed Italy. The transfer of the islands, or a vital part of them, to Italian control would indeed rid Italy of a constant menace, but only to turn it upon Austria, with an added strain in the situation and a more pronounced unnaturalness in the relation involved. When we recall the struggle which little Servia has made to get to the sea, we can form some idea of the protest Austria would make if imprisoned thus behind the barrier of a thin Italian coast strip. The recent situation in the Adriatic has been unstable enough, but any considerable extension of Italian territory round the Austrian side of the Adriatic would make it far more so.

The same holds with almost equal force of the

lodgment at Avlona. Austria is keenly sensitive to the possibilities of a foreign outpost on her side of the Adriatic and especially at so strategic a point as Avlona. To prevent even such powers as Servia and Greece from occupying this point of vantage both Austria and Italy were ready to take up arms during the Balkan wars, though the possibility of harm would certainly be slight, and Austria could count on Italy to aid her against any danger from such a quarter. How much more pronounced must be her objection to its occupation by a greater power like Italy, against which she would have to protect herself unaided. Such an isolated position as this, however strong, would be most precarious, in view of the certain hostility of the greater neighbour power.

The conclusion seems inevitable that any Italian advance on the east side of the Adriatic will be a menace to the peace of this region and a source of weakness rather than of strength to Italy. It is difficult to find a rational explanation for it except on the supposition of a farther advance. The strip must widen out into a broad hinterland and furnish the forces to defend its own frontiers and the resources to keep busy its harbours. The Albanian outpost must be linked up with other trans-Adriatic possessions if it is to be solidly held. Italy must encircle the Adriatic, reaching out to take a firm grip on the interior of the Balkan peninsula, absorbing a people not its kin and a stranger to its language and its faith, if its adventure is to be substantial and enduring. Probably few if any Italians have so conceived the logic of their "legitimate aspirations." Sufficient

to the day is the evil thereof. The new frontier with its new difficulties will produce its own aspirations and efforts. Let us judge these as we will, it is impossible to overlook the hazard involved, and the change from comparatively stable to unstable equilibrium in this part of the world.

If this is true of the expansion of the home frontiers, it is hardly less so of the ventures overseas. The Tripolitan acquisition is comparatively safe, with friendly powers on either side and the desert behind, although its economic possibilities are for the present far from reassuring. Opinions differ as to whether it will ultimately be self supporting, but none think it can be so now or soon. Italy can hardly be indifferent to this consideration, but as always, the question is decided on other than economic grounds.

In Asia the situation is less reassuring. A station there, especially on the mainland, must be precarious and costly, unless it expands to large proportions and becomes self supporting and self defended. Such expansion must be not only against native protest, but against the virile competition of the other European powers, for Italy will not be the only heir to the inheritance of the Turk. Here will be renewed the rivalries of western Europe. To this divided territory will be transferred the wars which originate in Europe, and this territory may in its turn originate disputes for Europe to fight out. It is infinite pity that the needful consolidation should so often involve disintegration in its turn.

Will the crises of European politics continue to pave the way for Italy's advance, as in the past?

Will she always find her enemies locked in death grapple and ready to yield what she covets as the price of her aid? She has always taken big risks, but hitherto for the most legitimate and necessary ends. The risks are increasing, and the ends seem less indispensable, despite their assertion of legitimacy. Nay, may it not be their very questionableness which evokes the loud assertion of legitimacy?

But we are not judging; we are learning. Italy furnishes an extreme example of the fascination of nationalist ideals and the disregard of practical considerations in their pursuit. To live safe and prosperous, to be content with a humble place, while other tongues and other customs slowly win the allegiance of mankind, this is not the temper of those whose sires built the eternal city. Let us applaud or condemn as we will, but let us understand.

CHAPTER XVI

THE CASE OF THE MINOR POWERS

THE minor powers of Europe have little in common except their relative weakness. They owe their existence to the most diverse causes, and their present status and their political prospects manifest equal diversity. Some are natural, others artificial; some are relics, others beginnings; some seem destined to endure, possibly even to grow, while others tend to disappear. In most cases they owe their continued existence to conflicts of interest between the great powers whose struggles they watch with breathless but helpless interest, knowing too well in many cases that a decisive issue to the struggle means their undoing, while its continuance means their ruin.

These powers constitute four groups widely separated in locality, character and interests. The first of these groups, that of the Balkan states, is so important in the problem of international relations in Europe, that it has necessarily occupied the first place in our inquiry. It is doubtless the least stable of all the groups, representing essentially incomplete integration in a territory where such integration seems inevitable. Nowhere do the passions of men, and superficial differences of race and speech, oppose one another to less purpose, but nowhere is the opposition

more indubitable. Of all the minor powers, these seem the first and most certainly doomed.

SPAIN AND PORTUGAL

This group is at once the most natural and the most artificial of the four; natural in that the peninsula occupied by the two countries is naturally isolated and well defined, and so situated that it neither blocks the path of the other powers nor finds its path blocked by them in turn; and artificial in that nature has furnished almost no excuse for the division of the country between two powers. Their separation, which is marked neither by natural barriers nor by pronounced differences of language or race, is none the less significant.

The comparative detachment of the peninsula from the continent of Europe does not in itself account for its immunity from the European turmoil. Italy is quite as sharply defined by nature, and England even more so, yet both are in the present conflict and seem likely to be in any other which may convulse Europe, while the participation of Spain has hardly been thought of. Even her alliance seems hardly to be sought. The reason would seem to be that Spain has nothing that anybody wants. It cannot be too often insisted that mere extension of territory, when it involves no strategic point, and especially when it offers no opportunity for colonisation and the expansion of the ruling race, appeals very little to the modern statesman or even to popular imperialism. This is especially true in countries where government has become dependent upon public opinion. If Spain were

unoccupied, or occupied by a feeble race, no doubt France would welcome its annexation, but the problem of French politics would be hopelessly complicated by the annexation of the Spanish people. The crude autocratic imperialism which could contemplate the subjection and incorporation of such a people has disappeared, at least in western Europe. No nation wants Spain for her own sake.

And no one now courts Spain for her possessions. Curiously enough, she owes her present immunity largely to her great losses. These losses are of two kinds, strategic and territorial. Under the first head comes Gibraltar. The territorial loss here involved was insignificant — only about three and a half square miles — but the strategic importance of "the Rock," as we have seen, is enormous. It is not that this is the only point where a naval base and a powerful fleet might dominate the straits, but that this, unquestionably the best point, once in the possession of the greatest naval power, no other can be tolerated. Hence Spain, the natural guardian of the Straits and mistress of the Mediterranean, is completely relieved of that responsibility. Imagine to what courtship and what coercion Spain would be exposed, if she really possessed this first class fortress and held unquestioned command of the Straits through navy, mines, or submarines. But this carefree existence, it may be safely asserted, is one little appreciated by the country, which in more than two hundred years has not been able to reconcile itself to the foreign occupation of Gibraltar. It is said that the Spanish governor of the adjacent mainland still announces himself

as "Governor of Algeciras and of Gibraltar in temporary possession of the British." The plain fact is that people do not prize tranquillity above all other goods. They desire influence and power, and are willing to accept the responsibilities and the suffering that these entail.

The second loss which Spain has experienced is that of her colonies. Her colonial empire, once the most extensive in the world, fell to pieces of its own weight during the nineteenth century, the final dénouement being aided by a brief war with America. It would take us far from our quest to moralise on this disastrous experiment in imperialism. Its lessons are everywhere conceded and in some degree heeded by those now chiefly concerned. It interests us merely to note that, having no territory available either for race expansion or for strategic control, Spain is undisturbed in our much disturbed world.

But Spain is restive under this condition of things, and actively seeks the troubles she is spared. She has in fact long held Ceuta, a point on the African coast opposite Gibraltar and potentially its rival. This is tolerated by Britain on condition that it remain unfortified and in the hands of a harmless power. Any sign of transfer to, or alliance with, a dangerous power would be immediately opposed. For the purpose of keeping Ceuta safely innocuous, Spain is admirably adapted, a sufficient commentary on her rank among the powers.

The beginnings of a new Spanish imperialism are to be noted in the assignment to Spain of a "sphere of influence" in Morocco, and her joint obligation

with France to preserve the peace of that country. Such arrangements as these phrases suggest are of course purely transitional, and in the ordinary course of events must develop into full occupation. Ambitious railway projects, including a tunnel under the Straits, add to the possibilities and the dangers of the scheme. Doubtless France is not enthusiastic over this partnership, but it was plainly politic. It insures the co-operation of Spain with the entente powers in any matter affecting this part of the world, and in particular, removes all likelihood that Spain might willingly serve as a base for a hostile power threatening the control of the Mediterranean or colonial possessions in Morocco. Spain has given hostages to Britain and France in return for her sphere of influence in Morocco. She has bartered away her immunity in an eager effort to get back into the game.

Portugal, though naturally a part of Spain, is politically peculiarly distinct. This is due to the fact that for more than two hundred years Portugal has been virtually an appanage of Britain. This curious and little noticed partnership can be traced back more than seven hundred years, when English knights aided Portugal in her wars of liberation from the Moors. In the early wars which England waged against France, in her later wars against Spain, and in her mighty struggle with Napoleon, Portugal, with its harbours on the western sea offered a most advantageous base for British operations. British influence was therefore enlisted always on the side of separatist tendencies. The merger with Spain, which seemed at one time an accomplished fact, might have had disastrous

consequences for Britain, to whose influence is perhaps due in part the failure of the unionist movement in the peninsula during the last century. This relation of dependence was embodied in a treaty in 1703 which virtually made Portugal a British protectorate, as regards foreign affairs, while leaving domestic interests to her own exceedingly incompetent administration. That relation has never since been disturbed. During the Napoleonic wars, when the Portuguese monarch took refuge in Brazil, the country was for a time directly ruled by a British admiral. It is significant that when the present republic was established, one of the first announcements of the provisional president was that the relation with Great Britain would not be modified. Since the outbreak of the present war Portugal has repeatedly offered her assistance to the Allies and has probably co-operated to some extent in Africa. But as she is one of the smallest countries in Europe and burdened with a debt equal to thirty-five or forty per cent. of her wealth, she is a negligible factor in the allied camp. Still, she is there, necessarily there, if Britain calls, as she is likely to do only in extreme need.

Insignificant as Portugal is, however, she still has colonies, and colonies of some value. These include extensive territories in east and west Africa, and numerous islands, Madeira, the Azores, etc., of great strategic importance. That she still holds these valuable possessions, which certain powers would gladly acquire by purchase or otherwise, is of course due to the same British backing to which she owes her separate existence. So well recognised is the British claim

that Britain freely crossed Portuguese territories during the Boer war, and later, in an effort to reach an understanding with Germany, arranged their definite partition between Germany and herself. If there was Portuguese protest to these proposals, it was hardly noticed or worthy of notice.

In brief, Portugal has no basis for separate existence. She is in effect an outpost of Britain, preserved as a political anomaly, to serve the far-seeing purposes of the British Empire.

THE SCANDINAVIAN COUNTRIES

The Scandinavian countries form a group of considerable size and importance, with an area half larger than that of Germany, and a population of over ten millions. Their importance, however, is primarily due to their position, which gives them not only harbours and a valuable seaboard, but command of the Baltic. This position they are quite unable to hold by their own strength. Their independent existence they hold on sufferance, or more exactly, by virtue of the deadlock between their powerful neighbours. The main rivalry is between Russia and Germany, but Britain is interested not only in the general question of national preponderance, but also in the naval possibilities of the Norway coast. Russia and Germany are therefore interested in securing control of the Scandinavian countries each for herself, and in preventing control by the other. Britain is interested in preventing control by either. So long as these powers have anything like their present relative strength, the Scandinavian countries are secure. When either Ger-

many or Russia becomes sufficiently powerful to resist the other two, their independence will become nominal and may quite disappear. Whether their status will be that of Finland or that of Portugal, matters little.

It may be worth while to notice the strength of the opposing claims, though no consideration of the equities involved is likely to have much influence on the result.

The claim of Russia is certainly a strong one. It is simply the necessity of controlling the door to her own house, so that none may close it against her. Sweden and Denmark will not, dare not, do so, but Germany can, and may easily feel so disposed. But the Scandinavian peoples are alien to Russia, and her rule, however tempered, would rest heavily upon them.

The claim of Germany is as clear. To be sure, she is not directly dependent upon the Baltic, even for access to her Baltic provinces, but she can hardly help regarding Russian control as the ultimate alternative to her own, and the full realisation of the Russian ideal would push the Russian advance west to Berlin. The logic of that advance is too inexorable to be overlooked, the more so as nature has provided no bulwark between the two countries. The Scandinavian peoples, too, are Teutonic, and although nowise minded to become German, have far more in common with Germany than with Russia. Subjugation or annexation would be bitterly resented, but would involve far less real hardship in the case of Germany than in the case of Russia.

Britain's interest is that of self protection. She

desires neither annexation nor paramount influence in this quarter, but the real independence of the Scandinavian powers. They will never harm her, whereas either of the greater powers could and sooner or later would, if they occupied the Scandinavian coasts. They might never attack her, but they would always *be there*, towering, gigantic, in the background of her consciousness. It would not do for her to provoke an attack. Thus under the slow attrition of continued subserviency, British independence would be sapped, and in a crisis the vast fabric of empire which her sons have inherited and her statesmen are set to guard, would fall in ruin.

Is it possible to imagine that any of these three powers will voluntarily abandon a policy born of such vital needs? Can they prudently do so with human nature as it is now? Can we expect a country like Russia to rest content without a doorway of its own? Can Britain or Germany tolerate Russian control of the Danish Straits? If not, we can expect only an unstable equilibrium, a long standing one perhaps, for the great rivals have other and more pressing cares, but unstable nevertheless because due to a conflict of vital interests, interests which none can surrender and which none can as yet make prevail. The Scandinavian countries are in no immediate danger, but it is difficult to read a promise of independence in their horoscope.

THE LOW COUNTRIES

This name is now used to designate the two small countries of Belgium and Holland, the former of

which has come into sudden prominence as a result of its unfortunate part in the present war. As at present constituted, these little kingdoms date from 1838, but they rest upon historical foundations which are very much older. Holland, indeed, is the somewhat reduced survival of a one-time considerable power, the precursor of Britain in foreign commerce, financial leadership and naval power. This supremacy was long ago lost to Britain, whose size and island location offered a much better base for it than Holland afforded, but the successful rival has by no means despoiled her of all her possessions. She holds not only Java and Sumatra, perhaps the most valuable of all tropical possessions, but nearly all of the great group of East India islands, an area nearly sixty times that of the little kingdom itself. Her possessions being all islands, only two of which she shares with other powers, she has almost no problem of defence or boundary disputes, except the all important problem of maintaining her existence as an independent power. This problem is serious enough. Her position as a strip of coast land lying between Germany's productive districts and the sea, subjects her to an importunate wooing, the fervour of which is not lessened by the knowledge of her magnificent dowry. Were it not for the fear of her stern guardians, it may be assumed that no protest of hers would prevent the ardently desired union. The chief objector is of course Britain, who sees herself menaced in her most vital interests by the establishment of a strong and potentially hostile power in the nearby harbours of the Dutch coast. Her protest against the fortification of

these harbours with the possibility that they might be seized by Germany for use against Britain has already been mentioned.

In passing it may be noted that the Dutch colonial empire as now constituted is the result of a protracted struggle between Holland and Britain, involving both coercion and bargain, an instance of the latter being Britain's surrender of Java for the Dutch possessions in India. The general result of the whole was to give Holland an empire of tropical islands while Britain secured the continental possessions. This was eminently appropriate in view of the fact that continental possessions are harder to defend, and boundary disputes might have involved the little country in wars at home which would have jeopardised her existence. Thus, Britain fought several wars with France before her position in India was established. For Holland, such a war would have meant annihilation.

But another result of this very sensible arrangement is more important, though possibly unforeseen. Holland received tropical colonies, and with them wealth and tranquillity. Britain received in northern India, and especially in South Africa, temperate climes, and with them dangers and arduous tasks, but withal the possibility of growth for her own people. The white man's land of the world is filling up with Britons and not with Dutchmen. This broadening base of the British race is the supreme fact in the British empire.

The kingdom of Belgium is the result of a secession from Holland in 1838. No very substantial base of union, historical or natural, justified the union, and

the advantage of size in this case was doubtful. Both together would still be smaller than any of their dangerous neighbours, and union would only expose both parts to dangers that would otherwise threaten but one. Singly or united they must still exist by the tolerance and the backing of the great powers, and, this being the case, a division along lines of religious and other characteristics, and administrative convenience was advantageous. How far these considerations were influential in securing the result, it is impossible to say. They at least go far to justify it.

The great importance attaching to Belgium has recently been enhanced by the acquisition of the Congo Free State, an immense territory in central Africa, which has had a peculiar and significant history. It was originally constituted in a chimerical attempt to stay the encroachments of the great powers in Africa. Its freedom was to be guaranteed by international agreement, and its administration provided for by private organisation. The king of the Belgians was chosen as its administrative head, both because of his ability and because of his detachment from all colonial powers. So far so good, but the problem of financing a vast tropical state proved too much for its custodians, with the result that administration quite naturally degenerated into exploitation, with abuses which shocked humanity and a demand that the responsibilities of administration be assumed by more responsible powers. The old problem of rivalry among African colonial powers having been nowise solved in the meantime, there was nothing to do but entrust Belgium with the burdensome honour, which

she accepted with mingled elation and anxiety. Belgium thus entered the list of the colonial powers with foreign possessions having an area eighty times that of the kingdom itself, and bordered by the possessions of all her great European neighbours. It is thus apparent that the chances of trouble with these neighbours, or of injury incident to these troubles with one another have been measurably increased. It is true that the perpetual neutrality of the Congo has been guaranteed by treaty, like that of Belgium itself, and that a further agreement pledged the great powers not to fight out their European quarrels on African soil, but these treaties have been violated, and it is now known that at least one power has long deliberately contemplated their violation.

But the supreme significance of Belgium lies in its location relative to the three great powers whose rivalries have so long disturbed the peace of Europe. It has been noted that a natural barrier of mountain and river, extending northward from the Alps, divides the plain of central Europe into two portions, the habitat of the French and German peoples. But this barrier is not complete. After maintaining its height for some two hundred miles (the present boundary between Germany and France) it drops into low hills, and beyond the river Meuse the hills disappear altogether, leaving a broad strip of lowland, which forms a natural highway between France and Germany. This is not only the easy route, it is the most direct route. A bee line from Berlin to Paris will cross Belgium a little south of Liège and Namur. The mountain barrier which extends from Switzer-

land to Belgium is always difficult to cross, and has at times been impregnable. Through this Belgian gateway, therefore, have passed nearly all the armies which have invaded the one country or the other.

But Belgium is also the natural point of contact between England and the continent. Its harbours are not quite so near to England as those of north-eastern France, but they are much more practicable, and political conditions have usually increased their availability, for Belgium, being between Germany and France and not quite a part of either, has usually been semi-independent and so open to foreign aggression. Belgium is therefore more than a gateway. It is a crossroads or junction point where three highways of the nations meet. Let any two or all three of these powers go to war, and there is an immediate rush for Belgium. It was in Belgium that Wellington landed to oppose Napoleon, who had at once directed his movements thither, and it was through Belgium that Blücher and his Prussians marched to Wellington's assistance, and Waterloo was added to the long list of Belgium's decisive battles. Let France or Germany establish herself in Belgium in advance of her opponent, and she can usually count on saving her own territory from invasion. Here, too, she can best co-operate with or repel a British expeditionary force. Let any one of these powers be established there permanently, and its ultimate ascendancy over the other two is assured.

It was these considerations which led the powers in 1838 to sign the treaty guaranteeing the neutrality of Belgium. Self interest was of course the motive,

must always be the motive in such a transaction. Each feared the occupation of Belgium by an enemy, and especially its joint occupation by two enemies. Each realised that the others were manœuvring for position, not only with forced marches in time of war, but with diplomatic intrigue in time of peace. Both forms of advance were forbidden by the treaty, which, while guaranteeing her against invasion, also debarred her from alliance with foreign powers.

The violation of this treaty by Germany has perhaps attracted undue attention on the part of hostile and neutral powers. It is doubtful whether its framers regarded it as more than a temporary diplomatic expedient, or expected it to be permanently binding. Certain it is that more than one of the contracting powers has, at one time or another, considered its abrogation. The government of Napoleon III opened negotiations with Bismarck relative to the annexation of Belgium to France, and while nothing came of it, the proposal seems to have neither shocked nor astonished the world. Our own breaches of faith with the Indians, with China, and even with other powers have been flagrant, and while these have elicited something of academic protest, it is easy to see that the moral sense of our people has condoned them as justified by unforeseen conditions. Indeed, it is appalling to think what would have happened if we had kept all our treaty pledges, though made in perfect good faith. It may be said that the moral sense of mankind in general regards the obligation of treaties as far less than absolute or perpetual, an obligation to be set

aside or relaxed, as we set aside the bankrupt's obligations, when their enforcement would mean ruin.

Nor is the plea that the Allies are championing the cause of the little nations to be taken much more seriously. As matters stand, it happens to be true, for there is not a little state in Europe which it is not to the interest of at least England and France to maintain. But France did not espouse the cause of the little nations when she negotiated for Belgium in the sixties, nor Britain when she incorporated the Boer republics a few years ago, though it is now plain to all reasonable persons that she did the only right or possible thing. Both nations were acting then, as they are acting now, in the interest of their own safety and to such acts the conscience of the world becomes reconciled.

It is much to be regretted that Germany did not stand by the first straightforward announcement of her chancellor, and continue to defend her act on the ground of military necessity. Her plea on this ground was incontestable, for though the military results of the movement have been disappointing, the judgment of all authorities would agree that this was her one chance of success. The later shuffling and evasion, both of the chancellor himself and of his inept defenders, has seriously weakened their case. The alleged conspiracy of Belgium with the Allies was disproved by the very documents cited in evidence, while the network of double-tracked German railways leading to the Belgian frontier, which had no possible industrial justification, had long advertised Germany's

intention and justified any defensive agreements which Belgium might have made.

But no wisdom of defence could have saved Germany from the storm of indignation which burst upon her from the four quarters of the globe. This storm was due to no mere violation of treaty. That in itself is an ugly fact, but it was neither unprecedented nor peculiarly outrageous as international transactions go. Had it been effected with due regard for its innocent victims and by a people whose cause commanded the sympathy of mankind, it would have passed as an ordinary incident in the none too moral game of war. As it was, two dramatic incidents completely obscured the real issue and roused the indolent conscience of mankind to an almost frenzied denunciation.

The first of these was the unparalleled harshness with which the Belgians were treated, partly as a matter of military policy and partly through personal brutality which found in military policy its incitement and its occasion. There is much reason to fear that these characteristics have grown upon Germany during recent years. Her campaign of 1870 left her with no such stain, but her record in China a quarter of a century later should have prepared the world for recent events. It would be interesting to trace the origin and development of this unfortunate tendency, but it would not be germane to our purpose.

The second of these dramatic facts was the heroic defence of the Belgians. The incident is instructive to those who would understand the motives of war. With amazing obtuseness Germany had reckoned that

Belgium would count the odds against her, and yield to the irresistible. With unconscious cynicism her spokesman expostulated with Belgium for the folly of her sacrifice. Does the tigress count her foes when she defends her cubs? When the last great issue is joined there lives not a people so tiny or so base that they will not do what Belgium did, and if Germany is to become a leader among the nations, it behooves her to learn the lesson that Belgium taught. With the fury of a beast at bay this little people whom the nations had forbidden to fight and had promised to defend, leaped upon its giant antagonist and gripped him; gripped him and held him; held him until, for him, it was too late. Had the world's sympathies been with the German cause, this appeal to the world's chivalry would have strained its sympathies sorely.

But the world's sympathies were not with the German cause. Its power was too menacing, its procedure too ruthless, its grievance too obscure, its designs too vast, its temper too arrogant, and its sensibilities too obtuse. The case was prejudged, because Germany had been judged. The violation of Belgian neutrality was an unpardonable offence, because Germany was an unpardonable offender.

Removed from this complicating environment of national feeling, the violation of Belgian neutrality has its lesson for the many who would fain fetter the passions of men with treaty agreements. Will nations keep such promises? The answer in this connection is not difficult. They will keep them if it does not involve too great a sacrifice to do so. But if circumstances so change that the keeping of promises in-

volves the destruction or the crippling of national life, then promises will be evaded or broken, and the judgment of mankind will justify the act.

And, in general, circumstances will so change with the lapse of time. Treaties die of old age and functional derangement like individuals. Death here as elsewhere may give occasion for tears, but not for surprise to those who are in touch with reality. This does not mean that moral forces are powerless to safeguard human interests. It means rather that moral forces must always be sought in the living present and not in the dead past. We may some day be ruled by righteousness, but never by the dead hand. Nor does this mean that treaties have no value or that they should be lightly disregarded. They involve a serious forecast of the future, and serious people will respect them until misadjustment makes further observance unreasonably hampering to the vital forces which they were designed to protect. Then revision becomes the only reasonable thing, revision by common consent if possible, as in our agreement with England concerning Panama, without consent if necessary, as in the case of our treaty with China concerning immigration. It will be our wisdom not to expect the impossible of finite foresight and finite faith.

What of the future of the two kingdoms? That depends on the future of the great powers, whose conflicting interests determine their fate. If Britain becomes unquestionably supreme, she will maintain their independence, not for righteousness' sake, but for Britain's sake, though she will derive sincere satisfaction from the fact that the two interests coincide. If

Germany triumphs she will absorb them, with or without a disguise. Whether they have the status of provinces or become protectorates under the euphemism of "allies" is a minor matter. Belgium will be simply annexed — has been annexed, if the Allies cannot tear her loose. With Holland, thus encircled by German arms, there will be no occasion for hurry. A treaty of alliance, a customs union, these are the familiar steps toward painless incorporation. Between these two extremes of British and German supremacy lie various degrees of unstable equilibrium in whose uncertainties the Low Countries must share. The relation established by conflicting interests and balanced forces may be, probably will be, expressed in new treaties, but it will be these forces and interests, as living things, and not treaties, that will determine their fate.

CHAPTER XVII

THE CASE OF CHINA AND JAPAN

IN considering the case of individual countries we have thus far confined our attention to nations having their headquarters in Europe. Turkey and Russia, to be sure, extend across the European frontier in unbroken expanse, a majority of their territory lying in Asia, and most of the other nations considered, rule over colonies beyond the confines of Europe. But all of these countries are in a more or less important sense, European. We now turn to countries having no territorial interests whatever in Europe, and lying at the extreme opposite end of the eastern hemisphere. Why this exception?

Simply because politically the entire eastern hemisphere consists of Europe and Japan. Africa is parcelled out among the European powers. The exceptions are nominal and negligible. They include Abyssinia, an interned nation, half entrenched and half imprisoned in a hill country which it has not been worth any one's while as yet to conquer, and Liberia, a negligible territory and sentimental appanage of the United States. Aside from these two mere left-overs whose appropriation awaits the convenience of Europe, Africa is a European estate.

The same is true of Asia with the single important

exception noted. The whole northern half is Russian. The southern peninsulas are British and French. The islands are Dutch and British. It is true that the Sultan of Oman, the King of Siam, and the Shah of Persia rule over nominally independent peoples; it is hardly necessary to discuss the value of independence in countries which are openly included in the "sphere of influence" of nations like Britain and Russia. In the case of China independence wears a little more the aspect of reality, and hovers in the debatable region between fiction and fact. How much of present and prospective independence we are to credit to this huge inert mass, we have soon to consider, but spheres of influence have been openly mapped out here, and partition among the powers will be prevented, if at all, more by their jealousies than by China's self-assertion. The most that can be said of China is that she is debatable ground, a half way term between the European dependencies like India, Tonkin and Siberia, and the one power whose independence is indubitable, Japan. So while it may be convenient still to speak of Europe, Asia and Africa in other connections, if we are concerned wholly with existing governments it is appropriate to speak of the eastern hemisphere as consisting of Europe and Japan.

The recent history of Japan is perhaps the most significant, as it certainly is the most fascinating of any in the world. Her purely native and oriental development may be said to have culminated in the early seventeenth century, when the famous Tokugawa Shoguns devised the remarkable administrative mecha-

nism and put the finishing touches upon the social organisation which were to render such noteworthy service to the country for two hundred and fifty years. An important feature of the work of these famous rulers was the absolute isolation of Japan, foreigners being forbidden to visit and natives to leave Japan under pain of death. We need not concern ourselves with the events which led to the adoption of this remarkable policy. It is sufficient to note that it left Japan in almost complete ignorance of what was going on in the world during two centuries and a half of exceptional progress. When we think of all that happened between Elizabeth and Victoria — the building of the European empires, the wars of Napoleon, the invention of railroads and steamships, the settling of the western hemisphere, and the developments in industry and commerce, we can form a faint idea of what Japan missed by these centuries of absolute isolation. Possibly, too, she missed one more thing which we might not think of, subjugation.

About the middle of the nineteenth century this policy of isolation broke down. Russia had expanded into contact with Japan, and American whaling vessels hovered near her coasts. The inevitable change took place rather suddenly under the bold and tactful initiative of the United States, followed by the exceedingly vigorous and far-seeing constructive work of Britain, whose representative, the famous Sir Harry Parkes, was responsible for the introduction of the system of Capitulations, previously confined to Turkey, for the regulation of the relations between Japan and foreign powers. The essence of this arrange-

ment was that foreign powers retained full jurisdiction over their own citizens while in Japan, holding them amenable to their own laws rather than to the laws of Japan, and making their houses and places of business inviolable to all Japanese authorities, and exempting them from the payment of taxes and the other obligations of Japanese citizens. It will be seen at a glance that this was equivalent to establishing foreign rule on portions of Japanese territory, and was a mark of subordination which the Japanese could not fail at last to feel keenly.

This change of policy, though made peaceably, was made most unwillingly. Only the exceptional tact of Commodore Perry averted a clash. As it was, he came at first with a small fleet, made his request for a treaty of friendship, and sailed away, promising to return the next year. In this interval the Japanese exhausted every resource in preparation to resist an attack from Perry on his return. To their credit be it said, that they convinced themselves by this effort that their case was, for the time being, hopeless, and so when Perry returned with a larger fleet, they made the best of it and signed the desired treaty. It is all but certain that they were temporising, that they opened their country to the western world only to learn its secret and gain the power to expel it again. In a modified sense that has remained the consistent policy of Japan.

The immediate result, however, was to intoxicate this long isolated people with the new wine of the West. A craze for westernisation spread over the country, affecting every department of life and play-

ing havoc with its exquisite hothouse civilisation. The havoc wrought in these frenzied years has been a source of keen regret not only to the patriotic Japanese of a later generation, but to all lovers of refinement and culture. Incidentally, a political revolution was necessary to confirm the reform, which ultimately swept away much of the very fabric of civilisation itself. We may well exert our utmost imagination to appreciate the social changes involved in this revolution. Take the single item of the abolition of classes. Perhaps the most characteristic institution of the earlier Japan was the warrior caste, the famous samurai. Born of the civil wars which ushered in the Tokugawa régime, this class enjoyed extraordinary privileges and prestige. They were both exempt and debarred from labour, commerce and gainful occupations. They were proudly ignorant of the relative value of coins in common use. As retainers of the nobility they lived upon the moderate ration which their lords furnished, seldom acquiring property and never honoured for such acquisition. Their ideal, if imperfect, was probably more perfectly obeyed than any other known to us. When they met a commoner in the way, he must step quite out of the road and bow till his face touched the ground, a sign hardly exaggerated of the respect actually felt for this remarkable caste. And this class, with their immense endowment of privilege and their paltry wealth, was turned loose, as it were, in a day to become household menials, policemen, and petty servants of the new government machine. With the sword so long in their exclusive keeping, such submission seems incredi-

ble. It is to be attributed to the wave of patriotic exaltation which has so many wonders recorded to its credit. This disendowed class has been to Japan a moral patrimony from which she has drawn her patriots and high-minded statesmen, the latter beyond question the ablest group of men that any country has produced in the closing decades of the nineteenth century.

The mental revolution was perhaps still more striking. When we recall the long isolation and the internal completeness of the Japanese civilisation, it will be apparent that we have here ideal conditions for intellectual conservatism. The political revolution above noted, revived the atrophied monarchy at a moment when a young man of marked ability was about to ascend the throne. In accordance with Japanese tradition, he adopted a throne name which was to designate his reign during his lifetime and himself after his death. This term, *Meiji*, enlightenment, justly characterises the chief of the good resolutions adopted at this wonderful period, and the only one from which Japan has never departed. *Japan resolved to know all that the western nations had learned, and to discover the secret of their power.* A simple resolve, but one which no other people ever made, much less carried through. Think of the hesitancy with which western nations have accepted the Copernican theory, the Darwinian theory, and others, a hesitation due to no intellectual doubts, but to superstition and prejudice. The writer well recalls the dismay of his pious mother when as a youth he decided to attend a state university instead of the in-

tended religious institution. The fear was that the instruction there received would "unsettle his beliefs." This fear, which is normal to individuals and nations, usually presents enormous resistance to the progress of enlightenment, and makes martyrs of its pioneers. It had previously done so in Japan. But at the period which we are considering, the leaders of the nation and virtually the nation as a whole held this fear in abeyance, and accorded a welcome to ideas more revolutionary than any that ever confronted a western people. How completely the knowledge of the western world has been received recent events have demonstrated. Such a policy has its dangers — every policy has — and Japan has not taken the risk without loss, but her achievement is the more remarkable when it is remembered that along with all this acquisition of the knowledge and power of the West, she has found a way to save her own civilisation in its essential character. The writer once asked a Japanese scholar how far contact with the West had modified Japanese civilisation. He replied: "The life of Japan is like the ocean. The rivers muddy it along the edge, but the great ocean knows nothing of the rivers." This would seem to be essentially the truth, though embodied in permissible hyperbole.

If Japan ever entertained the idea of again closing the door she had so reluctantly opened, that idea was necessarily abandoned. The door was opened to stay. But she not the less resolutely determined to be mistress in her own house. Gradually, with unremitting effort, she combined modern commercial and industrial methods with her own superior frugality,

until she recovered the export and import trade which had fallen at first to foreigners. Native engineers, chemists, mechanics and experts of every sort gradually displaced the westerners at first called to her aid. Universities grew up on western models, and bid against our own for the patronage of Chinese and other students. The army and navy were put on a modern basis and supplied with munitions of the latest type. Most remarkable of all, though least noticed, she worked out a complete system of law and judicial procedure on western lines, and administered it with so much impartiality that the western nations were compelled to overcome their reluctance and allow her full jurisdiction over their subjects living in Japan. All this, it must be remembered, was accomplished in a single generation, an achievement unequalled in the history of any other people.

But these achievements have been obscured by the more conspicuous (though not more significant) achievements on the field of battle. The new relation with foreign powers had hardly been established before it became apparent to the keen eye of Japanese statesmanship, that danger threatened from without. Russia had expanded to the Pacific, had seized the great island of Saghalien, though largely peopled by Japanese, and was obviously planning to annex Korea and Manchuria, thus acquiring at least half control of the Japan Sea and full control of the all-important Yellow Sea and its gateway to the East. These territories belonged to China, but China could not protect them. It is much to the credit of Japanese statesmanship that it perceived the danger and recognised

the helplessness of China while Europe was as yet dimly conscious of either. In 1885 China fought a war with France from which she emerged with considerable prestige, while French chagrin produced a reaction at home which was fraught with the most momentous consequences. It was therefore with some hardihood that Japan, a few years later, decided to try out her new army and navy in a struggle with the oriental colossus. The occasion of the war need not detain us. Suffice it to say that Japan had a clear case technically. But it is clear that her real purpose was to forestall Russia by establishing her own ascendancy in the region under debate. Europe looked on with astonishment to see the newcomer snatch victory after victory from superior numbers, where she herself had so recently been worsted. In the resulting peace China was compelled to cede the island of Formosa, to recognise the complete independence of Korea, and to lease to Japan for a term of years the tip of the famous Liaotung peninsula, with Port Arthur, the Gibraltar of the East. The masterly strategy of these peace terms surpassed the strategy of the war.

Russia took alarm at once, and since France was now her ally, and Germany found co-operation advantageous, the three powers addressed a joint note to Japan stating that her occupation of Port Arthur endangered the peace of the East, and advising her to restore the peninsula to China. As this "danger to the peace of the East" was merely a way of saying that these powers would make war on her if she did not comply, Japan wisely yielded, whereupon Russia

took possession of Port Arthur, while Germany and Britain established themselves on the peninsula of Shantung. These three great powers thus secured effectual control of the gateway to the East. Russia proceeded without delay to build railways, ports and fortresses, and to push her aggressions in northern Korea, all in a way that plainly implied that she had no thought of anything but permanent occupation. Japan's silence concealed her stern resolve with a self-control characteristic of true greatness, and seemingly quite disarmed the suspicions of Europe.

The years that followed were not only years of quiet preparation but of tenacious diplomatic struggle, especially in Korea, whose weakness and corruption left her the plaything of contending powers. Here Japan was worsted, for a stand-in with Russia seemed to Korea to be obviously the safer policy. The more important struggle, however, was with the three great powers that controlled the eastern situation. Japan could not think of opposing all of them, or even two of them. The move was to make friends with Britain, then the rival and potential enemy of the other two. The Anglo-Japanese alliance pledged both parties to come to each other's aid if either was attacked by two other powers in Asia. Neither France nor Germany, therefore, could aid Russia without having to reckon with the British navy, which would have made the transport of troops impossible. Japan was thus left free to deal with Russia alone, with results that we now know, but results for which Europe was totally unprepared. Peace established Japan in possession of Port Arthur

and Dairen, in control of the South Manchurian Railway as far as her armies had gone — nearly five hundred miles — and recognised her paramount interest in Korea, an interest which was soon given concrete form by complete annexation.

Once more we may ignore the concrete grievances which were made the pretext for the war. Such grievances always loom large at the moment, and Japan perfectly appreciates their value as an appeal to the patriotism of her people. But history knows nothing of them. The one fact worth recording is that Japan saw her independence menaced by the Russian occupation of Port Arthur and the forthcoming Russian control of Korea, and she staked all on its maintenance. Her judgment was perfectly sound. There is no evidence that Russia ever contemplated the conquest of Japan, but it cannot be too often insisted that the real danger to national independence is not conquest but overshadowing superiority in arms, in wealth, in size, and in their inevitable concomitants of glamour and prestige. Conceding that Japan might never have been invaded, her civilisation would have become shy, inert and apologetic and her national policy obsequious and subservient, if a power as vast as Russia had established her undisputed sway on the whole northern Asiatic continent. It is vain to tell a people so menaced that the passive rôle will conserve their material well-being, that all that is of value in their civilisation will be absorbed into the cosmic culture of the future. Not so do they conceive their loves and their hopes. As well console the man whose body is threatened with decay with the

thought that his substance shall reappear in some higher organism in an unknown future. He will have none of it. The things that we love and which our love is meant to conserve are concrete things of the here and now, comely things and wonted ways that we cannot but strive to make prevail. Japan risked her life to save her soul.

The enormous prestige which Japan won in her war with Russia did not blind her statesmen to the extreme danger of her position. Russia, no matter how neighbourly for the time being, must inevitably renew the attempt to secure an outlet to the open sea. Germany had a naval station near her borders. China with her vast resources was sure to be mobilised by her own leaders or by foreign powers. Japan's resources were scanty, her territory small, and her finances mortgaged to the creditors of Europe. To maintain her position she must broaden her base of support. She must have more citizens, more fields, more food, more wealth. Japan is like Britain minus her colonies, superbly situated for convenience and control of wealth producing dependencies, but a nothing in herself. Half occupied Korea and Manchuria with their vast mineral and agricultural resources must be peopled and developed, and that without delay. The task was undertaken with feverish energy.

Meanwhile opposition has arisen from another quarter, and that quite legitimately. China has come rather suddenly into a consciousness of her danger and her possibilities. Foreign occupied fortresses and foreign owned railroads have become objects of suspicion. Manchuria is still hers, and she is but too

anxious to oust her unwelcome tenants. Not yet able to control, she is able to embarrass without limit, and she shows every disposition to do so. Her fears are altogether justified, and her policy perfectly legitimate, though infinitely exasperating in its shifts, evasions and procrastinations, the natural resource of a weak power against threatened attack.

The present war has given Japan a much desired opportunity to confirm her position in the East, a position, it may be well to repeat, of enormous power which she cannot relinquish, and of enormous danger, which she cannot avoid. Her recent moves apparently look to the lessening of her danger rather than to the increase of her power.

In accordance with her treaty with Britain, and possibly at the latter's behest, Japan early notified Germany to evacuate her post in Shantung. It was not without a certain finesse that this notice was couched in the identical terms used by Germany, Russia and France twenty years before, when they warned Japan that her occupation of Port Arthur "endangered the peace of the East." Failing to comply, Germany was summarily ejected. Her ejection from her island possessions in the southern Pacific followed, the latter being turned over to the Australian representatives of Japan's ally. With regard to Tsingtao, the Shantung post, the announcement was first made that it was taken for restitution to China; later, that it would be held till the end of the war, when it would be made the subject of negotiations between the two countries. Still later, this postponement in turn seems to have been deemed inadvisable, and advantage was taken of

the preoccupation of the powers to press China for a settlement of all outstanding problems, or more strictly, perhaps, to secure from China what Japan believed necessary for the realisation of her national ambitions. The nature and scope of these demands require brief consideration.

The first group of these demands had to do with Manchuria. Japan held Port Arthur and Dairen by leases taken over from Russia, the term for one port being only twenty-five years. The South Manchurian Railway, secured in the same manner, was subject to purchase by China in thirty-six years, and it was certain that China would seek to avail herself of this privilege. Of these short leases, which Russia of course intended to extend at her pleasure, seventeen years had already expired. Japan therefore saw her tenancy drawing to a close. Meanwhile the railroad and the harbour at Dairen represented a large investment and potentially a very profitable one. The rapid development of Manchuria had taxed the capacity of both railroad and port to the breaking point, and there was a loud call for large additions to trackage, rolling stock, and, above all, for additional docks and warehouses. It was important for the country and for Japanese finances that this demand be met. But capitalists refused to advance funds because of Japan's brief tenure, and their entire distrust of Chinese management which was to follow. Japan therefore demanded an extension of these various leases to ninety-nine years. There was much to be said for such an extension, but it dashed the Chinese dream of early recovery of Manchuria, and naturally was

bitterly opposed. The citizen or friend of either country can easily find opportunity for passionate championship. The impartial observer, on the other hand, will see here the old struggle between aggressive efficiency and traditional right, a struggle in which each side has a case.

A more startling demand was that Inner Mongolia should be added to Manchuria as regards all matters in which Japan was concerned. The significance of this demand will be appreciated if we glance at the map. Manchuria is a most irregular territory, though not by any freak of nature. It is a political accident and not a natural unit. Yet there is a natural unit here which is very definitely marked, a broad valley running north from the gulf between two mountain chains. To the west of this valley and its mountain boundary lies the vast plateau of Mongolia, which has no natural connection with the valley plain lying to the east. Yet political accident has willed that Mongolia should spill over her mountain border and deluge a great rectangle in the heart of nature's Manchuria, crowding the latter over into the eastern side of the valley in its southern part, while wrapping all round Mongolia to the north. This Mongolian overflow or excrescence is known as Inner Mongolia, and this Japan asks to have incorporated, for economic purposes, in Manchuria, where it belongs.

But this again dashes one of China's pet hopes, which is to build a competing railway on this western side of the Manchurian valley, or to threaten to do so, and so to bring Japan to terms. Our own experience with parallel railways makes us familiar with these

tactics. From a business standpoint Japan's contention is sound and China's plan indefensible. But from the standpoint of Chinese territorial interests, this, like all other concessions, was objectionable. Japan is pushing her territorial aggression with the argument of sound finance.

The next demands take us far from Manchuria to the shores of southern China. It will be remembered that the large island of Formosa lying off this coast was ceded to Japan as one result of her victory over China. Later developments in naval science have warned Japan that a strong power could easily attack Formosa from the mainland. She therefore demands that none of this part of the Chinese coast shall ever be alienated to a foreign power, without her consent. Her interest is obvious, and in view of the alienation of Tsingtao, Wei-hai-wei, and Port Arthur, her demand seems pertinent. China can hardly object except on the ground of pride. The real point of the demand, however, is to give warning to foreign powers and to justify protest and even intervention on the part of Japan if need arises. The demand is disturbing, but not unreasonable, if we concede Japan's right to take far-reaching measures for her own safety.

More doubtful is the demand that Japan be admitted to partnership and virtual control in the great steel works at Han-yang in central China. This is industrial strategy of a daring order. That such a position would have vast possibilities no one will doubt who knows anything of the coal fields and iron deposits of China. A great English authority is

quoted as saying that the time will come when the steamships of the world will be built on the banks of the Yangtse rather than on the banks of the Clyde. A powerful corporation located at this "Chicago of China" and backed by government authority, would be a power to be reckoned with in the industrial development of the future. But Japan lacks capital, and the undertaking has deterrent risks. It is doubtful if it would tempt her usually prudent statesmen, were it not for the danger amounting to certainty that other foreign interests will entrench themselves there if Japan does not. The vast natural wealth of China and her industrial incompetency is a constant temptation to western interests to establish themselves there. It is the consistent purpose of Japan to get them out and keep them out. China cannot do it. Agreements and warnings are of little avail. The only sure way is to occupy the danger points herself.

It was in pursuance of this same policy that Japan made a further series of demands of a still more unusual and questionable nature. These were, in effect, that in so far as China saw fit to employ foreigners to organise her new administrative machinery, her postal, customs, and financial departments, her army, navy, and so forth, she should give the preference to Japanese. It is difficult at first to realise the sweeping nature of these demands. China will be obliged for a long time to come to employ large numbers of foreign experts in every branch of her government, as Japan did a few years ago. During this period of transition, the government will be practically con-

trolled by these experts. China now pursues the prudent policy of taking her advisers and experts from many nations, themselves rivals in Oriental matters and therefore quite incapable of making common cause. To choose them all from a single nation, and that nation one more likely than any other to encroachment upon her territory or her sovereignty, is quite another matter. It is easy to understand Japan's anxiety to get rid of these potent representatives of the European powers, but it is clear that China cannot bind herself to accept the guidance of a single nation without surrendering her independence.

China showed the utmost reluctance to accede to these demands, a reluctance which increased as she passed from group to group. Japan's argument was in essence: "We want to save you from the western powers." China's objection was in essence: "Who will save us from you?" Both dangers are real and both arguments justified. The strain of the situation became intense, and for a time the two countries were on the brink of war. Such a war would have overwhelmed China and would have ruined Japan. Each power sounded the other until it ascertained how much it would yield rather than fight. These points fortunately coincided, and war was averted. China yielded the first four points, giving Japan her long claim on Manchuria and the railroad, adding Inner Mongolia to her sphere of influence, promising not to alienate the coast opposite Formosa, and giving to Japan the desired interest in the great Yangtse industry. But Japan's demand that only Japanese experts and advisers be employed was "postponed." The last word is

ominous and suggests the possibility of further trouble.

Two questions suggest themselves in this connection. First, as to Japan's good faith. No one can doubt her ability to reorganise China and develop her power, but would she do so, or would she, in her own interest, keep China weak? Above all, would she give China back to herself? It is safe to say that Japan will act in her own interest, as other nations are wont to do. If she is guided as she has been for half a century, she will seek her interest wisely; but if her statesmen are replaced by demagogues, her action is difficult to predict. Assuming that her action will be prudent, as we thus far have reason to do, it may be doubted whether she will attempt to delay or misguide China's transformation. The abuse could not go unnoticed, and it is not likely that it would go unavenged. In no way would Japan defeat her purpose so surely as to give China reason to throw herself into the arms of the western powers. Nor is it likely that she would long attempt any actual domination of China. Such a rider on such a steed would certainly be riding for a fall. The doctrine of the Orient for the Orientals can be maintained only by an Orient that is developed and united.

This brings us to the second question: Is Japan's action wise? It has been urged with much force that by coercing instead of persuading, Japan has embittered China and jeopardised that unity in the Orient which is so necessary for the realisation of her hopes. She is not done with Russia yet, perhaps not with Germany. In a world divided between Europe and

Japan, the odds seem fearfully against her. When the new testing comes, Japan will need China. Will she have her whole-hearted, or only her perfunctory assistance, perhaps even her hostility? A generous policy of live-and-let-live commends itself to the far away observer, a wooing rather than an abduction. But the case is not clear. China moves slowly, so very slowly! Her weakness invites the marauder, and makes her useless in the common defence. The plot thickens and the crisis may come quickly. The Orient must, in self-defence, goad China to a quicker pace. China smarts under the goad and resents the unwelcome pressure. But most of the Chinese hardly know what has happened, and their resentment is not likely to be enduring. Japan has probably counted the cost.

Will Europe permit this organisation of the Orient under Japanese hegemony? Not willingly, but perhaps of necessity. Every day that the present war continues lessens the likelihood of effective interference. Japan's case is hopeless if she is confronted by a united, or even by an indifferent Europe. But Europe divided against herself is temporarily and may be permanently unable to resist her advance. Let this helplessness continue long enough, and the Orient will not need to concern itself with the attitude of Europe.

At the moment of writing, China mildly astonishes the world by announcing the restoration of her empire. The powers, including Japan, have filed their protest, fearing lest disorders ensue which should endanger the interests of their citizens at a time when

they are unable to protect them. China politely persists. Thereupon China is invited, probably at her own suggestion, to join the league of the Allies, a group to which Japan also belongs. Japan protests, alleging, somewhat baldly, that this would be derogatory to her own position as the paramount power in the Orient. The incident is suggestive. Britain and France wish to enlist China in passive hostility to Germany, whose intrigues in the Far East are far reaching and disquieting to her great rivals. China, in turn, wishes recognition as the equal of Japan. Then when the Allies finally come together to settle all their differences, China would get a new hearing and Japan perhaps be called to account. Japan promptly refuses either to recognise the equality of China or to submit their agreement to revision. Her position is that of the paramount power. This is plain fact and she insists upon its recognition.

It is common in these latter days to decry the Japanese. They are said to be tricky and unreliable, to be spoiled by their success, boastful and conceited. The writer, after some little opportunity for observation, finds little to justify such charges. When we consider the industrial revolution through which they have passed, it must be said that their business morality has shown remarkable stability. The oft repeated statement that Japanese banks employ Chinese because they cannot trust their fellow countrymen, is not true and never has been true. The only foundation for the myth is the establishment in Japan of branches of Shanghai and Hong Kong banks, with the transfer (for quite other reasons) of a part of their

trained Chinese staff. The charge of boastfulness and conceit comes with poor grace from American critics. The writer has slowly come to the conclusion that the Japanese are disliked, not for their boasts, but for their achievements. The Occidental is wont to expect in the Oriental an easy mark. The Japanese disappoints these expectations. Given a fair field and no favours, and the Japanese outclasses the westerner in most of the activities in which they come into competition. He is driving the foreign merchants out of Kobe and is establishing his own merchants in London. When the Russian war cloud lowered, a Russian official was asked if he thought there would be a war. "No," he replied, "the Japanese will threaten, but they will not fight. And if they do, we will be in Tokyo in two weeks." These rude awakenings are disconcerting, and that western displeasure should not give wholly ingenuous reasons for itself is not surprising. It is impossible, however, to see in Japanese successes a series of lucky accidents. They have learned the western science and have applied it with more than western diligence, that is all. And the end is not yet.

In considering the relation of the Orient to the western powers, and incidentally to ourselves, it is to be noted that as organisation advances, the likelihood of united action will diminish. A real China will not long be subservient to Japan, and the feuds that paralyse Europe are likely to be reproduced in the Orient. In our criticism of Japanese aggression and our sympathy for injured China, a permissible regard for our own self interest may reconcile us in part to

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the divisive tendencies in the Orient. With a united Orient and a divided Occident, the prospect for our cherished western civilisation would not be a pleasant one to contemplate.

CHAPTER XVIII

A CASE IN POINT

IF the foregoing chapters have been written to any purpose, it will be apparent that the present war is not due wholly to personal ambitions or to defective political institutions. Underneath these transient influences there are stubborn facts of a far more permanent and compelling nature, which predispose men to a certain line of action. We will not beg the question of the ages by asserting that men have no choice in the matter. It is sufficient to note that in certain situations their choice can be pretty safely predicted. As we note the uniformity with which the currents of human passion have surged through the great historic channels, it is impossible to avoid the conclusion that these channels have had much to do with the passions themselves. The ambitions of princes, the intrigues of diplomats, the hates and enthusiasms of peoples, all these are precipitating causes of war and must be held to their share of accountability. But closer observation usually discloses the fact that these forces of sentiment themselves correspond pretty closely to facts of environment. If that environment involves permanent dangers or needs, these soon become the object of a persistent purpose, the centre of a cult which enlists in its service all the energy and devo-

tion of the race. This devotion to a hereditary faith may become automatic and blind. That is true of the cults of war as of peace. The oft repeated criticism that the soldier does not know what he is fighting about, proves neither his indifference nor the futility of his sacrifice. How many of us can give any other reason for nine-tenths of the things we do, than that we follow the example or the behest of our people? This ritualising of life, by which concert action becomes automatic and unthinking, is the essence of all social procedure.

What then determines this ritual which is handed down from generation to generation, which is chanted by babes and veterans? Whence this legacy of unswerving purpose, of persistent jealousy and hate? Only one answer has any significance. The mind of the race shapes itself to its environment. Every feature of the landscape, as it were, generates its appropriate sentiment. Each bulwark gives confidence, each opportunity rouses ambition, each danger engenders suspicion and distrust. And as these potentialities are realised in experience, their corresponding sentiments are modified and reinforced. Continued success along lines of natural opportunity, will give momentum to ambition, until expansion becomes a habit of thought, not to say a gospel, while repeated checks at the point of national need, or disasters from the danger quarter will leave their legacy of sullenness and hate.

This does not mean that environment is everything, but it does mean that it is very much. Even if we turn from the problems of land and sea to study the

human factor, we are still confronted with environment as expressed in the persistent sentiments which it engenders. In these paramount facts which form the physical basis of the life of races, we must seek the chief causes of war. The acts of rulers, statesmen and governments furnish only the occasion.

Never was this truth so exemplified as in the case of the present war. It is in a sense a peculiarly normal or typical war. Any number of minor incidents might have been different, but its main features were inevitable. Every nation involved has a case. Not one could have done differently without violating all traditional standards of prudence and patriotism. Not one would have acted differently from any other, if it had been in that other's place. Nor could one of them have acted differently without the danger, almost the certainty of disaster. To illustrate: Japan, in Germany's place, would not have perpetrated the Belgian atrocities (the Boxer campaign proved that) but she would have invaded Belgium. So would England or France or the United States. Conversely, Germany in Japan's place, would have ousted her rival from Tsingtao. If Britain had been in the place of Germany, she would never have submitted to permanent repression and exclusion from all possibility of colonial expansion, with the certainty of being outgrown and outclassed, and equally, Germany in Britain's place would not have entertained for a moment the idea of parting with her colonies or jeopardising the security of their possession. These decisions are absolute, these interests vital, as human nature now stands. Never was a war so long fore-

seen, so deliberate, so free from misunderstanding. There was plenty of inveterate hate, but no sudden tempest of passion which swept men off their feet and befogged their senses. All participants, of course, have played to the galleries and pettifogged their case, as men are wont to do in war and peace, seeking to marshal the sentiments of men to their advantage or to the embarrassment of their opponents, but only the willing are deceived.

Who was responsible for the war? Servia, says Austria, for if she had ceased her agitation we should have dwelt in peace; Austria, says Russia, for had she not demanded the impossible, Servia would have yielded all; Russia, says Germany, for had she not interfered in a quarrel that was none of her affair, Servia would have yielded; Germany, says Britain, for a word from her would have restrained Austria; Britain, says Germany, for Russia would not have interfered unless assured of British support. And all are true. There is not one of these, from the least unto the greatest, that could not have stopped the war by refraining from the fatal step. And there is not one of them that could have refrained without sacrificing its vital interests. Servia, by ceasing its agitation, would have abandoned her hope of uniting her people and reaching the sea. Austria, by lessening her demands, would have risked the integrity of her empire. Russia, by holding aloof, would have lost to a rival the key to her own empire. Germany, by restraining Austria, would have closed up the only escape from her prison, and would have accepted for herself and her civilisation the status of another Holland.

Britain, if she had held aloof, would have ensured Germany's victory, would have lost her command of the sea, and would have ceased to be an empire. Peace can always be purchased, but sometimes the price is one which men are not willing to pay.

Ought men to pay the price? For outsiders, dimly conscious or wholly oblivious of the interests at stake, it is easy to urge compromise, concession, conciliation. Let us successively become patriots of the different countries involved, seeing the problem of the national life, so far as we may, as they see it. What would we as patriots — honest, reasonable patriots — counsel them to do?

We are Servians for the moment, simple, rustic and plodding. We have suffered from Turkish oppression and shaken ourselves free. We have raised our grain and our cattle for the markets of Europe, and have seen them held up at the border while our neighbour's flocks drove by. We have reached out our hands to our kinsmen who held the ports which we needed, and we have seen these kinsmen overwhelmed by an alien power and stationed as an unwilling barrier between ourselves and the sea. Reluctantly, we have turned away from our fettered kinsmen to seek elsewhere a route for our commerce, at the same time avenging old oppression and ending modern abuse. And lo, our old enemy of the North appears again and drives us back into the woods. Again we have appealed to our kinsmen, this time more passionately than before, to release us from our prison, and they begin to listen and to turn against their oppressor and ours. And now comes the sum-

mons from the arch enemy, surrender or be annihilated. What will we do?

Austria speaks. Let us pause and summon all our self control, for we have undertaken a difficult transmutation. We are to become Austrians now, born to the part, and knowing no other. The blind law of loyalty which is the inheritance of all men, predisposes us to see Austria's dangers rather than Austria's sins. There are jars in the household — none without know it so well as we — but thanks to the law of the household, they are only jars and not fratricidal feuds. We shudder to think what would happen if that restraining bond were removed. And now that danger threatens. A neighbour, with ways that are dark, is inciting the least loyal among us to open revolt and hostility. We court the neighbour's friendship, but in vain. We debar him from neighbour privileges, but to no purpose. Sullen and resentful, he establishes himself in our doorway, and we eject him as a matter of the simplest prudence. But he has won adherents in our midst, and our destined leader falls under the assassin's hand. What shall we do? We know whence the trouble comes, know that there is more trouble to come from that source, know that ruin will be the penalty for indulgence. What shall we do?

Again a long breath and a difficult transition. We are to become Russians now, loyal children of the "little father." Our land is broad and backward, and we are rude and poor. Perhaps we are at fault, but we cannot quite see why. The fact is that it is not easy to get about in our land, and we have no sure

exit to the lands of others. The ease of communication and the interplay of influence which characterise the peninsulas of western Europe, we have never known, and that is why we are where we are. Slowly the best thought of our people has fixed upon this as the one great need — outlet to the world. At the best we must always be cramped. If we had all the outlets that nature has provided, we should still be the most isolated, the most imprisoned of nations. But of the outlets which nature has provided we possess not one. For each and all, a neighbour and a rival holds the key. The outlet that is most vital, greatest and best of all, has been closed three times within a decade. We cannot tolerate such interruptions from local quarrels; still less can we submit to see our one great gateway held by a powerful enemy. Every consideration of self-interest and of equity makes that gateway ours.

And now Austria, backed by Germany, whose hostility is almost a foregone conclusion, approaches Constantinople with plausible pretext but with unmistakable intent. Serbia once occupied, our chance is gone. There will be no arguing with such a gatekeeper. If we go in and out this door, it will be on Germany's terms. Shall we accept this inevitable retardation of our progress, this handicap on our commerce and our intercourse with other peoples? Shall we tolerate the annexation of Serbia?

Let us turn to Germany. As we approach the storm centre of the present conflict, our precautions must be increased. If to any of the readers of this book, an invitation to become German in sympathy,

merely for purposes of exposition, comes as an unwelcome suggestion, it must be remembered that nothing less than this will give us even an approach to equity or understanding. As Germans we shall view the situation with passionate prejudice, but with minds accustomed in an unusual degree to take a look far into the future. For the present, all is well. We are strong, and no nation will dare attack us. We are prosperous, our industry and our commerce having gained rapidly on all rivals. We are united. If there are jars, they are born of the confidence of unity, the impossibility of sedition. What more do we want?

We want a future, and if we sit still and diligently farm our little estate we shall not have it. We have thought far enough ahead to realise that in the great arena of civilisation, the number of contestants is diminishing and their size is increasing. We are not small enough to give up without trying, but we are too small to stand the slightest chance of being in at the finals. We have tried to become larger and have failed. The owners will not part with their holdings. We are doomed.

Our situation is peculiarly trying. We have learned to think about this danger of the future as others have not. So they, seeing only our present well being, chide us for our discontent. We are dimly conscious, too, that we have not the gift of winning sympathy or of persuasively presenting our case. It is a cheerless task, this pleading of a cause whose need is obscured by present affluence, and before a tribunal incapable of sympathy. Yet no one has a clearer case, or a more desperate need.

These reflections have long ago led us to the only feasible plan of escape. We must move south and east, annexing, absorbing, subduing as need may be, till we have passed the Bosphorus and reached the Persian Gulf, and won an empire that touches the four great seas. We shall have all Europe against us, the needy because they want what we are after, and the possessing because they fear to lose what they possess, but every day we wait increases the odds against us. We cannot outgrow them. We can possibly outfight them — if we do not delay.

And now Russia reaches out for Servia which is one of our stepping stones. Indeed we have provoked the challenge, knowing that it will come to-morrow if not to-day. It is an awful responsibility, but awful is the alternative. Present ease and comfort, and after that, insignificance in a world whose destinies we were meant to shape. What is that but the choice of Esau, the sale of our birthright for a mess of pottage?

Does all this seem far fetched? Not so to a German. Expansion or extinction; so he reads his horoscope, and he reads it right.

The case of France scarce calls for discussion. By common consent, her rôle was inevitable. The sympathy of the world has been hers, even the sympathy of her enemies. Had she been allowed to choose, she could scarce have hesitated, but she was spared the necessity of choice. Germany could take no chances. As a probable antagonist, France must be the first in the field, and so the first to be attacked. As Frenchmen, we should have made the Frenchman's choice.

Belgium had an option, the option of ignominious surrender, or of resistance and ruin. We all see the option and honour the choice she made. The thing we do not see is that other countries were confronted by the same option and made the same choice. Is it any more noble to fight for an existence that is doomed to-day, than to fight for an existence that is doomed in a hundred years? It is merely easier to see one's way and feel one's duty.

For most of us it will probably be easiest to take our imaginary places as citizens of Britain, not because her course is clearer — it is nothing like so clear as that of Belgium or France, for her interests are more complex and inharmonious — but because we are sharers in her civilisation and in her great mission, in which our own must ultimately be merged. It will be unnecessary to invoke our sympathy, but the more necessary to appeal to our fairness.

Suppose Britain had remained neutral. Germany would have invaded Belgium and overrun France. Both would have been forced into an alliance with Germany, which, however unwilling, would have given Germany control of the French navy, and the French and Belgian ports. She would have established herself in Morocco and matched Gibraltar. She would have established a naval base in French China and neutralised Hong Kong. Above all, she would have won in the present war, and would have become unmistakably dominant on the continent. There might never have been a war with Britain; indeed, there probably would have been none, for the reason that war for Britain would have been hopeless.

Britain would have been isolated. She could never hope to meet Germany on land, and as Germany by controlling the continent, could control its navies, Britain could never hope to meet her on the sea. If Britain retained her colonies, it would be because Germany did not care to take them. Judging by many pronouncements, Britain would not have retained them. The present conflict sufficiently indicates what a single handed conflict between Britain and Germany would be. In a word, neutrality for Britain meant surrender and disintegration. If the choice of war is ever legitimate, this was a legitimate choice.

The case of Italy was less clear than the rest, and her action, for that reason perhaps, more hesitant. Italy has a real case against Austria which she is probably inclined to push too far. The Trentino should be hers. To extend her coast line round the head of the Adriatic to Trieste and Pola would give her an extended frontier to defend, and a narrow and unprofitable strip of territory, while it would be a serious loss to Austria with her meagre coast line, and would give her the strongest possible incentive to recover the needed coast at the first opportunity. To carry her acquisition still farther down the Dalmatian coast, and among the protecting islands, would still further cripple Austria, but would hardly help Italy, except by this same crippling. The expansion which it is feared that Italy contemplates, would not make for stability in this much troubled region. Meanwhile we are reminded that all that Italy could prudently accept, Austria offered as the price of Italian neutrality.

But two things must be remembered before we decide the wisdom or folly of Italy's course. The first is the distrust between the two countries, which made an amicable transfer impossible. Austria would not surrender the offered territory until the close of the war, lest Italy, once established there, should decide later to push farther, on some pretext too easily found. And Italy would not wait, lest Austria, once free from other enemies, should refuse to deliver. Neither supposition was unreasonable.

The other fact is the danger to Italy of a victorious Austria. Italy had forfeited the friendship of the Central Powers at the outset by refusing to come to their aid as they thought her under obligation to do. There had been threats of summary vengeance. Concessions extorted from Austria under duress would hardly be respected when she was free, and retaliation might not stop with the restoration of recent frontiers. For the Austrians remember that the monarch who now sits upon their throne once ruled all Italy down to Milan and the Po. Italy can hardly be blamed, in the light of history, for not trusting to Austrian considerateness or honour. The only Austria that could be trusted not to injure Italy would be an Austria humbled and impotent. Hence Italy's decision, and her programme of possibly excessive encroachment.

And so the close linked circle closes. Necessity is riveted in every link. To challenge this necessity is to challenge the right of nations to grow or to compete for the requisites of their being and growth. It is hardly possible to concede their right to be, without conceding their right to strive for necessary, even

favourable, conditions of being. And this point conceded, we are faced with the disturbing fact that nature has not fashioned the world into natural areas for nations to occupy, each with its needed resources and its suitable approaches and defences, like well planned houses in a street, but has so arranged things that no possible division can give to each the simplest requirements of independence and protection. What is more fundamental than that each should have its own doorway? Yet there are nothing like enough doorways to go round. What more reasonable than that each should have protection for its premises? Yet there are neighbour families that are separated by nothing but a chalk line on the floor. Nor could any man or body of men arrange a division of Europe among existing nations which would be free from these provocations to strife. Verily, the stars in their courses fight against nationalism as a static fact among men.

In the two remaining chapters it will be our purpose to consider what useful conclusions we can draw from these studies. The western mind is not in the habit of accepting necessity as the last word. Sooner or later — and usually all too soon — we leap to the inquiry: "What are we going to do about it?" That we can do something about it, is taken for granted, sometimes quite too precipitately. All honour to the puissant conviction that "nothing that ought not to be, need be." For faith were better than fatalism, even were fatalism true.

CHAPTER XIX

PROPOSED REMEDIES FOR WAR

TWO facts must be borne clearly in mind by those who would consider this subject to any purpose. The first is that war is a very ancient fact and one originally much more frequent than now. The evidence is conclusive that in the early stages of social evolution, war was chronic. A constant experience continued through many thousands of years invariably leaves tenacious instincts in the constitution of the race, instincts which often outlive the conditions which created them. Witness the duel as a method of settling disputes. This is a survival of the old institution of the ordeal, the essence of which was a belief that the innocent party was saved by a miraculous intervention. Hardly any one believes in such intervention to-day, yet there are millions who believe themselves in honour bound to submit their personal differences to the chance of the duel, though without the factor of miraculous intervention, the test is wholly irrational. In the same way, war has been so long the habit of human societies, that it is maintained, not by reasons, but by instincts, the most stubborn of all stand-patters.

Moreover, as in all such cases, the long continued experience has developed emotional compensations

and safeguards. We have not only learned to feel that we must fight, but we have learned to like to fight. The sufferings of war are terrible, but they are borne willingly, even gladly, as the athlete or the ascetic bears his self imposed hardships, for the sake of compensations which are of a very real character. The sense of achievement — never more real than in overcoming an enemy — the recognition of our fellows, most potent of all social incentives, these and other compensations war has made its own. The pacifist who is inclined to stake his case on the suffering caused by war, should first try commiserating a football team on its bruises and broken bones.

Equally significant and more often overlooked, are the protective instincts of war. Killing is a prominent incident of war, yet it is demonstrable that it has no such reaction upon the soldier as killing under other circumstances. Long continued war sometimes results in economic disturbance which paralyses industry and forces disbanded soldiers and others into criminal activity, as an alternative to starvation, but precisely the same happens in peace, when industry is disorganised by discovery or invention or hostile tariffs. The soldier who has accustomed himself to carnage, comes back to private life quite as peaceable as he left it and no more disposed to take the life of his fellows. War creates its own moral immunities or preserving instincts when it is conducted on lines which have received the sanction of self respecting peoples. The pacifist who begins his indictment of war by remarks about " wholesale murder " and other like epithets, forfeits his right to a serious hearing.

The second great fact which we have to remember is that war is functional, that is, it performs a real service for societies in certain situations. It may very well be that this service could be performed in some other way — indeed, that is the implication of our whole inquiry — but it must not be overlooked that it performs such a service. If we are to find a remedy for war, it must be of the nature of a substitute, an agency which can perform the same service at less cost. If we assume that men are fighting for nothing, we rule ourselves out of court at the very outset. It has been the purpose of the foregoing chapters to indicate some of the real interests which European wars are fought to secure or to preserve.

In this connection it must be noted that the reality of these interests does not depend upon universal perception of the concrete relations involved. It is one of the commonest of errors to assume that popular ignorance of the issue proves popular indifference or even unwillingness. Thus a recent writer tells us: ¹ “Wars are made by governments. . . . Before the present war broke out nobody outside governmental and journalistic circles was expecting it. Nobody desired it. . . . The millions who are carrying on the war, at the cost of incalculable suffering, would never have made it if the decision had rested with them. That is the one indisputable fact.” And again the same writer: “‘Germany,’ we say, ‘made the war.’ Germany? But what is Germany? The German people? The peasants? The factory labourers?

¹ G. Lowes Dickinson; *The War and the Way Out*; *Atlantic Monthly* for December, 1914, and April, 1915.

The millions of Social Democrats? They made the war? Is it likely? Ten days before the war broke out, they, like the people everywhere, were working, resting, eating, sleeping, dreaming of nothing less than war. War came upon them like a thunder-clap. . . . Whoever made the war, it was not any of the peoples." This is a typical sophistry of the kind we must avoid. Governments, no matter of what kind, have no such power as that here claimed for them. The war was unexpected as regards the moment of its outbreak, but these peoples had been expecting it for twenty years. If it had their disapprobation, they had had time and opportunity to make that disapprobation known. "Nobody desired it." Certainly not, or next to nobody, but all desired something which they thought it would secure, and most were willing to pay the price. Nobody likes to spend money, but most of us like to buy things, and we are willing to spend the money in order to get the things. The fact that they "were working, eating, sleeping, dreaming of nothing less than war," merely means that they were trusting to the sentinels they had put on guard while they went about their business. When the sentinels gave the alarm, they rushed to arms. An army doesn't have to be all on sentinel duty to prove its loyalty. This misinterpreted difference between government and people implies no opposition of purpose, but merely division of labour. As a matter of fact, modern peoples are more belligerent than their governments, for their passions are less restrained by knowledge of difficulties. It was the people who forced our country into war with Spain

against the will of our president and of a majority of our government representatives. There cannot be the slightest question that a similar relation exists in all the countries now at war.

To summarise the conditions antecedent to our inquiry. War is as old as human society and is deeply entrenched in human instinct. War brings suffering, but it also brings large emotional compensations. War suspends the protections of peace, but it safeguards the protective instincts. War renders a real service, and its cost is voluntarily incurred for that end. Finally, this attitude toward war is that of peoples and not merely of their governments, the latter being merely its specialised agents, a lookout and signal corps.

To all of this must be added the fact already much insisted upon, that peoples in their larger corporate activities are not mercenary, but idealist. They know that wars do not "pay" in the low, material sense. They are not seeking present ease and comfort, seldom a present good of any kind, but the triumph of an ideal which they associate with their national life. Their *method* may be wrong, but their *purpose* is essentially altruistic, perhaps the least selfish of any activity we know.

Can anything else take the place of war?

— Arbitration is naturally the first suggestion. It has been much discussed, and what is more important, it has been much tried. It already has a long record of successful achievement. It is a frequent argument that the constantly increasing number of successful arbitrations has but to be increased by patient effort

until confidence in the new principle is established, to insure the reference of all differences to some sort of judicial tribunal and the elimination of war. Is that hope justified?

It may be freely conceded at once that arbitration has a very large field of usefulness. A large number of disputes which arise between nations can be settled in this way and every possible encouragement should be given to all to settle their misunderstandings in some peaceable manner. The development of regular machinery for that purpose and the formulation of arbitral procedure may be expected to increase the number of disputes that are settled in that way.

But has arbitration averted war? It must be remembered that nations have still a third method of settling their differences, namely diplomacy. Their diplomats and foreign ministers are essentially claim agents, and most claims are settled through these agents. Arbitration is a relatively modern agency which has been devised to meet certain special classes of cases. It is like a new court of specialised jurisdiction added to an existing judicial system. Its value is indubitable, but its function is easily misunderstood.

Has arbitration encroached upon the field of war or of diplomacy? More exactly, if there had been no arbitration, would the dispute have led to war? We can best answer by considering a few typical cases.

The Canadian boundary dispute was settled by a joint high commission consisting of three British and three American representatives. This was but a slight adaptation of ordinary diplomacy, the two

parties to the dispute being equally matched and no third party represented. The sole purpose in this case was to isolate the problem and to avoid leaving upon the minds of the Canadians the impression that Britain's concessions had sold them out in deference to interests in some other quarter.

The Fisheries dispute between the United States and Great Britain was referred to the Hague tribunal, by whom it was decided in our favour. Here was a real difference of view and a real arbitration, but it is certain that in this case as in the last, war was impossible. The decision was most useful as removing causes of friction, but in both cases these causes of friction had continued for many years, and war had never been thought of. If they had continued another century, no war would have resulted. In a word, war was excluded before arbitration was agreed to.

A third case is that of the famous Venezuelan boundary dispute. In this case Great Britain was about to assert her claim against Venezuela by force, when the United States intervened and demanded that the case be referred to arbitration, which was done. Here is a case where arbitration seemingly averted war, but reflection clearly indicates that the deciding factor was our intervention. Britain was prepared to coerce Venezuela, but not to embroil herself with us. The possibility of arbitration made our intervention easy, but it is all but certain that intervention on any basis would have had the same result. War was averted, not by arbitration, but by alliance — the alliance of the United States with Venezuela. The

deciding fact in all these cases was the same, the absolute determination of Great Britain not to go to war with the United States, a determination which, we hope, was fully mutual. And this determination on either side was due primarily to the fact that our interests nowhere clashed seriously, while the necessity of co-operation was clearly foreseen.

Let us now take one or two cases where arbitration failed. Such was the proposal of Spain to arbitrate the case of the sinking of the *Maine*, and that of Servia to arbitrate the extremest of Austria's demands. In both cases the offer was instantly rejected. Why? Because back of the ostensible subject of dispute there was a larger issue which each nation instinctively felt could not be settled by arbitration. In our own case it was impatience with Spanish incompetency and a determination to dispossess a nation that had not made good. In the other case, it was a determination on the part of the Teutonic powers to enlarge their territories at the expense of weaker peoples, as a condition of successful maintenance against rivals more amply endowed.

Could these questions have been referred to arbitration? Imagine the attempt. The court meets in dignified state, and the attorney reads the indictment of Spain and moves her expulsion. The judge would ask for evidence of title, of violation of agreement, and the like. Spain's case would be perfect. But the indictment charges that Spain is one of the unfit, and under the law of the survival of the fittest, she should be dispossessed. Imagine a tribunal passing on such a question. But, it will be objected, the con-

crete issue was the blowing up of the *Maine*. That much could at least be referred. Certainly, and with what result? Either the court finds that Spain is not guilty, or else that she is guilty, in which case she must give apologies and indemnity. In either case Spain stays in Cuba, and that is why we refuse to arbitrate, because we want to get her out. Similarly, to arbitrate the Servian case would leave Servia independent, no matter what the decision, and Austria had decided on her subjection. In both these cases the proposal to arbitrate was refused because the real purpose was one which is *inherently beyond the scope of arbitration*. No human tribunal can ever decide the question of the fitness of a race to survive or the right of another to displace it.

But some one will be quick to object: "Has any nation such a right? Has Austria any right to subject Servia?" We can best answer by continuing our questions along this line. Had we a right to dispossess Spain of Cuba? Had we a right to take California from Mexico? Had we a right to take this country from the Indians? It is possible to object at every step, but it is impossible not to be glad that some of these things were done. Does anybody wish that California were still Mexican, or that New England were still inhabited by the descendants of Massasoit?

Our conclusion is that arbitration is a most useful adjunct to the machinery of international relations, removing difficulties that would otherwise fester in the national flesh, but that it is a supplement to diplomacy rather than a substitute for war. It may be

doubted whether arbitration ever yet averted war. The fundamental cause of war, race competition and struggle for survival, is permanently beyond the scope of arbitration.

Before leaving the subject it is necessary to note another and very practical difficulty in the way of arbitration, namely the difficulty of securing its enforcement. This appears in two forms, first that of persuading nations to arbitrate, and second, that of enforcing the award. The former is the greater. When a nation once consents to arbitrate, it not only virtually pledges itself to accept the award, but it has already decided by that act, that it is in no mood to go to war about the case. In short, no nation will consent to arbitration till it has made up its mind that the case is one that it can afford to lose. And this decision once reached, it is not likely to resume its claim under the added handicap of an unfavourable decision.

To secure a guarantee of arbitration it has been proposed to establish an international army or police, under a league of peace, to coerce any state that should resort to war against the will of the league. Such a suggestion shows a singular unconsciousness of the realities which we have been considering. Its first requisite is of course the league itself. This league must pledge itself to keep the peace, and since differences must always arise, it must also pledge its members to submit all such differences to some tribunal, that is, to arbitration in some form. Universal arbitration, therefore, is its first requisite. There can be no international police and no league until we have

overcome the first and greatest difficulty in the way of arbitration, namely, the reluctance of nations to submit cases affecting race survival to its adjudication. It is doubtful, as we have seen, whether we have yet made any progress toward such a decision.

But this decision reached and the league formed, it is recognised that there might be defections from the league. For this emergency, an international police would be formed of contingents from all the leaguers, sufficient to coerce any recalcitrant member, even the strongest. Evidently the member just at present would be Germany. To maintain an international force capable of coercing Germany would in itself convert Europe into an armed camp. But that is but the beginning of difficulties. A part of this force would necessarily be German, and the first sign of secession would undoubtedly be the secession of this part of the police force itself. Properly manipulated pretexts would enable this to be done in all good conscience, and the moment would be chosen when this force was so located as to make success assured.

But this is not the worst. The proposal presupposes a single seceding member. This war should teach us that we have no longer to deal with single nations. A dozen nations are now at war, and it is doubtful if any European nation will ever again go to war without allies. Nothing less than a police force that can coerce half of Europe will meet the theoretical requirements. This would put us about where we are now. It is obvious that secession from such a league would take exactly this form, namely, a split

or schism in the league itself, for which there would never be any lack of pretexts.

And who would command such a force? What man or body could be trusted with such a responsibility? Naïve indeed must be the enthusiast who would exchange the system of patriotic nationalism for this modern Prætorian Guard, men without a country, so far as their oath of allegiance goes, conscious of their power to set up and put down kings at their pleasure. Be their sincerity ever so great, their consciousness that they were the sole repository of power, would develop traditions of class solidarity and interest which would ultimately obscure the general welfare which they had been set to guard. New recruits would come under the spell of established tradition. The governments of Europe would be powerless to destroy, and so, powerless to control the power they had created. All Europe would succumb beneath the rule of these janissaries, to a military despotism from which it could escape only by a final orgy of anarchy and carnage. The militarism of to-day is at least patriotic. That of the system proposed would lack that saving grace.

→ Closely akin to the pledge of arbitration, is the pledge involved in the treaties associated with Mr. Bryan's name. The essence of this pledge is delay. It is argued that if nations postpone for a year the appeal to arms, that appeal will not be necessary. That all depends on the nature of the case. Such a postponement would not have stopped the present war, or either of the Balkan wars. All these wars were

perfectly deliberate, and in fact the great war at least, was once postponed for a year after the date had been definitely set. It is doubtful if deliberation would have averted our war with Spain, the most impulsive war of modern times. On the other hand, when the rupture has become imminent, delay would often completely shift the advantage from one contestant to the other. The proponents of this panacea naïvely assume that wars are fought between approximate equals who face each other with much the same weapons, and who can wait a year without disturbing their relative chances. This is almost never the case. The contestants are usually very unequal if pitted against each other under identical conditions. The only chance of the weaker lies in surprise. Suppose Japan and Russia had waited a year after war had become clearly possible. Russia would have had a million men in Manchuria and would have had the trans-Siberian doubletracked. Suppose the present war had been delayed a year after the *impasse* was reached. The Central Powers would have found ten million men lined up on their frontier. Or if we naïvely assume that such mobilisation could have been prevented by a paper promise, munitions at least could have been accumulated in a way to destroy completely Germany's lead. Is it to be supposed that Germany or Japan will be oblivious of such possibilities and will invite destruction by a delay which can inure only to the advantage of their adversaries? Most wars are deliberate rather than impulsive, and the aggressor counts largely on surprise as an aid to his cause. Against such wars proposals of delay are unavailing.

→ A somewhat more hopeful proposal is the internationalisation of danger points, the principle of international police being locally applied to secure obedience. This proposal has been oftenest made with regard to Constantinople, whose immense importance and small area fit it peculiarly for such an experiment. Such an arrangement would of course imply that the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus were to be open to all nations on equal terms, and with limitations designed to prevent the undue influence of any. The authority for such control would be derived from a concert of the powers. Whether such an arrangement could be made is uncertain. The question for the moment is whether it would work. The first problem would be to get an authority sufficiently detached from any one power or group of powers. The suggestion that the great responsibility be entrusted to King Albert of Belgium puts the question in concrete form. Would he be acceptable to Germany and Austria? Would he — could he — be fair? American control has been suggested (by some one seemingly not too anxious to keep us out of trouble) but again, would Germany and Austria be satisfied? How would we take to a German princeling as governor of Panama? For these new international or supernational functions we must take men from intensely national environments, and these men would be, or would be believed to be, partial. But this may not be, and probably is not, an insuperable difficulty. We may assume that for our new international establishment a suitable personnel has been found. What then?

It is much to be feared that such an establishment

would become the object of persistent diplomatic intrigue in which civilians, merchants, contractors, and the like, would take a hand. Whether the establishment succumbed to a particular influence or not, the suspicion of it would go far to neutralise the benefits derived from the scheme. In the light of what we now know about German intrigue, in all parts of the world, how would the world feel about a colony of German merchants living in an internationalised Constantinople? And what would such a colony, aided by consuls and ambassadors and German trained adventurers, be likely to do in preparation for a possible war between the fatherland and Russia? We may be quite sure that when Germany or Russia got ready to take Constantinople and thought the moment opportune, they would have a carefully prepared set of grievances, a damning indictment of international management as partial and inimical to their interests, all ready for their justification. Nations contemplating aggression prepare pretexts and store up grievances as they do munitions. Have we not heard that Belgium had already violated her neutrality?

It may be mentioned in passing that the principle has been more nearly realised than has usually been supposed. Belgium, Holland and Denmark are all strategic and much contested sites. All exist under international agreement and are prohibited from making alliances which would be to the advantage of one power and to the detriment of another. That is very nearly the internationalisation proposed. Its value has been somewhat put to the test in the present war.

It is unnecessary to enlarge upon these difficulties.

Much can come from arbitration, something, perhaps, from postponement, something from internationalisation, but it is chimerical to hope to stop war by contrivances so long as the disposition to war remains.

Against all the foregoing proposals an objection holds which is far more fundamental than any thus far considered. They all assume that present boundaries are satisfactory, and that the political accidents of to-day are to be perpetuated like so many personalities whose stature and shape are predetermined. Nations must stay in their boundaries as men stay in their skins. As a matter of fact no such fixedness exists or ever has existed, and no such finality has been reached. If we have the slightest regard for suitableness, for commercial convenience, for avoidance of friction, in short, for adaptation of conditions to vital needs, these arrangements ought not to remain as they are. The whole Balkan peninsula is one huge misfit, was so before the Balkan wars and remains so since. The Trentino, and perhaps more, should go to Italy, Bessarabia to Rumania, and so on, to mention the least and simplest problems. Carry the same principle a step farther, and some states ought to cease altogether, and erase their boundary lines in the interest of human convenience. Any solution of the vexed problem which would perpetuate present territorial divisions would fail and should fail, because these divisions are wrong. Can we, along with our provision against war, devise methods for the rectification of frontiers? Several proposals have been made.

One is that territories in dispute, like Alsace-Lor-

raine, Poland, and the like, be erected into independent buffer states. This is a move in exactly the wrong direction. Such states are weak and can exist only on sufferance. They multiply customs barriers and the frontier personnel. They are unable to provide the best facilities or to minimise the cost of government. For many centuries European progress has been in the direction of continued integration, and the difficulties of Europe seem to consist largely in the incompleteness of the process. An independent Alsace-Lorraine would not be independent, and would not be a buffer, but merely a cause of mutual heart-burnings and a hotbed of intrigue.

→ Another proposes that doubtful affinities be settled by a plebiscite. This was done in the case of the Ionian islands, which voted, about half a century ago, to join Greece instead of remaining in the possession of Great Britain. But it is all but certain that such an experience could not be repeated. Such a vote in Alsace-Lorraine would show indecisive and patchy results which would increase the difficulties in the way of the desired adjustment, besides giving to the losing party a sense of grievance not previously felt. Better that the Alsatians should feel bitter toward Berlin than toward their neighbours. But the all sufficient objection to the plebiscite is that the inhabitants of the debatable territory know nothing about the larger problem. Imagine submitting the question of Constantinople to a vote of its inhabitants! The Greeks would vote for Greek rule, the Turks for Turkish rule, the Armenians for Armenian rule, etc. But even supposing they reached a harmonious decision, scarcely

one would vote with any consciousness of the hundreds of millions of people whose interests are profoundly affected by their choice. As well allow the hybrid population of Gibraltar to decide the fate of the British Empire. It is significant that those who have most confidently urged the plebiscite, have usually disparaged the importance of national boundaries and decried nationalism altogether. They start with the assumption that it makes no difference to a man whether the state he lives in be large or small, well or ill equipped, so long as he is allowed to plough and sow unhindered. The number, size and location of states being a matter of no concern, territorial arrangements may well be left to local prejudice. We can come to any conclusion we please if we will calmly obliterate whatever master passion stands in our way, and preface our proposal with a revision of human nature. The plain fact is that men do care enormously about the size and character of the country which owes allegiance to their flag, and that they care more that their civilisation should prevail in the world than that they should be privileged to sow and reap undisturbed. Call this folly if we will, but it is fact, and it is folly to declaim against it.

—Another proposal which has the merit of recognising the unsatisfactoriness of present boundaries, seeks to remove this patent cause of war by reconstituting nations on a true ethnic basis. A recent writer who notes the persistent demand of Italians, Rumanians, etc., to be united to their kin, conceives this to be the root of all unrest among the nations, and adjures the Powers, when next they meet to settle the peace of

the world, to make this the guiding principle of their action. A true Italian unity, a Rumanian unity, a Polish or perhaps a Slavic unity, these he thinks would be stable and insure peace and contentment.

A glance at an ethnographic map will enlighten us as to the possibilities and difficulties of such a proposal. A reconstruction of European nations along ethnic lines would produce some strange results. The eastern projection of Prussia, which already seems to reach one or two hundred miles too far, would be prolonged almost to the gates of Petrograd, while just behind this narrow strip of coastland, Russia would stretch out to westward almost to the gates of Berlin. It would extend Italy clear round the Adriatic and Greece clear round the Ægean, but would not give to either of them a strip ten miles wide. Impracticable as such an arrangement would be, with its slender chain of coast settlements holding in irksome dependence the hinterland, it is not the worst. Such a strip of country at least has the merit of continuity. But in other cases this would be lacking. Take the case of Rumania, perhaps the most pronounced of all existing demands for ethnic unity. The much talked of Rumanians of Transylvania form a solid mass of comparatively pure Rumanian stock, but a mass completely surrounded by a broad territory whose population is equally pure Hungarian. If we are to have an ethnic unity, Rumania must consist of two separate portions, one of them completely embedded in the tissue of another and rival, not to say hostile, people. Imagine the administrative problem in a country where an official could not get from



one part of the country to another without crossing foreign territory. The world has had large experience with such states and draws a sigh of relief to think that that experiment at least is done forever.

But there are still more fatal objections to such a proposal. It would deprive certain peoples of the most elemental requirements of convenience and safety, and in particular of access to the sea. The Hungarians, a potent and richly endowed people, dwell wholly inland, and must get access to the sea and the outer world entirely through territories occupied by other races. The experience of Servia may enlighten us as to the mischievous possibilities of such a situation when not assured by political control. Even Rumania, foremost champion of the principle of ethnic unity, would suffer disastrously by its consistent application, for the Dobrudja, the long coast province which gives her her considerable frontage on the Black Sea, by a strange chance has one of the most purely Turkish populations in Europe.

It is hardly necessary to urge other practical difficulties which will occur to any thoughtful person; the regions — some of them supremely important, like Constantinople — where no race is clearly in the ascendant and which would thus become more than ever apples of discord; the impossibility of defining ethnic unity, even by the tangible criterion of speech, when every language is seamed with dialectal divisions, and drawn by ties of varying kinship. Where is the frontier of German speech? Will it include the Dutch, which is scarce more than a dialect? And if so, how about Danish and Norwegian and Swedish, all of them

first cousins? Is there to be a Slavic unity, or are there to be a dozen Slavic unities, and if so which? It has been well said that nature knows centres but no circumferences. These ethnic unities have distinctive centres, but their edges are nebulous and we pass from one unity to another by insensible gradations. To the traveller who crosses a modern frontier the transition may seem marked, but that sharp edge is official and arbitrary, a grievance in itself. It would be difficult to imagine a subject more prolific of discord than this indefinable and unworkable criterion of ethnic unity.

The fact is that ethnic unity is neither the only nor the chief interest which impels nations to extend their borders. These interests are essentially three, commercial facilities, defence, and ethnic unity, and of these three, ethnic unity is the least important and the least potent in influencing the action of peoples. We may add that in the age in which we live it is steadily dwindling in its influence. On the other hand, it is the one of the three which appeals to *all* the people of a nation. A nation under the spell of the blind instinct of expansion, will therefore always use this as a slogan if it can be done with any show of plausibility. The Italian peasant knows nothing about the strategic frontier in the Alps which is a matter of so grave concern to the strategist, but talk to him of unredeemed Italy, and his heart warms to the tartan. Rumania talks of her exiled brethren, because it happens that Rumanian is spoken in adjacent territory, but she did not hesitate to begin her expansion by annexing a province which contained almost no Ru-

manians at all. Germany isn't talking of unredeemed Germany for the reason that there are few Germans in the territory that she covets. We need not conclude that this slogan of ethnic unity is insincere, but it is never the only cause, seldom even the chief cause of national unrest. To reconstruct Europe along ethnic lines would not only be impracticable, but would immeasurably aggravate the influences which now disturb her peace.

There remains one more proposal, most serious, most hopeful, and most difficult of all, federation. This is an old dream, having been entertained, it is said, by Henry IV of France. It is often suggested in the present crisis, especially by Americans, who are perhaps prejudiced in its favour. The suggestion raises two questions: can it be introduced? would it work if introduced? On the first point, reference to our own history is not reassuring. Our federation was formed of thirteen small states mostly of English origin, and all speaking the English language and having similar institutions, all long united under one sovereign power, and later drawn together by a seven years' conflict with that power, and by the fear of further need of like kind. At no time in their history had they been at war with one another. Yet even so, the formation of a union was a matter of the utmost difficulty. The articles of union were adopted only by leaving them ambiguous on certain vital points, and by something akin to coercion on the latest accessions. Even so the union would hardly have endured had not these thirteen states been overwhelmed by nearly three times as many more, created by the fed-

eration itself and never independent. Finally, with all these unifying influences, the federation broke up, and was reformed and consolidated by the time honoured method of conquest. Have we realised that our Union is not a voluntary one, but a product of war?

Europe consists of about a score of states which differ in almost every conceivable respect. They are of different race, different speech, different religion and different civilisation. They are accustomed to different forms of government. They have fought with one another for centuries and have vast legacies of suspicion and hate. They have had a glorious past and have inherited traditions of heroic conflict with one another. To overcome these obstacles to union is a task almost inconceivably difficult. One-tenth the difficulties here encountered would have made American federation impossible.

The reply is sometimes made that we have in our own country all these elements, these differences, these legacies and traditions, yet the Union survives. It is difficult to take such an answer seriously. The Italian or Hungarian or Hebrew who comes to our shore, renounces all these things in spirit when he sets foot on the steamer's deck. He comes to learn our language, to adopt our ways, to obey our laws. In the vast majority of cases, he comes with a consuming passion to effect the transformation as soon as possible. Even were he far less willing, the environment into which he comes, exercises a compelling influence upon him and still more upon his children. Be the rallying prompt or slow, we at least

know what we rally to. But to what would federated Europeans rally? What would be their language, their religion, their political ideals? Which civilisation or political system would be dominant? There can be but one answer. *None* would be dominant. It must be noted that all the salient things that make for American unity are lacking in Europe, and just because they are lacking, they make against it. There is no common speech to unite them, but there are different speeches, proud and rich in treasure, to divide them. There is no common ideal of government to bind them together, but there are powerful and cherished ideals to keep them hopelessly apart.

But suppose that by some miraculous chance the European nations waive their differences and federate. Would such a federation work? Would it effectively provide for the needs of these varied peoples? It is much to be feared that it would not. Again the experience of our own country may be instructive. Our federation works, but not too easily, and it carries about all the burden that federation seems able to bear. For a generation we have kept an obsolete currency system which no one approved, because the West was jealous of the East, and they could not agree on a change. Our sectional jealousies between North and South are notorious. How would the age long jealousies of Teuton and Celt accommodate themselves to a federated authority? Underneath any ostensible community of action there would line up the old ententes and alliances, or new ones, and the old battles would be refought with results hardly less disastrous than those of to-day.

All our inquiry brings us round to this one great fact, which we can never take to heart too much.

Federation does not create union, but union creates federation.

CHAPTER XX

THE FUTURE OF WAR

AMONG the readers of these pages there will probably not be found one who regards war as beneficent. The great majority will be of those generous spirits who regard it as a scourge and are chiefly concerned to stop its ravages. With these right minded natures the writer finds himself in instinctive sympathy. It is therefore not without misgivings that he has led them, as seemingly he must, under sombre skies and to a viewpoint whence the outlook is not immediately reassuring. More than once, perhaps, the sanguine reader has flung the book aside, impatient at the depressing outcome of our inquiry. Those with whom the wish is habitually the father of the thought, may even conclude that the unwelcome thought is here fathered by an unholy wish, and that the book is a disguised plea for war. The inquirer who is sincere in his search for truth must risk such misunderstandings. These last pages are written with the same wish for peace on earth and good will toward men, that may have inspired the sanguine reader's protest. If the writer seems less ardent than some to set things right, it is perhaps because he is more confident than some that things will set themselves right. Great is the faith of those who believe that "nothing that

ought not to be, need be,"¹ but not greater than the faith of those who believe that nothing that ought not to be, *can* be. This inquiry closes, therefore, not with the proposal of another "remedy," but with a suggestion of the grounds of this soberer confidence.

Our inquiry has seemed to point to two conclusions which must be borne in mind as the condition of any profitable forecast.

First, the causes of war are to be found in the conformation of the planet rather than in the caprices of men. More exactly, war is a phase of the struggle between civilisations and the peoples who are their exponents, the objective being the possession of certain areas or points of vantage which vitally affect the future of the civilisations and peoples concerned. The things thus fought for are real things, important things, things worth fighting for, if they cannot be gotten in any other way. They are so fundamental that they are felt rather than seen, and are safeguarded by instincts rather than by reasoned considerations of self interest, as are all really vital interests.

Second, the remedies usually proposed are futile, because the causes of war are misjudged. It is assumed that wars are due to misunderstandings, that they are fought for unimportant or trivial interests, that they are willed by the few and fought unwillingly by the many, and that the elimination of war is merely a question of suppressing a few disturbers of the peace. These assumptions are one and all false, and all proposals based on them are necessarily doomed to failure. The misunderstandings and controversies

¹ Phillips Brooks.

which accompany war, have to do with its pretexts and surface incidents, rather than with its real issues, regarding which instinct is quite as unerring as in other connections. The issues are more vital and are championed with more unanimity than are the issues of peace. All people judge, and rightly judge, that their civilisation is more important than the comfort or even the lives of the individuals of a given generation. It alone endures; it alone gives value to the individual life.

Broadly speaking, nations arbitrate or negotiate matters affecting their comfort and convenience; they settle by war matters affecting their existence. Nations should not fight, and seldom do fight, for anything less than their existence. But they never refer to any court their right to exist, nor is it likely that any court would acknowledge jurisdiction in such a case. National existence as it stands, no matter how imperfect or transitory, must always be the fixed premise of judicial procedure. Yet national existence in its present form is not a fixture, and the possibility of modifying it is an essential condition of human progress and ultimate welfare. War has hitherto been the chief agency for effecting these changes. Can a less costly and more efficient agency be secured? If so, we may be able to eliminate war, but we can never do so by petrifying nations as they are. Nations as they now are, represent only a temporary stage in a continuing process, a stage which shows no sign of finality or complete adaptation. We may change the agency and the method if we can, but the process must and will go on. We may dry up a river

bed by providing a new channel, but never by damming the stream.

If we examine the crazyquilt map of mediæval Europe, it will be clear at a glance that the direction of this evolution has been toward a steadily increasing integration. And when we note that the highways and tollgates of commerce which the nations are so eager to control, are nowise enough to go round, it is impossible to escape the conclusion that the process must go farther. It would not help matters to have more nations. There must be fewer and larger political units. The Balkan peninsula must be united. There can be no other satisfactory settlement of its vexed problems. Local differences may be humoured and local liberties retained, but the barriers which hamper commerce and impede intercourse must disappear. An independent Alsace-Lorraine would be an absurd anachronism, justified, if at all, only as a temporary expedient after an indecisive war. It would be helpless alike in war and in peace. We may be sure that its own inhabitants would not vote for it. There is reason to doubt whether the much abused Poles would voluntarily accept the responsibilities and limitations of complete independence. It is still more doubtful whether they could maintain it, or would find it advantageous to do so.

We must not be misled by the fact that along with this process of progressive consolidation, there is a certain amount of disintegration. We make bad beginnings, which we have to undo and try over again. It was absurd to give the Netherlands to Austria, or Naples and Sicily to Spain. It was unfortunate to

divide Poland, and distribute the fragments as was done. Such combinations have to be broken up in order that more suitable ones may be formed. Other combinations are purely nominal, merely a disguise for essential independence, as was the case in European Turkey. Disintegration in such cases has no real significance. The real movement is all the other way.

Can this consolidation be effected without war? If so, it must be in one of two ways. Nations must unite or regroup their territories of their own accord, or they must be united and readjusted by a council of nations, the will of the whole group being imposed upon the individuals affected. The first is essentially the principle of voluntary federation already considered. It may be doubted whether any such voluntary combination has ever been effected. The voluntary union of the two parts of modern Rumania and of the two parts of Bulgaria against the will of their sponsors may be cited, but this was not a true union in either case. It was rather an assertion of union on the part of peoples that Europe was trying to divide. The only voluntary unions on record are mere transfers from one power to another. The Ionian Islands and Crete both entered the kingdom of Greece with enthusiasm, but neither had ever known independence, and their choice was merely a preference of one allegiance to another. The one significant example of our own country rather lessens than increases our faith in this principle. With little to separate us and everything to unite us, we still had to be unified by war.

Of unions imposed by a concert of the powers we also have seeming examples, the unification of Italy being the most conspicuous. The transfer of Bosnia, Cyprus, etc., may perhaps be mentioned as lesser exercises of the same power, as also the confirmation of states like Greece and Belgium. But with trifling exceptions, these decisions created no states and effected no unions. They merely ratified the results of war. *Political integration has thus far been effected only by war.*

Why? Because men have limited ability to sympathise with others and to adjust themselves to them. How jealously we guard the barriers even between neighbour families! The most expensive of all our luxuries is exclusiveness. This is not in the least a criticism. The surest way to break down the social instinct is to overtax it. We can like some people much and many people some, but not all people *any*. "The love of all! At the bottom it is emptiness."¹ It is useless to chide our finiteness in this respect. We can no more sympathise indefinitely than we can lift weights indefinitely. We have our limit.

It is further to be noted that this provincialism becomes intensified by time. The longer we are identified with a given group in the family, the community or the state, the more complete our adjustment to their ways becomes. To enter another group, or to take others into our group, otherwise than as servants, causes immense discomfort and calls forth vigorous

¹ L'amour de tous! Au fond c'est le vide. Victor Hugo, Quatre-vingt-treize.

protest. No matter how desirable the change, we do not like it. The more perfect the adjustment, the stronger our protest against anything that disturbs it. It is useless to ask a people thus circumstanced to unite with another on a basis of mutual concession. We are willing enough to unite, if the other will pay the bill, that is, if the other will make all the concession and come in submissively, assuring the supremacy of our race and our culture, but we object to bearing the discomfort of readjustment ourselves. And besides, our way is the right way, you know, and we *ought* not to change it. It is even doubtful whether we ought not to impose it upon others in their own interest.

Hence it comes that all integrations, even the most necessary and wholesome, require an element of coercion. Men like the relation well enough when the readjustment is effected. None of our southern states now desire to secede. Burgundy and Anjou now think no thought but the thought of France. But without coercion the southern states would now be separate, and Burgundy and Anjou would be petty, independent states. Nay, without the coercion of an earlier day, not even that much would be possible, and the co-operation upon which all our civilisation depends would not have begun. This coercion it is the function of war to furnish. It seems to be a blind and heedless process, but so is the whole struggle for existence, which has been nature's programme for the last few million years. Intelligence and guidance are not in it, but behind it, over it, God alone knows where. It must not be forgotten, however, that indiscrimi-

nating as war seems to be, it furnishes at least a certain criterion of fitness and merit. Conquest is not the result of mere torrential energy, but of organisation and team work. These are necessary conditions of civilisation, and their triumph is something of a guarantee of its advancement. No matter how odious its manifestation or its representatives, the triumph of organisation and collective efficiency is a contribution to fitness which is the one assurance of survival. It is all well enough to say that we prefer something else than efficiency. Neither we nor our preference will long be here, if we do.

But equally this integration requires something else than coercion. Without coercion union can never be effected; without conciliation it can never be maintained. Empires without number have been formed by Alexanders and Napoleons and Tamerlanes, but unless circumstance and policy conspire to woo the peoples won, the results are ephemeral. Equally, then, survival must depend on the power to conciliate, upon a wise combination of coercion and conciliation in proportions suited to its varying circumstances. It is doubtful if the recipe can be learned otherwise than in the school of experience.

Has war done its work? No. There are parts of the world where its task seems finished. It is to be hoped that our own union will not again fall to pieces, and that no further welding of war will be needed. In western Europe national lines represent approximate adjustment to condition, and it is difficult to see how forcible change of boundaries could profit one or another. Far more significant than these approaches

to finality is the growth of group consciousness and group sympathy on the part of existing nations. To this development recent wars have powerfully contributed. Our war with Spain produced a change in our feeling toward Great Britain which was little less than revolutionary. The present war has added enormously to our mutual sympathy and has brought other countries within the penumbra of its influence. Under favourable conditions these sympathies are likely to express themselves in co-operation, and repeated co-operation tends to harden into permanent alliance and actual union, so far as matters of general interest are concerned. It is not by any means impossible that this slow triumph of the centripetal over the centrifugal forces may lead to a permanent, though loose, integration of the Anglo-Saxon world. Left to itself, such a combination would almost certainly break to pieces, to be renewed by conquest, as was our union of American states. But it is not likely to be left to itself. There is some reason to believe that, as regards relations among themselves, a number of the nations of the world have completed the probation of war.

As we move eastward in Europe the process of integration seems less and less complete. There are jealousies and antipathies in Germany which have no counterpart in France. These in turn are as nothing to the divisive forces in Austria, while in the Balkan states we have merely the raw material of nations yet to be. There is no valid reason for the separate existence of Servia and Bulgaria, yet nowhere are antipathies more bitter. The world might

coax till doomsday, and these neighbours would not forget their feud. Or if they did, it would not be till they had festered in the flesh of Europe for centuries, and poisoned and endangered its whole life. Nor would the union of these two warring states be enough. Union with South and North is a necessity of convenience, of efficiency, of peace itself. Nay, more still. Something very like the German dream of a union from the Baltic to the Persian Gulf must some day be realised. It is a sane and reasonable dream that the train that starts from London should some day dash through the Dover tunnel, on to Cologne and Munich, to Vienna and Budapest, to Belgrade and Sofia and Stamboul, on through the Bosphorus tunnel to Asia, to Bagdad and Babylon, to Nineveh and Bosrah, and the steamers that weigh anchor for India and Araby the Blest. But such a route must not be barred by meaningless boundaries or mined by local feuds. Nor will the world wait forever. It has too much at stake to wait while these folklets get over their grudges, the more so as the grudges seem to grow by exercise. Heavy hammering is still needed to forge these shapeless fragments into an instrument for the world's use.

It is no part of the writer's purpose to prescribe a remedy for war. As well prescribe a remedy for labour pains. The one pertinent inquiry is whether we can see a probable outcome. In some measure we can. There must be fewer and larger nations, larger political unities, if we are to have the territorial freedom and the full utilisation of natural facilities, short of which integration should not and will not stop.

These may be expected to take all manner of forms and to represent all manner of anomalies of organisation. There will be annexations, federations, customs unions, alliances, ententes — no matter. The essential thing will be that they represent mergers as regards these interests where division is impracticable, or involves a sacrifice of efficiency. These will not be formed spontaneously out of sympathy or perception of the advantages of co-operation. Adjustments are too irksome to be effected without constraint. They will be the result of pressure, either war with resulting conquest, or the fear of war which drives nations into an otherwise unwilling union.

Must war continue until complete unity is finally effected? Probably not. The experience of industry may here instruct us. Competition — the war of industry — continues with increasing virulence, destroying small competitors and forcing larger and larger combinations, until a certain limit has been reached when the competitors are able to put their heads together and substitute agreement for competition. But all this is impossible till the field is narrowed and the few survivors are farseeing and trustworthy. So long as there are many competitors, and of all sizes and degrees of intelligence, no live-and-let-live agreement is possible. It is war to the knife.

Similarly, war seems essential to the earlier stages of integration, and under its influence nations become fewer and larger, until a point is reached — not the logical end — where they are so large and so few that they can safely conspire for the general interest instead of scheming solely for their own. It would

be pleasant to believe that we had reached that point, but present indications do not justify so comfortable a conclusion.

Can we forecast the new cohesions which are in store? Not with much certainty or profit. It will be harmless to indulge our fancy in a matter over which we have so little control, remembering that in connections like this the wish is apt to be father of the thought. If danger threatens, two combinations seem probable, which peace would never effect. The most obvious is the combination of the Central Powers, with losses of territory if they are beaten in the present war, and with additions in the Balkans and perhaps elsewhere if they win. The continued pressure of Russia seems so certain that it is hard to believe that their union can be other than permanent. At present it is uncongenial to Austria, but that is usually the case, and argues neither the undesirability nor the impracticability of the union.

A second plausible union — under some form, no matter how loose — is that of the United States and the British Empire. Their separation was the tragedy of English history, though inevitable and wholesome in its reactions upon both. There is no possible union of major powers for which sentiment speaks so strongly, but sentiment does not form such unions, nor can it alone preserve them when formed. If the Anglo-Saxon world is ever united — a condition essential to its ultimate success — it will be through the pressure of a common danger. That pressure is likely to be forthcoming.

Will the "Allies," so called, in the present war,

effect a permanent union? It seems most unlikely. It is true that German pressure has forced the settlement of their outstanding difficulties, which were many. It is much to have reached a definite understanding. But these understandings are after all only agreements, and not by any means always harmonies of interest. Conflicts of interest between the two greatest Asiatic powers seem probable, and agreements will not protect them any more than they protected Belgium.

The case of Britain and France seems more hopeful. France is not a growing power, and her policy will not feel the pressure of a redundant population. As large possessors of colonies, both have much to defend, and as there is little to be won by aggression, however successful, they seem committed to a conservative policy. Unless the present war changes their status, both are likely to act henceforth on the defensive. As regards each other, their territories are well defined and involve little conflict of interests. Above all, both are likely to be long exposed to the same dangers and to have need of each other. Anything like a culture merger is incomparably more difficult than in the case of Britain and the United States, but Britain is less likely than any other country to ask the impossible.

It is impossible, however, for those who recognise the biological basis of national life, not to see in the mere growth of the Russian people a factor destined to change the entire alignment of the European powers. No matter what the outcome of the present war, the time will come when Germany and her ally cannot

brave both East and West. The time will almost certainly come when she cannot brave the East alone. Then the true relation of interests will reveal itself, and Germany will combine with western Europe for defence against the power whose mass makes her irresistible, and whose unripeness makes her dangerous. The essentials of such a combination will be a Teutonic unity, in which Scandinavian and Anglo-Saxon and German will be but branches from a single stem. No thought could be more abhorrent in this moment of bitter hostility, but this is but a moment.

We have already wandered far, perhaps quite beyond the limits of prudent prophecy. As we gaze farther the mists quite obscure our vision. What of Asia and South America? Is one of these vaster unities building in the Far East? Will the South American republics unite to form another? Who knows?

EPILOGUE

I WILL close this book, as I began it, with a personal plea. The first was a plea for dispassionate inquiry; this shall be a plea for passionate sympathy. I have girded myself for the stoical task of passionless survey. To all these peoples at whose fireside I have sat, I have pledged a fair hearing, both for myself and for the reader who sits with me in judgment. I have kept the faith. In these pages they all appear finite but human, precarious tenants on a soil that knows no guaranteed tenure, striving to meet the difficult conditions which shall ensure that they dwell long in the land, and shall safeguard the ideals which they value above their individual being. I have drawn the portrait of no hypocrite, no marauder, no blind slave of selfish tyranny, among all the nations. The most elementary fairness compels us to reject these foolish caricatures of national character.

But impartiality is not indifference, and in all that I have written there is not a vestige of excuse for neutrality on the part of the American people. I make no plea for armed intervention — not because it would be wrong, but because I do not know that it would be good strategy. I have no mind to discuss the attitude of our government, that straw upon the surface which is as likely to be caught by the eddy as carried by the stream. But anything like neutrality of heart

on the part of the American people at this time would argue a blindness to their own interest and an indifference to their ideals which would prove them unable and unworthy to safeguard their civilisation.

To concede the legitimacy of a people's ambition does not mean that we must give them the right way. If their ambitions are legitimate, so are ours, and those of our kin. If their aggression is but the pressure of race protoplasm, then it is sure to be both pitiless and unrelenting. We are blind with our seeing eyes, if we do not see destiny sitting in judgment upon us this day.

Let us simplify our problem, eliminating all irrelevant terms. Never mind France; there are others will mind her. Waste no time on Russia; her hour is not yet come. Ignore Japan; the yellow peril may never materialise. Fling aside Turkey, Servia, Bulgaria, the potsherds of a broken past, or the clay of a potter to come. The present hour has just one issue. Shall Germany or Britain prevail? Which of these master hands shall shape the ideals and the institutions of the future?

I will lay but little stress on the problem of relative fitness. That each has large elements of efficiency is clear. Germany and her disciple, Japan, stand for physical science. They have formulated physical laws, as revealed by science, into a régime of life which is obeyed by a docile people, as nowhere else on earth. A Japanese army on the march waits before drinking until the bacteriologist examines the water. An English bacteriologist can detect the germs as easily, but he cannot keep a British soldier from drinking. A

British soldier, or merchant, or statesman, is resourceful in emergencies, but the German knows no emergencies. All is foreseen, forecalculated, forestalled. The trajectory of a German shell is almost as calculable as the orbit of a planet. The mental trajectory of a German soldier is hardly less so. But Germany cannot calculate the orbit of feeling in a free people within a whole diameter. With all her own undoubted patriotism, she still thought she could bully the Belgian and buy the Briton, or failing that, that she could incite the Irish and intimidate the Italian and bribe the Boer. Her obtuseness to the laws of human sentiment and free volition has had no parallel in recent history, and is the perfect corollary of her engrossment in the problems of physical force. In Germany's marvellous scheme of things, the individual must take his place as does the cell in the tissue of an organism.

The British principle is utterly unlike. The social, industrial and political organisation is infinitely looser. While Germany calls a class to the colours, British ministers plead for volunteers. While the mighty Krupp mechanism grinds out its fearful grist unceasingly, and unhampered, a British statesman pleads with labour unions to allow more workers in the munition shops, a spectacle for gods and men. Light indeed is the yoke which Britain lays upon her sons.

But that yoke rests secure upon half of a restive world which would not brook a tighter rein. Coaxing may be undignified, but coaxing succeeds where coercion fails. No coercion that is within Britain's power could have held the Boer in a crisis like this

as Britain's daring conciliation has done. They have been won to loyalty while still smarting from defeat, but Alsace-Lorraine is still unreconciled to German rule, and passes on her protest from father to son. Germany boasts of her power of organisation, albeit conceding Britain's greater power of conciliation. But if we are dealing with *men*, men who still have thought and feeling in a measure unconstrained, organisation and conciliation are almost interchangeable terms. German organisation is mechanism, the organisation of passive material into an effective instrument. British organisation is the bringing of sentient beings into voluntary and efficient co-operation. The one is effective with homogeneous units powerfully subordinated in initiative and volition. The other is suited to heterogeneous and independent units who will not submit to repression of initiative and volition, or who would be fatally weakened by such repression. Germany, with all her imperialism, is the least imperially minded of all great powers. She brings to her dreams of world dominion an utterly provincial ideal.

Which will win? I do not know. Which is best? I will not say. But one thing I do know and will say. Yea, I will proclaim it from the housetops. *The British civilisation is ours.* In it we live and move and have our being. Outside it we have no future. Let no man deceive us. Let us listen to no specious sophistries about our composite people and our distinctive civilisation. We speak one language, we cherish one literature, we recognise one political principle of temperate central rule and local freedom, and

these are the language, the literature and the ideal of Britain. We know nothing of the autocracy of Germany, nothing even of the centralised democracy of France. We have millions of Germans, but we are not German. We have Scandinavians and Hungarians and Poles, but they have brought us nothing of their institutions. They were not charter members of our commonwealth. Our civilisation, like our language, is the gift of a single people, and the difference between here and there is hardly greater in civilisation than in speech. There are local differences in Australia and America, as there are in Yorkshire and Devon, but the unity is as clear in the one case as in the other.

And this civilisation will survive or perish as a unit. If it triumphs in the present struggle, we share in its triumph. The instincts which we have inherited and the institutions that we have built will stand approved, and we may expect with confidence to see them prevail. If it fails, we shall as certainly see these instincts and these institutions discredited and ultimately discarded. The unthinking optimist among us may contemptuously repudiate the menace of German invasion. That is not the question. Germany may never invade us, but Germanism will. German conscription will invade us, with German much-government and German officialism and German mechanism in its train. We shall defend ourselves against Germany in the flesh, by surrendering to Germany in the spirit.

In the face of such a possibility, how petty is our protest over the brief interruption of commercial priv-

ilege! How contemptible our murmuring because we have lost our profit on the cotton that would have furnished high explosives to destroy us! There is not a people in the present struggle that does not perceive the larger meaning of that struggle, and its bearing on their ultimate destiny. Are we alone purblind or asleep? There is not a nation from the least unto the greatest that is not freely offering its ease, its treasure and its blood in the service of its ideals. Is America alone craven?

“Then Mordecai commanded to answer Esther, Think not with thyself that thou shalt escape in the king’s house, more than all the Jews. For if thou altogether holdest thy peace at such a time, then shall there enlargement and deliverance arise to the Jews from another place; but thou and thy father’s house shall be destroyed: and who knoweth whether thou art come to the kingdom for such a time as this?”

THE END

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